Re: Opportunistic STARTTLS in smtpmail.el

[Ted Zlatanov]

On Tue, 03 May 2011 01:36:47 +0200 Lars Magne Ingebrigtsen <address@hidden> 
wrote: 

LMI> Ted Zlatanov <address@hidden> writes:
>> There's no problem with specifying an unencrypted authinfo file for a
>> specific server+port+user (or any subset) combination, see
>> `auth-sources'.  So the authinfo line would look like this:
>> 
>> machine mysmtpserver.com login tzz password mypassword keyfile "~/.keyfile" 
>> certfile "~/.certfile"

LMI> But if you do have a ~/.authinfo.gpg, then auth-source will be opening
LMI> it just to check whether there are any mysmtpserver.com entries in
LMI> it.

Only once, then it's cached.  Plus you can specify an unencrypted file
at any point.  I really don't think this is a big deal, no more than
what happens for IMAP and NNTP.

If you insist on avoiding this file check, we could have a "Lisp data"
backend in addition to the file and Secrets backends.  That would be
pretty trivial to implement and would mirror the existing netrc parse
results structurally.

Ted