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Re: [GNU/consensus] [SocialSwarm-D] Zooko's Triangle


From: elijah
Subject: Re: [GNU/consensus] [SocialSwarm-D] Zooko's Triangle
Date: Thu, 25 Jul 2013 01:37:55 -0700
User-agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:17.0) Gecko/20130623 Thunderbird/17.0.7

On 07/25/2013 01:02 AM, carlo von lynX wrote:

> So in my case the cheat is in selecting a slice of the hash?

you cannot plausibly argue that "7yuogiqxgrak36kk" is human memorable.
you are not cheating, you just don't care about one side of Zooko's
triangle.

> Tor is leading the way. Simply by spelling out 7yuogiqxgrak36kk to you
> we have a cryptographic guarantee that your tor node will connect to mine
> and only to mine.

onion addresses are a prefect example of why we need to do better. just
look at all the fake onion addresses floating around the internet for
silk road.

> So I'd say Zooko is a problem solved.

keys as identifiers are the defining example of the problem that Zooko
was illustrating with the triangle postulate. using keys as identifiers
solves nothing.

> Now it's time to provide the key instead of the domain. You're living in the 
> past, Eli.  :)

good luck with that. you might get some people to use it, until
something actually human memorable comes along, which it will.

-elijah



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