Re: GNU Sharutils and security

[Bruno Haible]

> Somebody out there who wants to take over the sharutils package?

Before that, maybe it's time to split that package? uuencode and uudecode are 
occasionally
useful and can therefore be reasonably part of a distribution. However, shar 
and unshar
being a security leak by design, and being obsoleted by the addition of MIME 
attachments
to email protocols, I think shar and unshar shouldn't be installed on any Unix 
system by
default.

It's well-known that MSIE is a trojan horse and virus downloading engine, but 
in our camp
shar and unshar are similar, and we should address this issue.

Therefore, how about removing shar and unshar from the sharutils, or splitting 
sharutils
into a useful and harmless package and a separate security -killer package?

Bruno

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