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[SCM] GNU gnutls branch, new, updated. gnutls_2_9_10-124-g0f65714
|
From: |
Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos |
|
Subject: |
[SCM] GNU gnutls branch, new, updated. gnutls_2_9_10-124-g0f65714 |
|
Date: |
Mon, 24 May 2010 14:59:14 +0000 |
This is an automated email from the git hooks/post-receive script. It was
generated because a ref change was pushed to the repository containing
the project "GNU gnutls".
http://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/gnutls.git/commit/?id=0f6571477775e596c61bf17941364b6ca1235029
The branch, new has been updated
via 0f6571477775e596c61bf17941364b6ca1235029 (commit)
via 64fe18da279969b3cd9aafb1a6c29ad87ccf5529 (commit)
via f185ecddeeedf3137ea512431cb19ee9dc7bf11f (commit)
via e86e02ffc63a052a2d13325146ef2a217a606e5c (commit)
via ae67fc67c4b6412922327b429044620ea001e6cf (commit)
from 520827b6f8a49ee9351bb12f63160a773ad46997 (commit)
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- Log -----------------------------------------------------------------
commit 0f6571477775e596c61bf17941364b6ca1235029
Author: Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos <address@hidden>
Date: Mon May 24 16:58:31 2010 +0200
Added a modified pakchois library (to open arbitrary pkcs11 modules).
Current gnutls works only with this one.
commit 64fe18da279969b3cd9aafb1a6c29ad87ccf5529
Author: Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos <address@hidden>
Date: Mon May 24 16:58:27 2010 +0200
Added missing file.
commit f185ecddeeedf3137ea512431cb19ee9dc7bf11f
Author: Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos <address@hidden>
Date: Mon May 24 09:10:49 2010 +0200
Removed finished items.
commit e86e02ffc63a052a2d13325146ef2a217a606e5c
Author: Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos <address@hidden>
Date: Mon May 24 09:08:05 2010 +0200
Noted that there things to be done.
commit ae67fc67c4b6412922327b429044620ea001e6cf
Author: Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos <address@hidden>
Date: Mon May 24 09:07:50 2010 +0200
Added documentation on abstract types.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Summary of changes:
doc/Makefile.am | 6 +-
doc/TODO | 4 -
doc/cha-cert-auth.texi | 307 ++++++-----
doc/cha-gtls-app.texi | 495 +++++++++++++++++
lib/Makefile.am | 8 +-
lib/configure.ac | 17 -
lib/m4/hooks.m4 | 29 +
lib/pakchois/errors.c | 146 +++++
lib/pakchois/pakchois.c | 982 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
lib/pakchois/pakchois.h | 361 ++++++++++++
lib/pakchois/pakchois11.h | 1357 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
lib/pkcs11_write.c | 19 +-
12 files changed, 3570 insertions(+), 161 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 doc/cha-gtls-app.texi
create mode 100644 lib/pakchois/errors.c
create mode 100644 lib/pakchois/pakchois.c
create mode 100644 lib/pakchois/pakchois.h
create mode 100644 lib/pakchois/pakchois11.h
diff --git a/doc/Makefile.am b/doc/Makefile.am
index b474ab8..9d4c547 100644
--- a/doc/Makefile.am
+++ b/doc/Makefile.am
@@ -30,7 +30,11 @@ SUBDIRS += reference
endif
info_TEXINFOS = gnutls.texi
-gnutls_TEXINFOS = gnutls.texi fdl-1.3.texi lgpl-2.1.texi gpl-3.0.texi
+gnutls_TEXINFOS = gnutls.texi fdl-1.3.texi lgpl-2.1.texi gpl-3.0.texi \
+ cha-auth.texi cha-bib.texi cha-cert-auth.texi cha-ciphersuites.texi \
+ cha-copying.texi cha-functions.texi cha-gtls-app.texi \
+ cha-internals.texi cha-intro-tls.texi cha-library.texi \
+ cha-preface.texi cha-programs.texi cha-tls-app.texi
# Examples.
gnutls_TEXINFOS += examples/ex-client1.c examples/ex-client2.c \
diff --git a/doc/TODO b/doc/TODO
index d561d57..7d7360d 100644
--- a/doc/TODO
+++ b/doc/TODO
@@ -5,7 +5,6 @@ in order to avoid having people working on the same thing.
Current list:
+ Support PKCS#8 AES and DES-MD5 (tests/enc3pkcs8.pem) encrypted keys.
* Implement Datagram-TLS (DTLS).
-* Correct TLS 1.2 support.
* Cleanup pkix.asn and remove unused (by the certificate api) structures.
That way memory used will be reduced.
* Improve or rewrite libtasn1 to make it easier to maintain.
@@ -24,8 +23,6 @@ Current list:
- Clean up name space of helper functions in library (memmem,
firstElement, bit_mask, ...) for platforms that libtool's
-export-symbols-regex doesn't work.
-- Allow sending V2 Hello messages. It seems that some (old) broken
- implementations require that.
- Add Kerberos ciphersuites
- Certificate chain validation improvements:
- Implement "correct" DN comparison (instead of memcmp).
@@ -40,7 +37,6 @@ Current list:
- Check path length constraints.
- Check keyCertSign key usages.
- Reject extensions in v1 certificates.
-- Support for cryptodev (and thus hardware accelerators)
- Exhaustive test suite, using NIST's PKI Test vectors,
see http://csrc.nist.gov/pki/testing/x509paths_old.html
and http://csrc.nist.gov/pki/testing/x509paths.html
diff --git a/doc/cha-cert-auth.texi b/doc/cha-cert-auth.texi
index 7b76857..9843a2c 100644
--- a/doc/cha-cert-auth.texi
+++ b/doc/cha-cert-auth.texi
@@ -6,8 +6,9 @@
@menu
* The X.509 trust model::
* The OpenPGP trust model::
-* Digital signatures::
* PKCS #11 tokens::
+* Abstract data types::
+* Digital signatures::
@end menu
@node The X.509 trust model
@@ -317,123 +318,6 @@ MD5. These algorithms have been broken and should not be
trusted.
@end table
address@hidden Digital signatures
address@hidden Digital Signatures
address@hidden Digital signatures
-
-In this section we will provide some information about digital
-signatures, how they work, and give the rationale for disabling some
-of the algorithms used.
-
-Digital signatures work by using somebody's secret key to sign some
-arbitrary data. Then anybody else could use the public key of that
-person to verify the signature. Since the data may be arbitrary it is
-not suitable input to a cryptographic digital signature algorithm. For
-this reason and also for performance cryptographic hash algorithms are
-used to preprocess the input to the signature algorithm. This works as
-long as it is difficult enough to generate two different messages with
-the same hash algorithm output. In that case the same signature could
-be used as a proof for both messages. Nobody wants to sign an innocent
-message of donating 1 @euro{} to Greenpeace and find out that he
-donated 1.000.000 @euro{} to Bad Inc.
-
-For a hash algorithm to be called cryptographic the following three
-requirements must hold:
-
address@hidden
address@hidden Preimage resistance.
-That means the algorithm must be one way and given the output of the
-hash function @math{H(x)}, it is impossible to calculate @math{x}.
-
address@hidden 2nd preimage resistance.
-That means that given a pair @math{x,y} with @math{y=H(x)} it is
-impossible to calculate an @math{x'} such that @math{y=H(x')}.
-
address@hidden Collision resistance.
-That means that it is impossible to calculate random @math{x} and
address@hidden'} such @math{H(x')=H(x)}.
address@hidden enumerate
-
-The last two requirements in the list are the most important in
-digital signatures. These protect against somebody who would like to
-generate two messages with the same hash output. When an algorithm is
-considered broken usually it means that the Collision resistance of
-the algorithm is less than brute force. Using the birthday paradox the
-brute force attack takes
address@hidden
address@hidden(\rm{hash\ size}) / 2}}
address@hidden iftex
address@hidden
address@hidden((hash size) / 2)}}
address@hidden ifnottex
-operations. Today colliding certificates using the MD5 hash algorithm
-have been generated as shown in @xcite{WEGER}.
-
-There has been cryptographic results for the SHA-1 hash algorithms as
-well, although they are not yet critical. Before 2004, MD5 had a
-presumed collision strength of @math{2^{64}}, but it has been showed
-to have a collision strength well under @math{2^{50}}. As of November
-2005, it is believed that SHA-1's collision strength is around
address@hidden We consider this sufficiently hard so that we still
-support SHA-1. We anticipate that SHA-256/386/512 will be used in
-publicly-distributed certificates in the future. When @math{2^{63}}
-can be considered too weak compared to the computer power available
-sometime in the future, SHA-1 will be disabled as well. The collision
-attacks on SHA-1 may also get better, given the new interest in tools
-for creating them.
-
address@hidden Trading Security for Interoperability
-
-If you connect to a server and use GnuTLS' functions to verify the
-certificate chain, and get a @ref{GNUTLS_CERT_INSECURE_ALGORITHM}
-validation error (@pxref{Verifying X.509 certificate paths}), it means
-that somewhere in the certificate chain there is a certificate signed
-using @code{RSA-MD2} or @code{RSA-MD5}. These two digital signature
-algorithms are considered broken, so GnuTLS fail when attempting to
-verify the certificate. In some situations, it may be useful to be
-able to verify the certificate chain anyway, assuming an attacker did
-not utilize the fact that these signatures algorithms are broken.
-This section will give help on how to achieve that.
-
-First, it is important to know that you do not have to enable any of
-the flags discussed here to be able to use trusted root CA
-certificates signed using @code{RSA-MD2} or @code{RSA-MD5}. The only
-attack today is that it is possible to generate certificates with
-colliding signatures (collision resistance); you cannot generate a
-certificate that has the same signature as an already existing
-signature (2nd preimage resistance).
-
-If you are using @ref{gnutls_certificate_verify_peers2} to verify the
-certificate chain, you can call
address@hidden with the
address@hidden or
address@hidden flag, as in:
-
address@hidden
- gnutls_certificate_set_verify_flags (x509cred,
- GNUTLS_VERIFY_ALLOW_SIGN_RSA_MD5);
address@hidden example
-
-This will tell the verifier algorithm to enable @code{RSA-MD5} when
-verifying the certificates.
-
-If you are using @ref{gnutls_x509_crt_verify} or
address@hidden, you can pass the
address@hidden parameter directly in the
address@hidden parameter.
-
-If you are using these flags, it may also be a good idea to warn the
-user when verification failure occur for this reason. The simplest is
-to not use the flags by default, and only fall back to using them
-after warning the user. If you wish to inspect the certificate chain
-yourself, you can use @ref{gnutls_certificate_get_peers} to extract
-the raw server's certificate chain, then use
address@hidden to parse each of the certificates, and
-then use @ref{gnutls_x509_crt_get_signature_algorithm} to find out the
-signing algorithm used for each certificate. If any of the
-intermediary certificates are using @code{GNUTLS_SIGN_RSA_MD2} or
address@hidden, you could present a warning.
-
@node PKCS #11 tokens
@section @acronym{PKCS #11} tokens
@@ -563,29 +447,29 @@ unsigned int obj_list_size = 0;
gnutls_datum_t cinfo;
int i;
- crt_list_size = 0;
- ret = gnutls_pkcs11_obj_list_import_url( crt_list, NULL, url, \
+ obj_list_size = 0;
+ ret = gnutls_pkcs11_obj_list_import_url( obj_list, NULL, url, \
GNUTLS_PKCS11_OBJ_ATTR_CRT_WITH_PRIVKEY);
if (ret < 0 && ret != GNUTLS_E_SHORT_MEMORY_BUFFER)
exit(1);
- crt_list = malloc(sizeof(*crt_list)*crt_list_size);
- if (crt_list == NULL)
+ obj_list = malloc(sizeof(*obj_list)*obj_list_size);
+ if (obj_list == NULL)
exit(1);
- ret = gnutls_pkcs11_obj_list_import_url( crt_list, &crt_list_size, url,
flags);
+ ret = gnutls_pkcs11_obj_list_import_url( obj_list, &obj_list_size, url,
flags);
if (ret < 0)
exit(1);
- /* now all certificates are in crt_list */
+ /* now all certificates are in obj_list */
- for (i=0;i<crt_list_size;i++) {
+ for (i=0;i<obj_list_size;i++) {
ret = gnutls_x509_crt_init(&xcrt);
if (ret < 0)
exit(1);
- ret = gnutls_x509_crt_import_pkcs11(xcrt, crt_list[i]);
+ ret = gnutls_x509_crt_import_pkcs11(xcrt, obj_list[i]);
if (ret < 0)
exit(1);
@@ -619,8 +503,173 @@ to a token. This can be achieved with the following
functions
@subsection Using a @acronym{PKCS #11} token with TLS
-This example will demonstrate how to load keys and certificates
-from a @acronym{PKCS} #11 token, and use it with a TLS connection.
+It is possible to use a @acronym{PKCS #11} token to a TLS
+session, as shown in @ref{ex:pkcs11-client}. In addition
+the following functions can be used to load PKCS #11 key and
+certificates.
+
address@hidden
+
address@hidden @ref{gnutls_certificate_set_x509_trust_file}: If given a PKCS
#11 URL will load the trusted certificates from it.
+
address@hidden @ref{gnutls_certificate_set_x509_key_file}: Will also load PKCS
#11 URLs for keys and certificates.
+
address@hidden itemize
+
+
address@hidden Abstract data types
address@hidden Abstract data types
address@hidden:abstract}
address@hidden Abstract types
address@hidden examples/ex-cert-select-pkcs11.c
+Since there are many forms of a public or private keys supported by
@acronym{GnuTLS} such as
address@hidden, @acronym{OpenPGP}, or @acronym{PKCS #11} it is desirable to
allow common operations
+on them. For these reasons the abstract @code{gnutls_privkey_t} and
@code{gnutls_pubkey_t} were
+introduced in @code{gnutls/abstract.h} header. Those types are initialized
using a specific type of key and then can be used to
+perform operations in an abstract way. For example in order for someone to
sign an X.509 certificate
+with a key that resides in a smart he has to follow the steps below:
+
address@hidden
+#inlude <gnutls/abstract.h>
+#inlude <gnutls/pkcs11.h>
+
+void sign_cert( gnutls_x509_crt_t to_be_signed)
+{
+gnutls_pkcs11_privkey_t ca_key;
+gnutls_x509_crt_t ca_cert;
+gnutls_privkey_t abs_key;
+
+ /* load the PKCS 11 key and certificates */
+ gnutls_pkcs11_privkey_init(&ca_key);
+ gnutls_pkcs11_privkey_import_url(ca_key, key_url);
+
+ gnutls_x509_crt_init(&ca_cert);
+ gnutls_x509_crt_import_pkcs11_url(&ca_cert, cert_url);
+
+ /* initialize the abstract key */
+ gnutls_privkey_init(&abs_key);
+ gnutls_privkey_import_pkcs11(abs_key, ca_key);
+
+ /* sign the certificate to be signed */
+ gnutls_x509_crt_privkey_sign(to_be_signed, ca_cert, ca_key,
GNUTLS_DIG_SHA1, 0);
+}
address@hidden verbatim
+
+
address@hidden Digital signatures
address@hidden Digital Signatures
address@hidden Digital signatures
+
+In this section we will provide some information about digital
+signatures, how they work, and give the rationale for disabling some
+of the algorithms used.
+
+Digital signatures work by using somebody's secret key to sign some
+arbitrary data. Then anybody else could use the public key of that
+person to verify the signature. Since the data may be arbitrary it is
+not suitable input to a cryptographic digital signature algorithm. For
+this reason and also for performance cryptographic hash algorithms are
+used to preprocess the input to the signature algorithm. This works as
+long as it is difficult enough to generate two different messages with
+the same hash algorithm output. In that case the same signature could
+be used as a proof for both messages. Nobody wants to sign an innocent
+message of donating 1 @euro{} to Greenpeace and find out that he
+donated 1.000.000 @euro{} to Bad Inc.
+
+For a hash algorithm to be called cryptographic the following three
+requirements must hold:
+
address@hidden
address@hidden Preimage resistance.
+That means the algorithm must be one way and given the output of the
+hash function @math{H(x)}, it is impossible to calculate @math{x}.
+
address@hidden 2nd preimage resistance.
+That means that given a pair @math{x,y} with @math{y=H(x)} it is
+impossible to calculate an @math{x'} such that @math{y=H(x')}.
+
address@hidden Collision resistance.
+That means that it is impossible to calculate random @math{x} and
address@hidden'} such @math{H(x')=H(x)}.
address@hidden enumerate
+
+The last two requirements in the list are the most important in
+digital signatures. These protect against somebody who would like to
+generate two messages with the same hash output. When an algorithm is
+considered broken usually it means that the Collision resistance of
+the algorithm is less than brute force. Using the birthday paradox the
+brute force attack takes
address@hidden
address@hidden(\rm{hash\ size}) / 2}}
address@hidden iftex
address@hidden
address@hidden((hash size) / 2)}}
address@hidden ifnottex
+operations. Today colliding certificates using the MD5 hash algorithm
+have been generated as shown in @xcite{WEGER}.
+
+There has been cryptographic results for the SHA-1 hash algorithms as
+well, although they are not yet critical. Before 2004, MD5 had a
+presumed collision strength of @math{2^{64}}, but it has been showed
+to have a collision strength well under @math{2^{50}}. As of November
+2005, it is believed that SHA-1's collision strength is around
address@hidden We consider this sufficiently hard so that we still
+support SHA-1. We anticipate that SHA-256/386/512 will be used in
+publicly-distributed certificates in the future. When @math{2^{63}}
+can be considered too weak compared to the computer power available
+sometime in the future, SHA-1 will be disabled as well. The collision
+attacks on SHA-1 may also get better, given the new interest in tools
+for creating them.
+
address@hidden Trading Security for Interoperability
+
+If you connect to a server and use GnuTLS' functions to verify the
+certificate chain, and get a @ref{GNUTLS_CERT_INSECURE_ALGORITHM}
+validation error (@pxref{Verifying X.509 certificate paths}), it means
+that somewhere in the certificate chain there is a certificate signed
+using @code{RSA-MD2} or @code{RSA-MD5}. These two digital signature
+algorithms are considered broken, so GnuTLS fail when attempting to
+verify the certificate. In some situations, it may be useful to be
+able to verify the certificate chain anyway, assuming an attacker did
+not utilize the fact that these signatures algorithms are broken.
+This section will give help on how to achieve that.
+
+First, it is important to know that you do not have to enable any of
+the flags discussed here to be able to use trusted root CA
+certificates signed using @code{RSA-MD2} or @code{RSA-MD5}. The only
+attack today is that it is possible to generate certificates with
+colliding signatures (collision resistance); you cannot generate a
+certificate that has the same signature as an already existing
+signature (2nd preimage resistance).
+
+If you are using @ref{gnutls_certificate_verify_peers2} to verify the
+certificate chain, you can call
address@hidden with the
address@hidden or
address@hidden flag, as in:
+
address@hidden
+ gnutls_certificate_set_verify_flags (x509cred,
+ GNUTLS_VERIFY_ALLOW_SIGN_RSA_MD5);
address@hidden example
+
+This will tell the verifier algorithm to enable @code{RSA-MD5} when
+verifying the certificates.
+
+If you are using @ref{gnutls_x509_crt_verify} or
address@hidden, you can pass the
address@hidden parameter directly in the
address@hidden parameter.
+
+If you are using these flags, it may also be a good idea to warn the
+user when verification failure occur for this reason. The simplest is
+to not use the flags by default, and only fall back to using them
+after warning the user. If you wish to inspect the certificate chain
+yourself, you can use @ref{gnutls_certificate_get_peers} to extract
+the raw server's certificate chain, then use
address@hidden to parse each of the certificates, and
+then use @ref{gnutls_x509_crt_get_signature_algorithm} to find out the
+signing algorithm used for each certificate. If any of the
+intermediary certificates are using @code{GNUTLS_SIGN_RSA_MD2} or
address@hidden, you could present a warning.
diff --git a/doc/cha-gtls-app.texi b/doc/cha-gtls-app.texi
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4676802
--- /dev/null
+++ b/doc/cha-gtls-app.texi
@@ -0,0 +1,495 @@
address@hidden How to use GnuTLS in applications
address@hidden How To Use @acronym{GnuTLS} in Applications
address@hidden
address@hidden Example programs
+
address@hidden
+* Preparation::
+* Multi-threaded applications::
+* Client examples::
+* Server examples::
+* Miscellaneous examples::
+* Compatibility with the OpenSSL library::
+* Opaque PRF Input TLS Extension::
+* Keying Material Exporters::
address@hidden menu
+
address@hidden Preparation
address@hidden Preparation
+
+To use @acronym{GnuTLS}, you have to perform some changes to your
+sources and your build system. The necessary changes are explained in
+the following subsections.
+
address@hidden
+* Headers::
+* Initialization::
+* Version check::
+* Debugging::
+* Building the source::
address@hidden menu
+
address@hidden Headers
address@hidden Headers
+
+All the data types and functions of the @acronym{GnuTLS} library are
+defined in the header file @file{gnutls/gnutls.h}. This must be
+included in all programs that make use of the @acronym{GnuTLS}
+library.
+
+The extra functionality of the @acronym{GnuTLS-extra} library is
+available by including the header file @file{gnutls/extra.h} in your
+programs.
+
address@hidden Initialization
address@hidden Initialization
+
+GnuTLS must be initialized before it can be used. The library is
+initialized by calling @ref{gnutls_global_init}. The resources
+allocated by the initialization process can be released if the
+application no longer has a need to call GnuTLS functions, this is
+done by calling @ref{gnutls_global_deinit}.
+
+The extra functionality of the @acronym{GnuTLS-extra} library is
+available after calling @ref{gnutls_global_init_extra}.
+
+In order to take advantage of the internationalisation features in
+GnuTLS, such as translated error messages, the application must set
+the current locale using @code{setlocale} before initializing GnuTLS.
+
address@hidden Version check
address@hidden Version Check
+
+It is often desirable to check that the version of `gnutls' used is
+indeed one which fits all requirements. Even with binary
+compatibility new features may have been introduced but due to problem
+with the dynamic linker an old version is actually used. So you may
+want to check that the version is okay right after program startup.
+See the function @ref{gnutls_check_version}.
+
address@hidden Debugging
address@hidden Debugging
+
+In many cases things may not go as expected and further information,
+to assist debugging, from @acronym{GnuTLS} is desired. Those are the
+case where the @ref{gnutls_global_set_log_level} and
address@hidden are to be used. Those will print
+verbose information on the @acronym{GnuTLS} functions internal flow.
+
address@hidden Building the source
address@hidden Building the Source
+
+If you want to compile a source file including the
address@hidden/gnutls.h} header file, you must make sure that the
+compiler can find it in the directory hierarchy. This is accomplished
+by adding the path to the directory in which the header file is
+located to the compilers include file search path (via the @option{-I}
+option).
+
+However, the path to the include file is determined at the time the
+source is configured. To solve this problem, the library uses the
+external package @command{pkg-config} that knows the path to the
+include file and other configuration options. The options that need
+to be added to the compiler invocation at compile time are output by
+the @option{--cflags} option to @command{pkg-config gnutls}. The
+following example shows how it can be used at the command line:
+
address@hidden
+gcc -c foo.c `pkg-config gnutls --cflags`
address@hidden example
+
+Adding the output of @samp{pkg-config gnutls --cflags} to the
+compilers command line will ensure that the compiler can find the
address@hidden/gnutls.h} header file.
+
+A similar problem occurs when linking the program with the library.
+Again, the compiler has to find the library files. For this to work,
+the path to the library files has to be added to the library search
+path (via the @option{-L} option). For this, the option
address@hidden to @command{pkg-config gnutls} can be used. For
+convenience, this option also outputs all other options that are
+required to link the program with the libarary (for instance, the
address@hidden option). The example shows how to link @file{foo.o}
+with the library to a program @command{foo}.
+
address@hidden
+gcc -o foo foo.o `pkg-config gnutls --libs`
address@hidden example
+
+Of course you can also combine both examples to a single command by
+specifying both options to @command{pkg-config}:
+
address@hidden
+gcc -o foo foo.c `pkg-config gnutls --cflags --libs`
address@hidden example
+
address@hidden Multi-threaded applications
address@hidden Multi-Threaded Applications
+
+Although the @acronym{GnuTLS} library is thread safe by design, some
+parts of Libgcrypt, such as the random generator, are not.
+Applications have to register callback functions to ensure proper
+locking in the sensitive parts of @emph{libgcrypt}.
+
+There are helper macros to help you properly initialize the libraries.
+Examples are shown below.
+
address@hidden
+
address@hidden POSIX threads
address@hidden
+#include <gnutls.h>
+#include <gcrypt.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <pthread.h>
+GCRY_THREAD_OPTION_PTHREAD_IMPL;
+
+int main()
address@hidden
+ /* The order matters.
+ */
+ gcry_control (GCRYCTL_SET_THREAD_CBS, &gcry_threads_pthread);
+ gnutls_global_init();
address@hidden
address@hidden example
+
address@hidden GNU PTH threads
address@hidden
+#include <gnutls.h>
+#include <gcrypt.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <pth.h>
+GCRY_THREAD_OPTION_PTH_IMPL;
+
+int main()
address@hidden
+ gcry_control (GCRYCTL_SET_THREAD_CBS, &gcry_threads_pth);
+ gnutls_global_init();
address@hidden
address@hidden example
+
address@hidden Other thread packages
address@hidden
+/* The gcry_thread_cbs structure must have been
+ * initialized.
+ */
+static struct gcry_thread_cbs gcry_threads_other = @{ ... @};
+
+int main()
address@hidden
+ gcry_control (GCRYCTL_SET_THREAD_CBS, &gcry_threads_other);
address@hidden
address@hidden example
address@hidden itemize
+
address@hidden Client examples
address@hidden Client Examples
+
+This section contains examples of @acronym{TLS} and @acronym{SSL}
+clients, using @acronym{GnuTLS}. Note that these examples contain
+little or no error checking. Some of the examples require functions
+implemented by another example.
+
address@hidden
+* Simple client example with anonymous authentication::
+* Simple client example with X.509 certificate support::
+* Obtaining session information::
+* Verifying peer's certificate::
+* Using a callback to select the certificate to use::
+* Client using a PKCS #11 token with TLS::
+* Client with Resume capability example::
+* Simple client example with SRP authentication::
+* Simple client example with TLS/IA support::
+* Simple client example in C++::
+* Helper function for TCP connections::
address@hidden menu
+
address@hidden Simple client example with anonymous authentication
address@hidden Simple Client Example with Anonymous Authentication
+
+The simplest client using TLS is the one that doesn't do any
+authentication. This means no external certificates or passwords are
+needed to set up the connection. As could be expected, the connection
+is vulnerable to man-in-the-middle (active or redirection) attacks.
+However, the data is integrity and privacy protected.
+
address@hidden examples/ex-client1.c
+
address@hidden Simple client example with X.509 certificate support
address@hidden Simple Client Example with @acronym{X.509} Certificate Support
+
+Let's assume now that we want to create a TCP client which
+communicates with servers that use @acronym{X.509} or
address@hidden certificate authentication. The following client is
+a very simple @acronym{TLS} client, it does not support session
+resuming, not even certificate verification. The TCP functions defined
+in this example are used in most of the other examples below, without
+redefining them.
+
address@hidden examples/ex-client2.c
+
address@hidden Obtaining session information
address@hidden Obtaining Session Information
+
+Most of the times it is desirable to know the security properties of
+the current established session. This includes the underlying ciphers
+and the protocols involved. That is the purpose of the following
+function. Note that this function will print meaningful values only
+if called after a successful @ref{gnutls_handshake}.
+
address@hidden examples/ex-session-info.c
+
address@hidden Verifying peer's certificate
address@hidden Verifying Peer's Certificate
address@hidden:verify}
+
+A @acronym{TLS} session is not secure just after the handshake
+procedure has finished. It must be considered secure, only after the
+peer's certificate and identity have been verified. That is, you have
+to verify the signature in peer's certificate, the hostname in the
+certificate, and expiration dates. Just after this step you should
+treat the connection as being a secure one.
+
address@hidden examples/ex-rfc2818.c
+
+An other example is listed below which provides a more detailed
+verification output.
+
address@hidden examples/ex-verify.c
+
address@hidden Using a callback to select the certificate to use
address@hidden Using a Callback to Select the Certificate to Use
+
+There are cases where a client holds several certificate and key
+pairs, and may not want to load all of them in the credentials
+structure. The following example demonstrates the use of the
+certificate selection callback.
+
address@hidden examples/ex-cert-select.c
+
+
address@hidden Client using a PKCS #11 token with TLS
address@hidden Using a @acronym{PKCS #11} token with TLS
address@hidden:pkcs11-client}
+
+This example will demonstrate how to load keys and certificates
+from a @acronym{PKCS} #11 token, and use it with a TLS connection.
+
address@hidden examples/ex-cert-select-pkcs11.c
+
+
address@hidden Client with Resume capability example
address@hidden Client with Resume Capability Example
address@hidden:resume-client}
+
+This is a modification of the simple client example. Here we
+demonstrate the use of session resumption. The client tries to connect
+once using @acronym{TLS}, close the connection and then try to
+establish a new connection using the previously negotiated data.
+
address@hidden examples/ex-client-resume.c
+
+
address@hidden Simple client example with SRP authentication
address@hidden Simple Client Example with @acronym{SRP} Authentication
+
+The following client is a very simple @acronym{SRP} @acronym{TLS}
+client which connects to a server and authenticates using a
address@hidden and a @emph{password}. The server may authenticate
+itself using a certificate, and in that case it has to be verified.
+
address@hidden examples/ex-client-srp.c
+
address@hidden Simple client example with TLS/IA support
address@hidden Simple Client Example with @acronym{TLS/IA} Support
+
+The following client is a simple client which uses the
address@hidden/IA} extension to authenticate with the server.
+
address@hidden examples/ex-client-tlsia.c
+
address@hidden Simple client example in C++
address@hidden Simple Client Example using the C++ API
+
+The following client is a simple example of a client client utilizing
+the GnuTLS C++ API.
+
address@hidden examples/ex-cxx.cpp
+
address@hidden Helper function for TCP connections
address@hidden Helper Function for TCP Connections
+
+This helper function abstracts away TCP connection handling from the
+other examples. It is required to build some examples.
+
address@hidden examples/tcp.c
+
address@hidden Server examples
address@hidden Server Examples
+
+This section contains examples of @acronym{TLS} and @acronym{SSL}
+servers, using @acronym{GnuTLS}.
+
address@hidden
+* Echo Server with X.509 authentication::
+* Echo Server with X.509 authentication II::
+* Echo Server with OpenPGP authentication::
+* Echo Server with SRP authentication::
+* Echo Server with anonymous authentication::
address@hidden menu
+
address@hidden Echo Server with X.509 authentication
address@hidden Echo Server with @acronym{X.509} Authentication
+
+This example is a very simple echo server which supports
address@hidden authentication, using the RSA ciphersuites.
+
address@hidden examples/ex-serv1.c
+
address@hidden Echo Server with X.509 authentication II
address@hidden Echo Server with @acronym{X.509} Authentication II
+
+The following example is a server which supports @acronym{X.509}
+authentication. This server supports the export-grade cipher suites,
+the DHE ciphersuites and session resuming.
+
address@hidden examples/ex-serv-export.c
+
address@hidden Echo Server with OpenPGP authentication
address@hidden Echo Server with @acronym{OpenPGP} Authentication
address@hidden @acronym{OpenPGP} Server
+
+The following example is an echo server which supports
address@hidden@acronym{OpenPGP}} key authentication. You can easily combine
+this functionality ---that is have a server that supports both
address@hidden and @acronym{OpenPGP} certificates--- but we separated
+them to keep these examples as simple as possible.
+
address@hidden examples/ex-serv-pgp.c
+
address@hidden Echo Server with SRP authentication
address@hidden Echo Server with @acronym{SRP} Authentication
+
+This is a server which supports @acronym{SRP} authentication. It is
+also possible to combine this functionality with a certificate
+server. Here it is separate for simplicity.
+
address@hidden examples/ex-serv-srp.c
+
address@hidden Echo Server with anonymous authentication
address@hidden Echo Server with Anonymous Authentication
+
+This example server support anonymous authentication, and could be
+used to serve the example client for anonymous authentication.
+
address@hidden examples/ex-serv-anon.c
+
address@hidden Miscellaneous examples
address@hidden Miscellaneous Examples
+
address@hidden
+* Checking for an alert::
+* X.509 certificate parsing example::
+* Certificate request generation::
+* PKCS #12 structure generation::
address@hidden menu
+
address@hidden Checking for an alert
address@hidden Checking for an Alert
+
+This is a function that checks if an alert has been received in the
+current session.
+
address@hidden examples/ex-alert.c
+
address@hidden X.509 certificate parsing example
address@hidden @acronym{X.509} Certificate Parsing Example
address@hidden:x509-info}
+
+To demonstrate the @acronym{X.509} parsing capabilities an example program is
+listed below. That program reads the peer's certificate, and prints
+information about it.
+
address@hidden examples/ex-x509-info.c
+
address@hidden Certificate request generation
address@hidden Certificate Request Generation
address@hidden:crq}
+
+The following example is about generating a certificate request, and a
+private key. A certificate request can be later be processed by a CA,
+which should return a signed certificate.
+
address@hidden examples/ex-crq.c
+
address@hidden PKCS #12 structure generation
address@hidden @acronym{PKCS} #12 Structure Generation
address@hidden:pkcs12}
+
+The following example is about generating a @acronym{PKCS} #12
+structure.
+
address@hidden examples/ex-pkcs12.c
+
address@hidden Compatibility with the OpenSSL library
address@hidden Compatibility with the OpenSSL Library
address@hidden OpenSSL
+
+To ease @acronym{GnuTLS}' integration with existing applications, a
+compatibility layer with the widely used OpenSSL library is included
+in the @code{gnutls-openssl} library. This compatibility layer is not
+complete and it is not intended to completely reimplement the OpenSSL
+API with @acronym{GnuTLS}. It only provides source-level
+compatibility. There is currently no attempt to make it
+binary-compatible with OpenSSL.
+
+The prototypes for the compatibility functions are in the
address@hidden/openssl.h} header file.
+
+Current limitations imposed by the compatibility layer include:
+
address@hidden
+
address@hidden Error handling is not thread safe.
+
address@hidden itemize
+
address@hidden Opaque PRF Input TLS Extension
address@hidden Opaque PRF Input TLS Extension
address@hidden Opaque PRF Input
+
+GnuTLS supports the Opaque PRF Input TLS extension
+(@code{draft-rescorla-tls-opaque-prf-input-00.txt}). The API consists
+of one API for use in the client, @ref{gnutls_oprfi_enable_client},
+and one API for use in the server, @ref{gnutls_oprfi_enable_server}.
+You must invoke both functions before calling @ref{gnutls_handshake}.
+The server utilizes a callback function into the application. The
+callback can look at the random string provided by the client, and
+also set the server string. The string lengths must be equal
+according to the protocol.
+
address@hidden Keying Material Exporters
address@hidden Keying Material Exporters
address@hidden Keying Material Exporters
address@hidden Exporting Keying Material
+
+The TLS PRF can be used by other protocols to derive data. The API to
+use is @ref{gnutls_prf}. The function needs to be provided with the
+label in the parameter @code{label}, and the extra data to mix in the
address@hidden parameter. Depending on whether you want to mix in the
+client or server random data first, you can set the
address@hidden parameter.
+
+For example, after establishing a TLS session using
address@hidden, you can invoke the TLS PRF with this call:
+
address@hidden
+#define MYLABEL "EXPORTER-FOO"
+#define MYCONTEXT "some context data"
+char out[32];
+rc = gnutls_prf (session, strlen (MYLABEL), MYLABEL, 0,
+ strlen (MYCONTEXT), MYCONTEXT, 32, out);
address@hidden smallexample
+
+If you don't want to mix in the client/server random, there is a more
+low-level TLS PRF interface called @ref{gnutls_prf_raw}.
diff --git a/lib/Makefile.am b/lib/Makefile.am
index 0ccb5e0..fc1ef17 100644
--- a/lib/Makefile.am
+++ b/lib/Makefile.am
@@ -84,6 +84,7 @@ COBJECTS = gnutls_record.c gnutls_compress.c debug.c
gnutls_cipher.c \
crypto-api.c ext_safe_renegotiation.c gnutls_privkey.c \
pkcs11.c pkcs11_privkey.c gnutls_pubkey.c pkcs11_write.c
+
if ENABLE_NETTLE
SUBDIRS += nettle
else
@@ -111,6 +112,11 @@ HFILES = debug.h gnutls_compress.h gnutls_cipher.h
gnutls_buffers.h \
ext_session_ticket.h ext_signature.h gnutls_cryptodev.h \
ext_safe_renegotiation.h
+if ENABLE_LOCAL_PAKCHOIS
+COBJECTS+=pakchois/pakchois.c pakchois/errors.c
+HFILES+=pakchois/pakchois.h pakchois/pakchois11.h
+endif
+
# Separate so we can create the documentation
libgnutls_la_SOURCES = $(HFILES) $(COBJECTS) $(SRP_COBJECTS) \
@@ -140,9 +146,7 @@ else
libgnutls_la_LDFLAGS += $(LTLIBTASN1)
endif
-if ENABLE_PAKCHOIS
libgnutls_la_LDFLAGS += $(LTLIBPAKCHOIS)
-endif
if ENABLE_NETTLE
libgnutls_la_LDFLAGS += $(LTLIBNETTLE) -lgmp -lpthread -lhogweed
diff --git a/lib/configure.ac b/lib/configure.ac
index a372b89..35fa0d4 100644
--- a/lib/configure.ac
+++ b/lib/configure.ac
@@ -79,23 +79,6 @@ else
AC_MSG_RESULT(no)
fi
-AC_ARG_WITH(pakchois, AS_HELP_STRING([--without-pakchois],
- [disable pakchois PKCS11 support]),
- ac_pakchois=$withval, ac_pakchois=yes)
-AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether to include pakchois PKCS11 support])
-if test x$ac_pakchois != xno; then
- AC_MSG_RESULT(yes)
- AC_LIB_HAVE_LINKFLAGS(pakchois,, [#include <pakchois/pakchois.h>],
[pakchois_module_load(0,0);])
- if test "$ac_cv_libpakchois" != yes; then
- AC_MSG_ERROR(
-***
-*** Pakchois was not found. This is required for PKCS11 support.)
- fi
-else
- AC_MSG_RESULT(no)
-fi
-AM_CONDITIONAL(ENABLE_PAKCHOIS, test "$ac_cv_libpakchois" = "yes")
-
lgl_INIT
LIBGNUTLS_LIBS="-L${libdir} -lgnutls $LIBS"
diff --git a/lib/m4/hooks.m4 b/lib/m4/hooks.m4
index 316bf82..aaf95c6 100644
--- a/lib/m4/hooks.m4
+++ b/lib/m4/hooks.m4
@@ -92,6 +92,35 @@ AC_DEFUN([LIBGNUTLS_HOOKS],
AC_MSG_RESULT($included_libtasn1)
AM_CONDITIONAL(ENABLE_MINITASN1, test "$included_libtasn1" = "yes")
+ AC_ARG_WITH(included-pakchois,
+ AS_HELP_STRING([--with-included-pakchois], [use the included pakchois]),
+ included_pakchois=$withval,
+ included_pakchois=no)
+ if test "$included_pakchois" = "no"; then
+ AC_LIB_HAVE_LINKFLAGS(pakchois,, [#include <pakchois/pakchois.h>],
+ [pakchois_module_load(0,0);])
+ if test "$ac_cv_pakchois" != yes; then
+ included_pakchois=yes
+ AC_MSG_WARN([[
+ ***
+ *** Pakchois was not found. Will use the included one.
+ ]])
+ fi
+ fi
+ AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether to use the included pakchois])
+ AC_MSG_RESULT($included_pakchois)
+ AM_CONDITIONAL(ENABLE_LOCAL_PAKCHOIS, test "$included_pakchois" = "yes")
+ if test "$included_pakchois" = "yes";then
+ AC_CHECK_LIB(pthread, pthread_mutex_lock,,
+ [AC_MSG_ERROR([could not find pthread_mutex_lock])])
+ AC_CHECK_LIB(dl, dlopen,,
+ [AC_MSG_ERROR([could not find dlopen])])
+
+ module_path="${libdir}:${libdir}/pkcs11"
+
+ CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -DPAKCHOIS_MODPATH=\\\"${module_path}\\\""
+ fi
+
AC_ARG_WITH(lzo,
AS_HELP_STRING([--with-lzo], [use experimental LZO compression]),
use_lzo=$withval, use_lzo=no)
diff --git a/lib/pakchois/errors.c b/lib/pakchois/errors.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..de09b92
--- /dev/null
+++ b/lib/pakchois/errors.c
@@ -0,0 +1,146 @@
+/*
+ pakchois PKCS#11 interface -- error mapping
+ Copyright (C) 2008, Joe Orton <address@hidden>
+
+ This library is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ modify it under the terms of the GNU Library General Public
+ License as published by the Free Software Foundation; either
+ version 2 of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
+
+ This library is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
+ Library General Public License for more details.
+
+ You should have received a copy of the GNU Library General Public
+ License along with this library; if not, write to the Free
+ Software Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place - Suite 330, Boston,
+ MA 02111-1307, USA
+*/
+
+/*
+ This code is directly derived from the scute.org PKCS#11 cryptoki
+ interface, which is:
+
+ Copyright 2006, 2007 g10 Code GmbH
+ Copyright 2006 Andreas Jellinghaus
+
+ This file is free software; as a special exception the author gives
+ unlimited permission to copy and/or distribute it, with or without
+ modifications, as long as this notice is preserved.
+
+ This file is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
+ WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by law; without even
+ the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ PURPOSE.
+*/
+
+#include "config.h"
+
+#include "pakchois.h"
+
+#ifdef ENABLE_NLS
+#include <libintl.h>
+#define _(x) dgettext(PACKAGE_NAME, x)
+#else
+#define _(x) x
+#endif
+
+const char *pakchois_error(ck_rv_t rv)
+{
+ if (rv >= CKR_VENDOR_DEFINED) {
+ return _("Vendor defined error");
+ }
+
+ switch (rv) {
+ case CKR_OK: return _("OK");
+ case CKR_CANCEL: return _("Cancel");
+ case CKR_HOST_MEMORY: return _("Host memory");
+ case CKR_SLOT_ID_INVALID: return _("Slot id invalid");
+ case CKR_GENERAL_ERROR: return _("General error");
+ case CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED: return _("Function failed");
+ case CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD: return _("Arguments bad");
+ case CKR_NO_EVENT: return _("No event");
+ case CKR_NEED_TO_CREATE_THREADS: return _("Need to create threads");
+ case CKR_CANT_LOCK: return _("Can't lock");
+ case CKR_ATTRIBUTE_READ_ONLY: return _("Attribute read only");
+ case CKR_ATTRIBUTE_SENSITIVE: return _("Attribute sensitive");
+ case CKR_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE_INVALID: return _("Attribute type invalid");
+ case CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID: return _("Attribute value invalid");
+ case CKR_DATA_INVALID: return _("Data invalid");
+ case CKR_DATA_LEN_RANGE: return _("Data len range");
+ case CKR_DEVICE_ERROR: return _("Device error");
+ case CKR_DEVICE_MEMORY: return _("Device memory");
+ case CKR_DEVICE_REMOVED: return _("Device removed");
+ case CKR_ENCRYPTED_DATA_INVALID: return _("Encrypted data invalid");
+ case CKR_ENCRYPTED_DATA_LEN_RANGE: return _("Encrypted data len range");
+ case CKR_FUNCTION_CANCELED: return _("Function canceled");
+ case CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_PARALLEL: return _("Function not parallel");
+ case CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_SUPPORTED: return _("Function not supported");
+ case CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID: return _("Key handle invalid");
+ case CKR_KEY_SIZE_RANGE: return _("Key size range");
+ case CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT: return _("Key type inconsistent");
+ case CKR_KEY_NOT_NEEDED: return _("Key not needed");
+ case CKR_KEY_CHANGED: return _("Key changed");
+ case CKR_KEY_NEEDED: return _("Key needed");
+ case CKR_KEY_INDIGESTIBLE: return _("Key indigestible");
+ case CKR_KEY_FUNCTION_NOT_PERMITTED: return _("Key function not
permitted");
+ case CKR_KEY_NOT_WRAPPABLE: return _("Key not wrappable");
+ case CKR_KEY_UNEXTRACTABLE: return _("Key unextractable");
+ case CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID: return _("Mechanism invalid");
+ case CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID: return _("Mechanism param invalid");
+ case CKR_OBJECT_HANDLE_INVALID: return _("Object handle invalid");
+ case CKR_OPERATION_ACTIVE: return _("Operation active");
+ case CKR_OPERATION_NOT_INITIALIZED: return _("Operation not initialized");
+ case CKR_PIN_INCORRECT: return _("PIN incorrect");
+ case CKR_PIN_INVALID: return _("PIN invalid");
+ case CKR_PIN_LEN_RANGE: return _("PIN len range");
+ case CKR_PIN_EXPIRED: return _("PIN expired");
+ case CKR_PIN_LOCKED: return _("PIN locked");
+ case CKR_SESSION_CLOSED: return _("Session closed");
+ case CKR_SESSION_COUNT: return _("Session count");
+ case CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID: return _("Session handle invalid");
+ case CKR_SESSION_PARALLEL_NOT_SUPPORTED: return _("Session parallel not
supported");
+ case CKR_SESSION_READ_ONLY: return _("Session read only");
+ case CKR_SESSION_EXISTS: return _("Session exists");
+ case CKR_SESSION_READ_ONLY_EXISTS: return _("Session read only exists");
+ case CKR_SESSION_READ_WRITE_SO_EXISTS: return _("Session read write so
exists");
+ case CKR_SIGNATURE_INVALID: return _("Signature invalid");
+ case CKR_SIGNATURE_LEN_RANGE: return _("Signature length range");
+ case CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE: return _("Template incomplete");
+ case CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT: return _("Template inconsistent");
+ case CKR_TOKEN_NOT_PRESENT: return _("Token not present");
+ case CKR_TOKEN_NOT_RECOGNIZED: return _("Token not recognized");
+ case CKR_TOKEN_WRITE_PROTECTED: return _("Token write protected");
+ case CKR_UNWRAPPING_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID: return _("Unwrapping key handle
invalid");
+ case CKR_UNWRAPPING_KEY_SIZE_RANGE: return _("Unwrapping key size range");
+ case CKR_UNWRAPPING_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT: return _("Unwrapping key type
inconsistent");
+ case CKR_USER_ALREADY_LOGGED_IN: return _("User already logged in");
+ case CKR_USER_NOT_LOGGED_IN: return _("User not logged in");
+ case CKR_USER_PIN_NOT_INITIALIZED: return _("User PIN not initialized");
+ case CKR_USER_TYPE_INVALID: return _("User type invalid");
+ case CKR_USER_ANOTHER_ALREADY_LOGGED_IN: return _("Another user already
logged in");
+ case CKR_USER_TOO_MANY_TYPES: return _("User too many types");
+ case CKR_WRAPPED_KEY_INVALID: return _("Wrapped key invalid");
+ case CKR_WRAPPED_KEY_LEN_RANGE: return _("Wrapped key length range");
+ case CKR_WRAPPING_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID: return _("Wrapping key handle
invalid");
+ case CKR_WRAPPING_KEY_SIZE_RANGE: return _("Wrapping key size range");
+ case CKR_WRAPPING_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT: return _("Wrapping key type
inconsistent");
+ case CKR_RANDOM_SEED_NOT_SUPPORTED: return _("Random seed not supported");
+ case CKR_RANDOM_NO_RNG: return _("Random no rng");
+ case CKR_DOMAIN_PARAMS_INVALID: return _("Domain params invalid");
+ case CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL: return _("Buffer too small");
+ case CKR_SAVED_STATE_INVALID: return _("Saved state invalid");
+ case CKR_INFORMATION_SENSITIVE: return _("Information sensitive");
+ case CKR_STATE_UNSAVEABLE: return _("State unsaveable");
+ case CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED: return _("Cryptoki not initialized");
+ case CKR_CRYPTOKI_ALREADY_INITIALIZED: return _("Cryptoki already
initialized");
+ case CKR_MUTEX_BAD: return _("Mutex bad");
+ case CKR_MUTEX_NOT_LOCKED: return _("Mutex not locked");
+ case CKR_FUNCTION_REJECTED: return _("Function rejected");
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+
+ return _("Unknown error");
+}
diff --git a/lib/pakchois/pakchois.c b/lib/pakchois/pakchois.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a69dfb0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/lib/pakchois/pakchois.c
@@ -0,0 +1,982 @@
+/*
+ pakchois PKCS#11 interface
+ Copyright (C) 2008, Joe Orton <address@hidden>
+
+ This library is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ modify it under the terms of the GNU Library General Public
+ License as published by the Free Software Foundation; either
+ version 2 of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
+
+ This library is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
+ Library General Public License for more details.
+
+ You should have received a copy of the GNU Library General Public
+ License along with this library; if not, write to the Free
+ Software Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place - Suite 330, Boston,
+ MA 02111-1307, USA
+*/
+
+/*
+ The interface is directly derived from the scute.org PKCS#11
+ cryptoki interface, which is:
+
+ Copyright 2006, 2007 g10 Code GmbH
+ Copyright 2006 Andreas Jellinghaus
+
+ This file is free software; as a special exception the author gives
+ unlimited permission to copy and/or distribute it, with or without
+ modifications, as long as this notice is preserved.
+
+ This file is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
+ WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by law; without even
+ the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ PURPOSE.
+*/
+
+#include "config.h"
+
+#include <dlfcn.h>
+#include <limits.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <pthread.h>
+#include <assert.h>
+#include "pakchois.h"
+
+struct provider {
+ char *name;
+ void *handle;
+ pthread_mutex_t mutex;
+ const struct ck_function_list *fns;
+ unsigned int refcount;
+ struct provider *next, **prevref;
+};
+
+struct pakchois_module_s {
+ struct slot *slots;
+ struct provider *provider;
+};
+
+static pthread_mutex_t provider_mutex = PTHREAD_MUTEX_INITIALIZER;
+
+/* List of loaded providers; any modification to the list or any
+ * individual module must performed whilst holding this mutex. */
+static struct provider *provider_list;
+
+struct pakchois_session_s {
+ pakchois_module_t *module;
+ ck_session_handle_t id;
+ pakchois_notify_t notify;
+ void *notify_data;
+ /* Doubly-linked list. Either prevref = &previous->next or else
+ * prevref = &slot->sessions for the list head. */
+ pakchois_session_t **prevref;
+ pakchois_session_t *next;
+};
+
+struct slot {
+ ck_slot_id_t id;
+ pakchois_session_t *sessions;
+ struct slot *next;
+};
+
+#define DIR_DELIMITER '/'
+
+char* pkcs11ize(const char* name)
+{
+ int len;
+ char* oname;
+ char *base;
+ char *suffix;
+
+ oname = strdup(name);
+ if (oname == NULL) {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ /* basename has too many ifs to use */
+ base = strrchr(oname, DIR_DELIMITER);
+ if (base == NULL) {
+ base = oname;
+ } else {
+ base++;
+ }
+
+ suffix = strchr(base, '.');
+ if (suffix != NULL) {
+ if (strncmp(suffix, ".so", 3)==0) {
+ suffix[0] = 0; /* null terminate before . */
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* check and remove for -p11 or -pkcs11 */
+ suffix = base;
+ while((suffix=strchr(suffix, '-')) != NULL) {
+ if (strncasecmp(suffix, "-p11", 4)==0 ||
+ strncasecmp(suffix, "-pkcs11", 7)==0) {
+ suffix[0] = 0;
+ break;
+ }
+ suffix++;
+ }
+
+ len = strlen(base);
+
+ memmove(oname, base, len);
+ oname[len] = 0;
+
+ return oname;
+}
+
+static const char *suffix_prefixes[][2] = {
+ { "lib", "pk11.so" },
+ { "", "-pkcs11.so" },
+ { "", ".so" },
+ { "lib", ".so" },
+ { NULL, NULL }
+};
+
+#define CALL(name, args) (mod->provider->fns->C_ ## name) args
+#define CALLS(name, args) (sess->module->provider->fns->C_ ## name) args
+#define CALLS1(n, a) CALLS(n, (sess->id, a))
+#define CALLS2(n, a, b) CALLS(n, (sess->id, a, b))
+#define CALLS3(n, a, b, c) CALLS(n, (sess->id, a, b, c))
+#define CALLS4(n, a, b, c, d) CALLS(n, (sess->id, a, b, c, d))
+#define CALLS5(n, a, b, c, d, e) CALLS(n, (sess->id, a, b, c, d, e))
+#define CALLS7(n, a, b, c, d, e, f, g) CALLS(n, (sess->id, a, b, c, d, e, f,
g))
+
+static void *find_pkcs11_module(const char *name, CK_C_GetFunctionList *gfl)
+{
+ char module_path[] = PAKCHOIS_MODPATH;
+ char *next = module_path;
+ void *h;
+
+ /* try the plain name first */
+ h = dlopen(name, RTLD_LOCAL|RTLD_NOW);
+ if (h != NULL) {
+ *gfl = dlsym(h, "C_GetFunctionList");
+ if (*gfl) {
+ return h;
+ }
+ dlclose(h);
+ }
+
+ while (next) {
+ char *dir = next, *sep = strchr(next, ':');
+ unsigned i;
+
+ if (sep) {
+ *sep++ = '\0';
+ next = sep;
+ }
+ else {
+ next = NULL;
+ }
+
+
+ for (i = 0; suffix_prefixes[i][0]; i++) {
+ char path[PATH_MAX];
+
+ snprintf(path, sizeof path, "%s/%s%s%s", dir,
+ suffix_prefixes[i][0], name, suffix_prefixes[i][1]);
+
+ h = dlopen(path, RTLD_LOCAL|RTLD_NOW);
+ if (h != NULL) {
+ *gfl = dlsym(h, "C_GetFunctionList");
+ if (*gfl) {
+ return h;
+ }
+ dlclose(h);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+static struct provider *find_provider(const char *name)
+{
+ struct provider *p;
+
+ for (p = provider_list; p; p = p->next) {
+ if (strcmp(name, p->name) == 0) {
+ return p;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+static ck_rv_t load_provider(struct provider **provider, const char *name,
+ void *reserved)
+{
+ CK_C_GetFunctionList gfl;
+ struct provider *prov;
+ struct ck_function_list *fns;
+ struct ck_c_initialize_args args;
+ void *h;
+ ck_rv_t rv;
+ char *cname = NULL;
+
+ if (pthread_mutex_lock(&provider_mutex) != 0) {
+ return CKR_CANT_LOCK;
+ }
+
+ cname = pkcs11ize(name);
+ if (cname == NULL) {
+ rv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
+ goto fail_locked;
+ }
+
+fprintf(stderr, "found name: %s\n", cname);
+
+ prov = find_provider(cname);
+ if (prov) {
+ prov->refcount++;
+ *provider = prov;
+ free(cname);
+ pthread_mutex_unlock(&provider_mutex);
+ return CKR_OK;
+ }
+
+ h = find_pkcs11_module(name, &gfl);
+ if (!h) {
+ rv = CKR_GENERAL_ERROR;
+ goto fail_ndup;
+ }
+
+ rv = gfl(&fns);
+ if (rv != CKR_OK) {
+ goto fail_dso;
+ }
+
+ *provider = prov = malloc(sizeof *prov);
+ if (prov == NULL) {
+ rv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
+ goto fail_dso;
+ }
+
+ if (pthread_mutex_init(&prov->mutex, NULL)) {
+ rv = CKR_GENERAL_ERROR;
+ goto fail_ctx;
+ }
+
+ prov->name = cname;
+ prov->handle = h;
+ prov->fns = fns;
+ prov->refcount = 1;
+
+ /* Require OS locking, the only sane option. */
+ memset(&args, 0, sizeof args);
+ args.flags = CKF_OS_LOCKING_OK;
+ args.reserved = reserved;
+
+ rv = fns->C_Initialize(&args);
+ if (rv != CKR_OK) {
+ goto fail_ctx;
+ }
+
+ prov->next = provider_list;
+ prov->prevref = &provider_list;
+ if (prov->next) {
+ prov->next->prevref = &prov->next;
+ }
+ provider_list = prov;
+
+ pthread_mutex_unlock(&provider_mutex);
+
+ return CKR_OK;
+fail_ctx:
+ free(prov);
+fail_dso:
+ dlclose(h);
+fail_ndup:
+ free(cname);
+fail_locked:
+ pthread_mutex_unlock(&provider_mutex);
+ *provider = NULL;
+ return rv;
+}
+
+static ck_rv_t load_module(pakchois_module_t **module, const char *name,
+ void *reserved)
+{
+ ck_rv_t rv;
+ pakchois_module_t *pm = malloc(sizeof *pm);
+
+ if (!pm) {
+ return CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
+ }
+
+ rv = load_provider(&pm->provider, name, reserved);
+ if (rv) {
+ return rv;
+ }
+
+ *module = pm;
+ pm->slots = NULL;
+
+ return CKR_OK;
+}
+
+ck_rv_t pakchois_module_load(pakchois_module_t **module, const char *name)
+{
+ return load_module(module, name, NULL);
+}
+
+ck_rv_t pakchois_module_nssload(pakchois_module_t **module,
+ const char *name,
+ const char *directory,
+ const char *cert_prefix,
+ const char *key_prefix,
+ const char *secmod_db)
+{
+ char buf[256];
+
+ snprintf(buf, sizeof buf,
+ "configdir='%s' certPrefix='%s' keyPrefix='%s' secmod='%s'",
+ directory, cert_prefix ? cert_prefix : "",
+ key_prefix ? key_prefix : "",
+ secmod_db ? secmod_db : "secmod.db");
+
+ return load_module(module, name, buf);
+}
+
+/* Unreference a provider structure and destoy if, if necessary. Must
+ * be called WIHTOUT the provider mutex held. */
+static void provider_unref(struct provider *prov)
+{
+ assert(pthread_mutex_lock(&provider_mutex) == 0);
+
+ if (--prov->refcount == 0) {
+ prov->fns->C_Finalize(NULL);
+ dlclose(prov->handle);
+ *prov->prevref = prov->next;
+ if (prov->next) {
+ prov->next->prevref = prov->prevref;
+ }
+ free(prov->name);
+ free(prov);
+ }
+ pthread_mutex_unlock(&provider_mutex);
+}
+
+void pakchois_module_destroy(pakchois_module_t *mod)
+{
+ provider_unref(mod->provider);
+
+ while (mod->slots) {
+ struct slot *slot = mod->slots;
+ pakchois_close_all_sessions(mod, slot->id);
+ mod->slots = slot->next;
+ free(slot);
+ }
+
+ free(mod);
+}
+
+#ifdef __GNUC__
+static void pakchois_destructor(void)
+ __attribute__((destructor));
+
+static void pakchois_destructor(void)
+{
+ pthread_mutex_destroy(&provider_mutex);
+}
+#else
+#warning need destructor support
+#endif
+
+ck_rv_t pakchois_get_info(pakchois_module_t *mod, struct ck_info *info)
+{
+ return CALL(GetInfo, (info));
+}
+
+ck_rv_t pakchois_get_slot_list(pakchois_module_t *mod,
+ unsigned char token_present,
+ ck_slot_id_t *slot_list,
+ unsigned long *count)
+{
+ return CALL(GetSlotList, (token_present, slot_list, count));
+}
+
+ck_rv_t pakchois_get_slot_info(pakchois_module_t *mod,
+ ck_slot_id_t slot_id,
+ struct ck_slot_info *info)
+{
+ return CALL(GetSlotInfo, (slot_id, info));
+}
+
+ck_rv_t pakchois_get_token_info(pakchois_module_t *mod,
+ ck_slot_id_t slot_id,
+ struct ck_token_info *info)
+{
+ return CALL(GetTokenInfo, (slot_id, info));
+}
+
+ck_rv_t pakchois_wait_for_slot_event(pakchois_module_t *mod,
+ ck_flags_t flags, ck_slot_id_t *slot,
+ void *reserved)
+{
+ ck_rv_t rv;
+
+ if (pthread_mutex_lock(&mod->provider->mutex)) {
+ return CKR_CANT_LOCK;
+ }
+
+ rv = CALL(WaitForSlotEvent, (flags, slot, reserved));
+ pthread_mutex_unlock(&mod->provider->mutex);
+ return rv;
+}
+
+ck_rv_t pakchois_get_mechanism_list(pakchois_module_t *mod,
+ ck_slot_id_t slot_id,
+ ck_mechanism_type_t *mechanism_list,
+ unsigned long *count)
+{
+ return CALL(GetMechanismList, (slot_id, mechanism_list, count));
+}
+
+ck_rv_t pakchois_get_mechanism_info(pakchois_module_t *mod,
+ ck_slot_id_t slot_id,
+ ck_mechanism_type_t type,
+ struct ck_mechanism_info *info)
+{
+ return CALL(GetMechanismInfo, (slot_id, type, info));
+}
+
+ck_rv_t pakchois_init_token(pakchois_module_t *mod,
+ ck_slot_id_t slot_id, unsigned char *pin,
+ unsigned long pin_len, unsigned char *label)
+{
+ return CALL(InitToken, (slot_id, pin, pin_len, label));
+}
+
+ck_rv_t pakchois_init_pin(pakchois_session_t *sess, unsigned char *pin,
+ unsigned long pin_len)
+{
+ return CALLS2(InitPIN, pin, pin_len);
+}
+
+ck_rv_t pakchois_set_pin(pakchois_session_t *sess, unsigned char *old_pin,
+ unsigned long old_len, unsigned char *new_pin,
+ unsigned long new_len)
+{
+ return CALLS4(SetPIN, old_pin, old_len, new_pin, new_len);
+}
+
+static ck_rv_t notify_thunk(ck_session_handle_t session,
+ ck_notification_t event, void *application)
+{
+ pakchois_session_t *sess = application;
+
+ return sess->notify(sess, event, sess->notify_data);
+}
+
+static struct slot *find_slot(pakchois_module_t *mod, ck_slot_id_t id)
+{
+ struct slot *slot;
+
+ for (slot = mod->slots; slot; slot = slot->next)
+ if (slot->id == id)
+ return slot;
+
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+static struct slot *find_or_create_slot(pakchois_module_t *mod,
+ ck_slot_id_t id)
+{
+ struct slot *slot = find_slot(mod, id);
+
+ if (slot) {
+ return slot;
+ }
+
+ slot = malloc(sizeof *slot);
+ if (!slot) {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ slot->id = id;
+ slot->sessions = NULL;
+ slot->next = mod->slots;
+ mod->slots = slot;
+
+ return slot;
+}
+
+static ck_rv_t insert_session(pakchois_module_t *mod,
+ pakchois_session_t *session,
+ ck_slot_id_t id)
+{
+ struct slot *slot = find_or_create_slot(mod, id);
+
+ if (!slot) {
+ return CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
+ }
+
+ session->prevref = &slot->sessions;
+ session->next = slot->sessions;
+ if (session->next) {
+ session->next->prevref = session->prevref;
+ }
+ slot->sessions = session;
+
+ return CKR_OK;
+}
+
+ck_rv_t pakchois_open_session(pakchois_module_t *mod,
+ ck_slot_id_t slot_id, ck_flags_t flags,
+ void *application, pakchois_notify_t notify,
+ pakchois_session_t **session)
+{
+ ck_session_handle_t sh;
+ pakchois_session_t *sess;
+ ck_rv_t rv;
+
+ sess = calloc(1, sizeof *sess);
+ if (sess == NULL) {
+ return CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
+ }
+
+ rv = CALL(OpenSession, (slot_id, flags, sess, notify_thunk, &sh));
+ if (rv != CKR_OK) {
+ free(sess);
+ return rv;
+ }
+
+ *session = sess;
+ sess->module = mod;
+ sess->id = sh;
+
+ return insert_session(mod, sess, slot_id);
+}
+
+ck_rv_t pakchois_close_session(pakchois_session_t *sess)
+{
+ /* PKCS#11 says that all bets are off on failure, so destroy the
+ * session object and just return the error code. */
+ ck_rv_t rv = CALLS(CloseSession, (sess->id));
+ *sess->prevref = sess->next;
+ if (sess->next) {
+ sess->next->prevref = sess->prevref;
+ }
+ free(sess);
+ return rv;
+}
+
+ck_rv_t pakchois_close_all_sessions(pakchois_module_t *mod,
+ ck_slot_id_t slot_id)
+{
+ struct slot *slot;
+ ck_rv_t rv, frv = CKR_OK;
+
+ slot = find_slot(mod, slot_id);
+
+ if (!slot) {
+ return CKR_SLOT_ID_INVALID;
+ }
+
+ while (slot->sessions) {
+ rv = pakchois_close_session(slot->sessions);
+ if (rv != CKR_OK) {
+ frv = rv;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return frv;
+}
+
+ck_rv_t pakchois_get_session_info(pakchois_session_t *sess,
+ struct ck_session_info *info)
+{
+ return CALLS1(GetSessionInfo, info);
+}
+
+ck_rv_t pakchois_get_operation_state(pakchois_session_t *sess,
+ unsigned char *operation_state,
+ unsigned long *operation_state_len)
+{
+ return CALLS2(GetOperationState, operation_state,
+ operation_state_len);
+}
+
+ck_rv_t pakchois_set_operation_state(pakchois_session_t *sess,
+ unsigned char *operation_state,
+ unsigned long operation_state_len,
+ ck_object_handle_t encryption_key,
+ ck_object_handle_t authentiation_key)
+{
+ return CALLS4(SetOperationState, operation_state, operation_state_len,
+ encryption_key, authentiation_key);
+}
+
+ck_rv_t pakchois_login(pakchois_session_t *sess, ck_user_type_t user_type,
+ unsigned char *pin, unsigned long pin_len)
+{
+ return CALLS3(Login, user_type, pin, pin_len);
+}
+
+ck_rv_t pakchois_logout(pakchois_session_t *sess)
+{
+ return CALLS(Logout, (sess->id));
+}
+
+ck_rv_t pakchois_create_object(pakchois_session_t *sess,
+ struct ck_attribute *templ,
+ unsigned long count,
+ ck_object_handle_t *object)
+{
+ return CALLS3(CreateObject, templ, count, object);
+}
+
+ck_rv_t pakchois_copy_object(pakchois_session_t *sess,
+ ck_object_handle_t object,
+ struct ck_attribute *templ, unsigned long count,
+ ck_object_handle_t *new_object)
+{
+ return CALLS4(CopyObject, object, templ, count, new_object);
+}
+
+ck_rv_t pakchois_destroy_object(pakchois_session_t *sess,
+ ck_object_handle_t object)
+{
+ return CALLS1(DestroyObject, object);
+}
+
+ck_rv_t pakchois_get_object_size(pakchois_session_t *sess,
+ ck_object_handle_t object,
+ unsigned long *size)
+{
+ return CALLS2(GetObjectSize, object, size);
+}
+
+ck_rv_t pakchois_get_attribute_value(pakchois_session_t *sess,
+ ck_object_handle_t object,
+ struct ck_attribute *templ,
+ unsigned long count)
+{
+ return CALLS3(GetAttributeValue, object, templ, count);
+}
+
+ck_rv_t pakchois_set_attribute_value(pakchois_session_t *sess,
+ ck_object_handle_t object,
+ struct ck_attribute *templ,
+ unsigned long count)
+{
+ return CALLS3(SetAttributeValue, object, templ, count);
+}
+
+ck_rv_t pakchois_find_objects_init(pakchois_session_t *sess,
+ struct ck_attribute *templ,
+ unsigned long count)
+{
+ return CALLS2(FindObjectsInit, templ, count);
+}
+
+ck_rv_t pakchois_find_objects(pakchois_session_t *sess,
+ ck_object_handle_t *object,
+ unsigned long max_object_count,
+ unsigned long *object_count)
+{
+ return CALLS3(FindObjects, object, max_object_count, object_count);
+}
+
+ck_rv_t pakchois_find_objects_final(pakchois_session_t *sess)
+{
+ return CALLS(FindObjectsFinal, (sess->id));
+}
+
+ck_rv_t pakchois_encrypt_init(pakchois_session_t *sess,
+ struct ck_mechanism *mechanism,
+ ck_object_handle_t key)
+{
+ return CALLS2(EncryptInit, mechanism, key);
+}
+
+ck_rv_t pakchois_encrypt(pakchois_session_t *sess,
+ unsigned char *data, unsigned long data_len,
+ unsigned char *encrypted_data,
+ unsigned long *encrypted_data_len)
+{
+ return CALLS4(Encrypt, data, data_len,
+ encrypted_data, encrypted_data_len);
+}
+
+ck_rv_t pakchois_encrypt_update(pakchois_session_t *sess,
+ unsigned char *part, unsigned long part_len,
+ unsigned char *encrypted_part,
+ unsigned long *encrypted_part_len)
+{
+ return CALLS4(EncryptUpdate, part, part_len,
+ encrypted_part, encrypted_part_len);
+}
+
+ck_rv_t pakchois_encrypt_final(pakchois_session_t *sess,
+ unsigned char *last_encrypted_part,
+ unsigned long *last_encrypted_part_len)
+{
+ return CALLS2(EncryptFinal, last_encrypted_part, last_encrypted_part_len);
+}
+
+ck_rv_t pakchois_decrypt_init(pakchois_session_t *sess,
+ struct ck_mechanism *mechanism,
+ ck_object_handle_t key)
+{
+ return CALLS2(DecryptInit, mechanism, key);
+}
+
+ck_rv_t pakchois_decrypt(pakchois_session_t *sess,
+ unsigned char *encrypted_data,
+ unsigned long encrypted_data_len,
+ unsigned char *data, unsigned long *data_len)
+{
+ return CALLS4(Decrypt, encrypted_data, encrypted_data_len, data, data_len);
+}
+
+ck_rv_t pakchois_decrypt_update(pakchois_session_t *sess,
+ unsigned char *encrypted_part,
+ unsigned long encrypted_part_len,
+ unsigned char *part, unsigned long *part_len)
+{
+ return CALLS4(DecryptUpdate, encrypted_part, encrypted_part_len,
+ part, part_len);
+}
+
+ck_rv_t pakchois_decrypt_final(pakchois_session_t *sess,
+ unsigned char *last_part,
+ unsigned long *last_part_len)
+{
+ return CALLS2(DecryptFinal, last_part, last_part_len);
+}
+
+ck_rv_t pakchois_digest_init(pakchois_session_t *sess,
+ struct ck_mechanism *mechanism)
+{
+ return CALLS1(DigestInit, mechanism);
+}
+
+ck_rv_t pakchois_digest(pakchois_session_t *sess, unsigned char *data,
+ unsigned long data_len, unsigned char *digest,
+ unsigned long *digest_len)
+{
+ return CALLS4(Digest, data, data_len, digest, digest_len);
+}
+
+ck_rv_t pakchois_digest_update(pakchois_session_t *sess,
+ unsigned char *part, unsigned long part_len)
+{
+ return CALLS2(DigestUpdate, part, part_len);
+}
+
+ck_rv_t pakchois_digest_key(pakchois_session_t *sess,
+ ck_object_handle_t key)
+{
+ return CALLS1(DigestKey, key);
+}
+
+ck_rv_t pakchois_digest_final(pakchois_session_t *sess,
+ unsigned char *digest,
+ unsigned long *digest_len)
+{
+ return CALLS2(DigestFinal, digest, digest_len);
+}
+
+ck_rv_t pakchois_sign_init(pakchois_session_t *sess,
+ struct ck_mechanism *mechanism,
+ ck_object_handle_t key)
+{
+ return CALLS2(SignInit, mechanism, key);
+}
+
+ck_rv_t pakchois_sign(pakchois_session_t *sess, unsigned char *data,
+ unsigned long data_len, unsigned char *signature,
+ unsigned long *signature_len)
+{
+ return CALLS4(Sign, data, data_len, signature, signature_len);
+}
+
+ck_rv_t pakchois_sign_update(pakchois_session_t *sess,
+ unsigned char *part, unsigned long part_len)
+{
+ return CALLS2(SignUpdate, part, part_len);
+}
+
+ck_rv_t pakchois_sign_final(pakchois_session_t *sess,
+ unsigned char *signature,
+ unsigned long *signature_len)
+{
+ return CALLS2(SignFinal, signature, signature_len);
+}
+
+ck_rv_t pakchois_sign_recover_init(pakchois_session_t *sess,
+ struct ck_mechanism *mechanism,
+ ck_object_handle_t key)
+{
+ return CALLS2(SignRecoverInit, mechanism, key);
+}
+
+ck_rv_t pakchois_sign_recover(pakchois_session_t *sess,
+ unsigned char *data, unsigned long data_len,
+ unsigned char *signature,
+ unsigned long *signature_len)
+{
+ return CALLS4(SignRecover, data, data_len, signature, signature_len);
+}
+
+ck_rv_t pakchois_verify_init(pakchois_session_t *sess,
+ struct ck_mechanism *mechanism,
+ ck_object_handle_t key)
+{
+ return CALLS2(VerifyInit, mechanism, key);
+}
+
+ck_rv_t pakchois_verify(pakchois_session_t *sess, unsigned char *data,
+ unsigned long data_len, unsigned char *signature,
+ unsigned long signature_len)
+{
+ return CALLS4(Verify, data, data_len, signature, signature_len);
+}
+
+ck_rv_t pakchois_verify_update(pakchois_session_t *sess,
+ unsigned char *part, unsigned long part_len)
+{
+ return CALLS2(VerifyUpdate, part, part_len);
+}
+
+ck_rv_t pakchois_verify_final(pakchois_session_t *sess,
+ unsigned char *signature,
+ unsigned long signature_len)
+{
+ return CALLS2(VerifyFinal, signature, signature_len);
+}
+
+ck_rv_t pakchois_verify_recover_init(pakchois_session_t *sess,
+ struct ck_mechanism *mechanism,
+ ck_object_handle_t key)
+{
+ return CALLS2(VerifyRecoverInit, mechanism, key);
+}
+
+ck_rv_t pakchois_verify_recover(pakchois_session_t *sess,
+ unsigned char *signature,
+ unsigned long signature_len,
+ unsigned char *data, unsigned long *data_len)
+{
+ return CALLS4(VerifyRecover, signature, signature_len, data, data_len);
+}
+
+ck_rv_t pakchois_digest_encrypt_update(pakchois_session_t *sess,
+ unsigned char *part,
+ unsigned long part_len,
+ unsigned char *encrypted_part,
+ unsigned long *encrypted_part_len)
+{
+ return CALLS4(DigestEncryptUpdate, part, part_len,
+ encrypted_part, encrypted_part_len);
+}
+
+ck_rv_t pakchois_decrypt_digest_update(pakchois_session_t *sess,
+ unsigned char *encrypted_part,
+ unsigned long encrypted_part_len,
+ unsigned char *part,
+ unsigned long *part_len)
+{
+ return CALLS4(DecryptDigestUpdate, encrypted_part, encrypted_part_len,
+ part, part_len);
+}
+
+ck_rv_t pakchois_sign_encrypt_update(pakchois_session_t *sess,
+ unsigned char *part,
+ unsigned long part_len,
+ unsigned char *encrypted_part,
+ unsigned long *encrypted_part_len)
+{
+ return CALLS4(SignEncryptUpdate, part, part_len,
+ encrypted_part, encrypted_part_len);
+}
+
+ck_rv_t pakchois_decrypt_verify_update(pakchois_session_t *sess,
+ unsigned char *encrypted_part,
+ unsigned long encrypted_part_len,
+ unsigned char *part,
+ unsigned long *part_len)
+{
+ return CALLS4(DecryptVerifyUpdate, encrypted_part, encrypted_part_len,
+ part, part_len);
+}
+
+ck_rv_t pakchois_generate_key(pakchois_session_t *sess,
+ struct ck_mechanism *mechanism,
+ struct ck_attribute *templ,
+ unsigned long count, ck_object_handle_t *key)
+{
+ return CALLS4(GenerateKey, mechanism, templ, count, key);
+}
+
+ck_rv_t pakchois_generate_key_pair(pakchois_session_t *sess,
+ struct ck_mechanism *mechanism,
+ struct ck_attribute *public_key_template,
+ unsigned long public_key_attribute_count,
+ struct ck_attribute *private_key_template,
+ unsigned long private_key_attribute_count,
+ ck_object_handle_t *public_key,
+ ck_object_handle_t *private_key)
+{
+ return CALLS7(GenerateKeyPair, mechanism,
+ public_key_template, public_key_attribute_count,
+ private_key_template, private_key_attribute_count,
+ public_key, private_key);
+}
+
+ck_rv_t pakchois_wrap_key(pakchois_session_t *sess,
+ struct ck_mechanism *mechanism,
+ ck_object_handle_t wrapping_key,
+ ck_object_handle_t key, unsigned char *wrapped_key,
+ unsigned long *wrapped_key_len)
+{
+ return CALLS5(WrapKey, mechanism, wrapping_key,
+ key, wrapped_key, wrapped_key_len);
+}
+
+ck_rv_t pakchois_unwrap_key(pakchois_session_t *sess,
+ struct ck_mechanism *mechanism,
+ ck_object_handle_t unwrapping_key,
+ unsigned char *wrapped_key,
+ unsigned long wrapped_key_len,
+ struct ck_attribute *templ,
+ unsigned long attribute_count,
+ ck_object_handle_t *key)
+{
+ return CALLS7(UnwrapKey, mechanism, unwrapping_key,
+ wrapped_key, wrapped_key_len, templ, attribute_count,
+ key);
+}
+
+ck_rv_t pakchois_derive_key(pakchois_session_t *sess,
+ struct ck_mechanism *mechanism,
+ ck_object_handle_t base_key,
+ struct ck_attribute *templ,
+ unsigned long attribute_count,
+ ck_object_handle_t *key)
+{
+ return CALLS5(DeriveKey, mechanism, base_key, templ, attribute_count, key);
+}
+
+
+ck_rv_t pakchois_seed_random(pakchois_session_t *sess,
+ unsigned char *seed, unsigned long seed_len)
+{
+ return CALLS2(SeedRandom, seed, seed_len);
+}
+
+ck_rv_t pakchois_generate_random(pakchois_session_t *sess,
+ unsigned char *random_data,
+ unsigned long random_len)
+{
+ return CALLS2(GenerateRandom, random_data, random_len);
+}
diff --git a/lib/pakchois/pakchois.h b/lib/pakchois/pakchois.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..76999ef
--- /dev/null
+++ b/lib/pakchois/pakchois.h
@@ -0,0 +1,361 @@
+/*
+ pakchois PKCS#11 interface
+ Copyright (C) 2008, Joe Orton <address@hidden>
+
+ This library is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ modify it under the terms of the GNU Library General Public
+ License as published by the Free Software Foundation; either
+ version 2 of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
+
+ This library is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
+ Library General Public License for more details.
+
+ You should have received a copy of the GNU Library General Public
+ License along with this library; if not, write to the Free
+ Software Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place - Suite 330, Boston,
+ MA 02111-1307, USA
+
+*/
+
+/*
+ This interface is directly derived from the scute.org PKCS#11
+ cryptoki interface, which is:
+
+ Copyright 2006, 2007 g10 Code GmbH
+ Copyright 2006 Andreas Jellinghaus
+
+ This file is free software; as a special exception the author gives
+ unlimited permission to copy and/or distribute it, with or without
+ modifications, as long as this notice is preserved.
+
+ This file is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
+ WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by law; without even
+ the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ PURPOSE.
+*/
+
+#ifndef PAKCHOIS_H
+#define PAKCHOIS_H
+
+#define CRYPTOKI_GNU
+
+#include "pakchois11.h"
+
+/* API version: major is bumped for any backwards-incompatible
+ * changes. minor is bumped for any new interfaces. Note that the API
+ * is versioned independent of the project release version. */
+#define PAKCHOIS_API_MAJOR (0)
+#define PAKCHOIS_API_MINOR (2)
+
+/* API version history (note that API versions do not map directly to
+ the project version!):
+
+ 0.1: Initial release
+ 0.2: Addition of pakchois_error()
+ Concurrent access guarantee added for pakchois_module_load()
+ Thread-safety guarantee added for pakchois_wait_for_slot_event()
+*/
+
+typedef struct pakchois_module_s pakchois_module_t;
+typedef struct pakchois_session_s pakchois_session_t;
+
+/* Load a PKCS#11 module by name (for example "opensc" or
+ * "gnome-keyring"). Returns CKR_OK on success. Any module of given
+ * name may be safely loaded multiple times within an application; the
+ * underlying PKCS#11 provider will be loaded only once. */
+ck_rv_t pakchois_module_load(pakchois_module_t **module, const char *name);
+
+/* Load an NSS "softokn" which violates the PKCS#11 standard in
+ * initialization, with given name (e.g. "softokn3"). The directory
+ * in which the NSS database resides must be specified; the other
+ * arguments may be NULL to use defaults. Returns CKR_OK on
+ * success. */
+ck_rv_t pakchois_module_nssload(pakchois_module_t **module,
+ const char *name,
+ const char *directory,
+ const char *cert_prefix,
+ const char *key_prefix,
+ const char *secmod_db);
+
+/* Destroy a PKCS#11 module. */
+void pakchois_module_destroy(pakchois_module_t *module);
+
+/* Return the error string corresponding to the given return value.
+ * Never returns NULL. */
+const char *pakchois_error(ck_rv_t rv);
+
+/* All following interfaces model the PKCS#11 equivalents, without the
+ camel-cased naming convention. The PKCS#11 specification has
+ detailed interface descriptions:
+
+ http://www.rsa.com/rsalabs/node.asp?id=2133
+
+ The differences between this interface and PKCS#11 are:
+
+ 1. some interfaces take a module pointer as first argument
+
+ 2. session handlers are represented as opaque objects
+
+ 3. the notify callback type has changed accordingly
+
+ 4. the C_Initialize, C_Finalize, and C_GetFunctionList interfaces
+ are not exposed (these are called internally by
+ pakchois_module_load and pakchois_module_destroy)
+
+ 5. pakchois_wait_for_slot_event() is thread-safe against other
+ callers of pakchois_wait_for_slot_event(); the call to the
+ underlying provider's WaitForSlotEvent function is protected by a
+ mutex.
+
+ 6. pakchois_close_all_sessions() only closes sessions associated
+ with the given module instance; any sessions opened by other users
+ of the underlying provider are unaffected.
+
+ If a module object is used concurrently from separate threads,
+ undefined behaviour results. If a session object is used
+ concurrently from separate threads, undefined behavioure results.
+
+*/
+ck_rv_t pakchois_get_info(pakchois_module_t *module, struct ck_info *info);
+
+ck_rv_t pakchois_get_slot_list(pakchois_module_t *module,
+ unsigned char token_present,
+ ck_slot_id_t *slot_list,
+ unsigned long *count);
+
+ck_rv_t pakchois_get_slot_info(pakchois_module_t *module,
+ ck_slot_id_t slot_id,
+ struct ck_slot_info *info);
+
+ck_rv_t pakchois_get_token_info(pakchois_module_t *module,
+ ck_slot_id_t slot_id,
+ struct ck_token_info *info);
+
+ck_rv_t pakchois_wait_for_slot_event(pakchois_module_t *module,
+ ck_flags_t flags, ck_slot_id_t *slot,
+ void *reserved);
+
+ck_rv_t pakchois_get_mechanism_list(pakchois_module_t *module,
+ ck_slot_id_t slot_id,
+ ck_mechanism_type_t *mechanism_list,
+ unsigned long *count);
+
+ck_rv_t pakchois_get_mechanism_info(pakchois_module_t *module,
+ ck_slot_id_t slot_id,
+ ck_mechanism_type_t type,
+ struct ck_mechanism_info *info);
+
+ck_rv_t pakchois_init_token(pakchois_module_t *module,
+ ck_slot_id_t slot_id, unsigned char *pin,
+ unsigned long pin_len, unsigned char *label);
+
+ck_rv_t pakchois_init_pin(pakchois_session_t *session, unsigned char *pin,
+ unsigned long pin_len);
+
+ck_rv_t pakchois_set_pin(pakchois_session_t *session, unsigned char *old_pin,
+ unsigned long old_len, unsigned char *new_pin,
+ unsigned long new_len);
+
+typedef ck_rv_t (*pakchois_notify_t) (pakchois_session_t *sess,
+ ck_notification_t event,
+ void *application);
+
+ck_rv_t pakchois_open_session(pakchois_module_t *module,
+ ck_slot_id_t slot_id, ck_flags_t flags,
+ void *application, pakchois_notify_t notify,
+ pakchois_session_t **session);
+
+ck_rv_t pakchois_close_session(pakchois_session_t *session);
+
+ck_rv_t pakchois_close_all_sessions(pakchois_module_t *module,
+ ck_slot_id_t slot_id);
+
+ck_rv_t pakchois_get_session_info(pakchois_session_t *session,
+ struct ck_session_info *info);
+ck_rv_t pakchois_get_operation_state(pakchois_session_t *session,
+ unsigned char *operation_state,
+ unsigned long *operation_state_len);
+ck_rv_t pakchois_set_operation_state(pakchois_session_t *session,
+ unsigned char *operation_state,
+ unsigned long operation_state_len,
+ ck_object_handle_t encryption_key,
+ ck_object_handle_t authentiation_key);
+
+ck_rv_t pakchois_login(pakchois_session_t *session, ck_user_type_t user_type,
+ unsigned char *pin, unsigned long pin_len);
+ck_rv_t pakchois_logout(pakchois_session_t *session);
+
+ck_rv_t pakchois_create_object(pakchois_session_t *session,
+ struct ck_attribute *templ,
+ unsigned long count,
+ ck_object_handle_t *object);
+ck_rv_t pakchois_copy_object(pakchois_session_t *session,
+ ck_object_handle_t object,
+ struct ck_attribute *templ, unsigned long count,
+ ck_object_handle_t *new_object);
+ck_rv_t pakchois_destroy_object(pakchois_session_t *session,
+ ck_object_handle_t object);
+ck_rv_t pakchois_get_object_size(pakchois_session_t *session,
+ ck_object_handle_t object,
+ unsigned long *size);
+
+ck_rv_t pakchois_get_attribute_value(pakchois_session_t *session,
+ ck_object_handle_t object,
+ struct ck_attribute *templ,
+ unsigned long count);
+ck_rv_t pakchois_set_attribute_value(pakchois_session_t *session,
+ ck_object_handle_t object,
+ struct ck_attribute *templ,
+ unsigned long count);
+ck_rv_t pakchois_find_objects_init(pakchois_session_t *session,
+ struct ck_attribute *templ,
+ unsigned long count);
+ck_rv_t pakchois_find_objects(pakchois_session_t *session,
+ ck_object_handle_t *object,
+ unsigned long max_object_count,
+ unsigned long *object_count);
+ck_rv_t pakchois_find_objects_final(pakchois_session_t *session);
+
+ck_rv_t pakchois_encrypt_init(pakchois_session_t *session,
+ struct ck_mechanism *mechanism,
+ ck_object_handle_t key);
+ck_rv_t pakchois_encrypt(pakchois_session_t *session,
+ unsigned char *data, unsigned long data_len,
+ unsigned char *encrypted_data,
+ unsigned long *encrypted_data_len);
+ck_rv_t pakchois_encrypt_update(pakchois_session_t *session,
+ unsigned char *part, unsigned long part_len,
+ unsigned char *encrypted_part,
+ unsigned long *encrypted_part_len);
+ck_rv_t pakchois_encrypt_final(pakchois_session_t *session,
+ unsigned char *last_encrypted_part,
+ unsigned long *last_encrypted_part_len);
+
+ck_rv_t pakchois_decrypt_init(pakchois_session_t *session,
+ struct ck_mechanism *mechanism,
+ ck_object_handle_t key);
+ck_rv_t pakchois_decrypt(pakchois_session_t *session,
+ unsigned char *encrypted_data,
+ unsigned long encrypted_data_len,
+ unsigned char *data, unsigned long *data_len);
+ck_rv_t pakchois_decrypt_update(pakchois_session_t *session,
+ unsigned char *encrypted_part,
+ unsigned long encrypted_part_len,
+ unsigned char *part, unsigned long *part_len);
+ck_rv_t pakchois_decrypt_final(pakchois_session_t *session,
+ unsigned char *last_part,
+ unsigned long *last_part_len);
+ck_rv_t pakchois_digest_init(pakchois_session_t *session,
+ struct ck_mechanism *mechanism);
+ck_rv_t pakchois_digest(pakchois_session_t *session, unsigned char *data,
+ unsigned long data_len, unsigned char *digest,
+ unsigned long *digest_len);
+ck_rv_t pakchois_digest_update(pakchois_session_t *session,
+ unsigned char *part, unsigned long part_len);
+ck_rv_t pakchois_digest_key(pakchois_session_t *session,
+ ck_object_handle_t key);
+ck_rv_t pakchois_digest_final(pakchois_session_t *session,
+ unsigned char *digest,
+ unsigned long *digest_len);
+
+ck_rv_t pakchois_sign_init(pakchois_session_t *session,
+ struct ck_mechanism *mechanism,
+ ck_object_handle_t key);
+ck_rv_t pakchois_sign(pakchois_session_t *session, unsigned char *data,
+ unsigned long data_len, unsigned char *signature,
+ unsigned long *signature_len);
+ck_rv_t pakchois_sign_update(pakchois_session_t *session,
+ unsigned char *part, unsigned long part_len);
+ck_rv_t pakchois_sign_final(pakchois_session_t *session,
+ unsigned char *signature,
+ unsigned long *signature_len);
+ck_rv_t pakchois_sign_recover_init(pakchois_session_t *session,
+ struct ck_mechanism *mechanism,
+ ck_object_handle_t key);
+ck_rv_t pakchois_sign_recover(pakchois_session_t *session,
+ unsigned char *data, unsigned long data_len,
+ unsigned char *signature,
+ unsigned long *signature_len);
+
+ck_rv_t pakchois_verify_init(pakchois_session_t *session,
+ struct ck_mechanism *mechanism,
+ ck_object_handle_t key);
+ck_rv_t pakchois_verify(pakchois_session_t *session, unsigned char *data,
+ unsigned long data_len, unsigned char *signature,
+ unsigned long signature_len);
+ck_rv_t pakchois_verify_update(pakchois_session_t *session,
+ unsigned char *part, unsigned long part_len);
+ck_rv_t pakchois_verify_final(pakchois_session_t *session,
+ unsigned char *signature,
+ unsigned long signature_len);
+ck_rv_t pakchois_verify_recover_init(pakchois_session_t *session,
+ struct ck_mechanism *mechanism,
+ ck_object_handle_t key);
+ck_rv_t pakchois_verify_recover(pakchois_session_t *session,
+ unsigned char *signature,
+ unsigned long signature_len,
+ unsigned char *data, unsigned long *data_len);
+
+ck_rv_t pakchois_digest_encrypt_update(pakchois_session_t *session,
+ unsigned char *part,
+ unsigned long part_len,
+ unsigned char *encrypted_part,
+ unsigned long *encrypted_part_len);
+ck_rv_t pakchois_decrypt_digest_update(pakchois_session_t *session,
+ unsigned char *encrypted_part,
+ unsigned long encrypted_part_len,
+ unsigned char *part,
+ unsigned long *part_len);
+ck_rv_t pakchois_sign_encrypt_update(pakchois_session_t *session,
+ unsigned char *part,
+ unsigned long part_len,
+ unsigned char *encrypted_part,
+ unsigned long *encrypted_part_len);
+ck_rv_t pakchois_decrypt_verify_update(pakchois_session_t *session,
+ unsigned char *encrypted_part,
+ unsigned long encrypted_part_len,
+ unsigned char *part,
+ unsigned long *part_len);
+
+ck_rv_t pakchois_generate_key(pakchois_session_t *session,
+ struct ck_mechanism *mechanism,
+ struct ck_attribute *templ,
+ unsigned long count, ck_object_handle_t *key);
+ck_rv_t pakchois_generate_key_pair(pakchois_session_t *session,
+ struct ck_mechanism *mechanism,
+ struct ck_attribute *public_key_template,
+ unsigned long public_key_attribute_count,
+ struct ck_attribute *private_key_template,
+ unsigned long private_key_attribute_count,
+ ck_object_handle_t *public_key,
+ ck_object_handle_t *private_key);
+
+ck_rv_t pakchois_wrap_key(pakchois_session_t *session,
+ struct ck_mechanism *mechanism,
+ ck_object_handle_t wrapping_key,
+ ck_object_handle_t key, unsigned char *wrapped_key,
+ unsigned long *wrapped_key_len);
+ck_rv_t pakchois_unwrap_key(pakchois_session_t *session,
+ struct ck_mechanism *mechanism,
+ ck_object_handle_t unwrapping_key,
+ unsigned char *wrapped_key,
+ unsigned long wrapped_key_len,
+ struct ck_attribute *templ,
+ unsigned long attribute_count,
+ ck_object_handle_t *key);
+ck_rv_t pakchois_derive_key(pakchois_session_t *session,
+ struct ck_mechanism *mechanism,
+ ck_object_handle_t base_key,
+ struct ck_attribute *templ,
+ unsigned long attribute_count,
+ ck_object_handle_t *key);
+
+ck_rv_t pakchois_seed_random(pakchois_session_t *session,
+ unsigned char *seed, unsigned long seed_len);
+ck_rv_t pakchois_generate_random(pakchois_session_t *session,
+ unsigned char *random_data,
+ unsigned long random_len);
+
+#endif /* PAKCHOIS_H */
diff --git a/lib/pakchois/pakchois11.h b/lib/pakchois/pakchois11.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2e6a1e3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/lib/pakchois/pakchois11.h
@@ -0,0 +1,1357 @@
+/* pkcs11.h
+ Copyright 2006, 2007 g10 Code GmbH
+ Copyright 2006 Andreas Jellinghaus
+
+ This file is free software; as a special exception the author gives
+ unlimited permission to copy and/or distribute it, with or without
+ modifications, as long as this notice is preserved.
+
+ This file is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
+ WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by law; without even
+ the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ PURPOSE. */
+
+/* Please submit changes back to the Scute project at
+ http://www.scute.org/ (or send them to address@hidden), so that
+ they can be picked up by other projects from there as well. */
+
+/* This file is a modified implementation of the PKCS #11 standard by
+ RSA Security Inc. It is mostly a drop-in replacement, with the
+ following change:
+
+ This header file does not require any macro definitions by the user
+ (like CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION etc). In fact, it defines those macros
+ for you (if useful, some are missing, let me know if you need
+ more).
+
+ There is an additional API available that does comply better to the
+ GNU coding standard. It can be switched on by defining
+ CRYPTOKI_GNU before including this header file. For this, the
+ following changes are made to the specification:
+
+ All structure types are changed to a "struct ck_foo" where CK_FOO
+ is the type name in PKCS #11.
+
+ All non-structure types are changed to ck_foo_t where CK_FOO is the
+ lowercase version of the type name in PKCS #11. The basic types
+ (CK_ULONG et al.) are removed without substitute.
+
+ All members of structures are modified in the following way: Type
+ indication prefixes are removed, and underscore characters are
+ inserted before words. Then the result is lowercased.
+
+ Note that function names are still in the original case, as they
+ need for ABI compatibility.
+
+ CK_FALSE, CK_TRUE and NULL_PTR are removed without substitute. Use
+ <stdbool.h>.
+
+ If CRYPTOKI_COMPAT is defined before including this header file,
+ then none of the API changes above take place, and the API is the
+ one defined by the PKCS #11 standard. */
+
+#ifndef PKCS11_H
+#define PKCS11_H 1
+
+#if defined(__cplusplus)
+extern "C" {
+#endif
+
+
+/* The version of cryptoki we implement. The revision is changed with
+ each modification of this file. If you do not use the "official"
+ version of this file, please consider deleting the revision macro
+ (you may use a macro with a different name to keep track of your
+ versions). */
+#define CRYPTOKI_VERSION_MAJOR 2
+#define CRYPTOKI_VERSION_MINOR 20
+#define CRYPTOKI_VERSION_REVISION 6
+
+
+/* Compatibility interface is default, unless CRYPTOKI_GNU is
+ given. */
+#ifndef CRYPTOKI_GNU
+#ifndef CRYPTOKI_COMPAT
+#define CRYPTOKI_COMPAT 1
+#endif
+#endif
+
+/* System dependencies. */
+
+#if defined(_WIN32) || defined(CRYPTOKI_FORCE_WIN32)
+
+/* There is a matching pop below. */
+#pragma pack(push, cryptoki, 1)
+
+#ifdef CRYPTOKI_EXPORTS
+#define CK_SPEC __declspec(dllexport)
+#else
+#define CK_SPEC __declspec(dllimport)
+#endif
+
+#else
+
+#define CK_SPEC
+
+#endif
+
+
+#ifdef CRYPTOKI_COMPAT
+ /* If we are in compatibility mode, switch all exposed names to the
+ PKCS #11 variant. There are corresponding #undefs below. */
+
+#define ck_flags_t CK_FLAGS
+#define ck_version _CK_VERSION
+
+#define ck_info _CK_INFO
+#define cryptoki_version cryptokiVersion
+#define manufacturer_id manufacturerID
+#define library_description libraryDescription
+#define library_version libraryVersion
+
+#define ck_notification_t CK_NOTIFICATION
+#define ck_slot_id_t CK_SLOT_ID
+
+#define ck_slot_info _CK_SLOT_INFO
+#define slot_description slotDescription
+#define hardware_version hardwareVersion
+#define firmware_version firmwareVersion
+
+#define ck_token_info _CK_TOKEN_INFO
+#define serial_number serialNumber
+#define max_session_count ulMaxSessionCount
+#define session_count ulSessionCount
+#define max_rw_session_count ulMaxRwSessionCount
+#define rw_session_count ulRwSessionCount
+#define max_pin_len ulMaxPinLen
+#define min_pin_len ulMinPinLen
+#define total_public_memory ulTotalPublicMemory
+#define free_public_memory ulFreePublicMemory
+#define total_private_memory ulTotalPrivateMemory
+#define free_private_memory ulFreePrivateMemory
+#define utc_time utcTime
+
+#define ck_session_handle_t CK_SESSION_HANDLE
+#define ck_user_type_t CK_USER_TYPE
+#define ck_state_t CK_STATE
+
+#define ck_session_info _CK_SESSION_INFO
+#define slot_id slotID
+#define device_error ulDeviceError
+
+#define ck_object_handle_t CK_OBJECT_HANDLE
+#define ck_object_class_t CK_OBJECT_CLASS
+#define ck_hw_feature_type_t CK_HW_FEATURE_TYPE
+#define ck_key_type_t CK_KEY_TYPE
+#define ck_certificate_type_t CK_CERTIFICATE_TYPE
+#define ck_attribute_type_t CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE
+
+#define ck_attribute _CK_ATTRIBUTE
+#define value pValue
+#define value_len ulValueLen
+
+#define ck_date _CK_DATE
+
+#define ck_mechanism_type_t CK_MECHANISM_TYPE
+
+#define ck_mechanism _CK_MECHANISM
+#define parameter pParameter
+#define parameter_len ulParameterLen
+
+#define ck_mechanism_info _CK_MECHANISM_INFO
+#define min_key_size ulMinKeySize
+#define max_key_size ulMaxKeySize
+
+#define ck_rv_t CK_RV
+#define ck_notify_t CK_NOTIFY
+
+#define ck_function_list _CK_FUNCTION_LIST
+
+#define ck_createmutex_t CK_CREATEMUTEX
+#define ck_destroymutex_t CK_DESTROYMUTEX
+#define ck_lockmutex_t CK_LOCKMUTEX
+#define ck_unlockmutex_t CK_UNLOCKMUTEX
+
+#define ck_c_initialize_args _CK_C_INITIALIZE_ARGS
+#define create_mutex CreateMutex
+#define destroy_mutex DestroyMutex
+#define lock_mutex LockMutex
+#define unlock_mutex UnlockMutex
+#define reserved pReserved
+
+#endif /* CRYPTOKI_COMPAT */
+
+
+
+typedef unsigned long ck_flags_t;
+
+struct ck_version
+{
+ unsigned char major;
+ unsigned char minor;
+};
+
+
+struct ck_info
+{
+ struct ck_version cryptoki_version;
+ unsigned char manufacturer_id[32];
+ ck_flags_t flags;
+ unsigned char library_description[32];
+ struct ck_version library_version;
+};
+
+
+typedef unsigned long ck_notification_t;
+
+#define CKN_SURRENDER (0)
+
+
+typedef unsigned long ck_slot_id_t;
+
+
+struct ck_slot_info
+{
+ unsigned char slot_description[64];
+ unsigned char manufacturer_id[32];
+ ck_flags_t flags;
+ struct ck_version hardware_version;
+ struct ck_version firmware_version;
+};
+
+
+#define CKF_TOKEN_PRESENT (1 << 0)
+#define CKF_REMOVABLE_DEVICE (1 << 1)
+#define CKF_HW_SLOT (1 << 2)
+#define CKF_ARRAY_ATTRIBUTE (1 << 30)
+
+
+struct ck_token_info
+{
+ unsigned char label[32];
+ unsigned char manufacturer_id[32];
+ unsigned char model[16];
+ unsigned char serial_number[16];
+ ck_flags_t flags;
+ unsigned long max_session_count;
+ unsigned long session_count;
+ unsigned long max_rw_session_count;
+ unsigned long rw_session_count;
+ unsigned long max_pin_len;
+ unsigned long min_pin_len;
+ unsigned long total_public_memory;
+ unsigned long free_public_memory;
+ unsigned long total_private_memory;
+ unsigned long free_private_memory;
+ struct ck_version hardware_version;
+ struct ck_version firmware_version;
+ unsigned char utc_time[16];
+};
+
+
+#define CKF_RNG (1 << 0)
+#define CKF_WRITE_PROTECTED (1 << 1)
+#define CKF_LOGIN_REQUIRED (1 << 2)
+#define CKF_USER_PIN_INITIALIZED (1 << 3)
+#define CKF_RESTORE_KEY_NOT_NEEDED (1 << 5)
+#define CKF_CLOCK_ON_TOKEN (1 << 6)
+#define CKF_PROTECTED_AUTHENTICATION_PATH (1 << 8)
+#define CKF_DUAL_CRYPTO_OPERATIONS (1 << 9)
+#define CKF_TOKEN_INITIALIZED (1 << 10)
+#define CKF_SECONDARY_AUTHENTICATION (1 << 11)
+#define CKF_USER_PIN_COUNT_LOW (1 << 16)
+#define CKF_USER_PIN_FINAL_TRY (1 << 17)
+#define CKF_USER_PIN_LOCKED (1 << 18)
+#define CKF_USER_PIN_TO_BE_CHANGED (1 << 19)
+#define CKF_SO_PIN_COUNT_LOW (1 << 20)
+#define CKF_SO_PIN_FINAL_TRY (1 << 21)
+#define CKF_SO_PIN_LOCKED (1 << 22)
+#define CKF_SO_PIN_TO_BE_CHANGED (1 << 23)
+
+#define CK_UNAVAILABLE_INFORMATION ((unsigned long) -1)
+#define CK_EFFECTIVELY_INFINITE (0)
+
+
+typedef unsigned long ck_session_handle_t;
+
+#define CK_INVALID_HANDLE (0)
+
+
+typedef unsigned long ck_user_type_t;
+
+#define CKU_SO (0)
+#define CKU_USER (1)
+#define CKU_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC (2)
+
+
+typedef unsigned long ck_state_t;
+
+#define CKS_RO_PUBLIC_SESSION (0)
+#define CKS_RO_USER_FUNCTIONS (1)
+#define CKS_RW_PUBLIC_SESSION (2)
+#define CKS_RW_USER_FUNCTIONS (3)
+#define CKS_RW_SO_FUNCTIONS (4)
+
+
+struct ck_session_info
+{
+ ck_slot_id_t slot_id;
+ ck_state_t state;
+ ck_flags_t flags;
+ unsigned long device_error;
+};
+
+#define CKF_RW_SESSION (1 << 1)
+#define CKF_SERIAL_SESSION (1 << 2)
+
+
+typedef unsigned long ck_object_handle_t;
+
+
+typedef unsigned long ck_object_class_t;
+
+#define CKO_DATA (0)
+#define CKO_CERTIFICATE (1)
+#define CKO_PUBLIC_KEY (2)
+#define CKO_PRIVATE_KEY (3)
+#define CKO_SECRET_KEY (4)
+#define CKO_HW_FEATURE (5)
+#define CKO_DOMAIN_PARAMETERS (6)
+#define CKO_MECHANISM (7)
+#define CKO_VENDOR_DEFINED ((unsigned long) (1 << 31))
+
+
+typedef unsigned long ck_hw_feature_type_t;
+
+#define CKH_MONOTONIC_COUNTER (1)
+#define CKH_CLOCK (2)
+#define CKH_USER_INTERFACE (3)
+#define CKH_VENDOR_DEFINED ((unsigned long) (1 << 31))
+
+
+typedef unsigned long ck_key_type_t;
+
+#define CKK_RSA (0)
+#define CKK_DSA (1)
+#define CKK_DH (2)
+#define CKK_ECDSA (3)
+#define CKK_EC (3)
+#define CKK_X9_42_DH (4)
+#define CKK_KEA (5)
+#define CKK_GENERIC_SECRET (0x10)
+#define CKK_RC2 (0x11)
+#define CKK_RC4 (0x12)
+#define CKK_DES (0x13)
+#define CKK_DES2 (0x14)
+#define CKK_DES3 (0x15)
+#define CKK_CAST (0x16)
+#define CKK_CAST3 (0x17)
+#define CKK_CAST128 (0x18)
+#define CKK_RC5 (0x19)
+#define CKK_IDEA (0x1a)
+#define CKK_SKIPJACK (0x1b)
+#define CKK_BATON (0x1c)
+#define CKK_JUNIPER (0x1d)
+#define CKK_CDMF (0x1e)
+#define CKK_AES (0x1f)
+#define CKK_BLOWFISH (0x20)
+#define CKK_TWOFISH (0x21)
+#define CKK_VENDOR_DEFINED ((unsigned long) (1 << 31))
+
+
+typedef unsigned long ck_certificate_type_t;
+
+#define CKC_X_509 (0)
+#define CKC_X_509_ATTR_CERT (1)
+#define CKC_WTLS (2)
+#define CKC_VENDOR_DEFINED ((unsigned long) (1 << 31))
+
+
+typedef unsigned long ck_attribute_type_t;
+
+#define CKA_CLASS (0)
+#define CKA_TOKEN (1)
+#define CKA_PRIVATE (2)
+#define CKA_LABEL (3)
+#define CKA_APPLICATION (0x10)
+#define CKA_VALUE (0x11)
+#define CKA_OBJECT_ID (0x12)
+#define CKA_CERTIFICATE_TYPE (0x80)
+#define CKA_ISSUER (0x81)
+#define CKA_SERIAL_NUMBER (0x82)
+#define CKA_AC_ISSUER (0x83)
+#define CKA_OWNER (0x84)
+#define CKA_ATTR_TYPES (0x85)
+#define CKA_TRUSTED (0x86)
+#define CKA_CERTIFICATE_CATEGORY (0x87)
+#define CKA_JAVA_MIDP_SECURITY_DOMAIN (0x88)
+#define CKA_URL (0x89)
+#define CKA_HASH_OF_SUBJECT_PUBLIC_KEY (0x8a)
+#define CKA_HASH_OF_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY (0x8b)
+#define CKA_CHECK_VALUE (0x90)
+#define CKA_KEY_TYPE (0x100)
+#define CKA_SUBJECT (0x101)
+#define CKA_ID (0x102)
+#define CKA_SENSITIVE (0x103)
+#define CKA_ENCRYPT (0x104)
+#define CKA_DECRYPT (0x105)
+#define CKA_WRAP (0x106)
+#define CKA_UNWRAP (0x107)
+#define CKA_SIGN (0x108)
+#define CKA_SIGN_RECOVER (0x109)
+#define CKA_VERIFY (0x10a)
+#define CKA_VERIFY_RECOVER (0x10b)
+#define CKA_DERIVE (0x10c)
+#define CKA_START_DATE (0x110)
+#define CKA_END_DATE (0x111)
+#define CKA_MODULUS (0x120)
+#define CKA_MODULUS_BITS (0x121)
+#define CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT (0x122)
+#define CKA_PRIVATE_EXPONENT (0x123)
+#define CKA_PRIME_1 (0x124)
+#define CKA_PRIME_2 (0x125)
+#define CKA_EXPONENT_1 (0x126)
+#define CKA_EXPONENT_2 (0x127)
+#define CKA_COEFFICIENT (0x128)
+#define CKA_PRIME (0x130)
+#define CKA_SUBPRIME (0x131)
+#define CKA_BASE (0x132)
+#define CKA_PRIME_BITS (0x133)
+#define CKA_SUB_PRIME_BITS (0x134)
+#define CKA_VALUE_BITS (0x160)
+#define CKA_VALUE_LEN (0x161)
+#define CKA_EXTRACTABLE (0x162)
+#define CKA_LOCAL (0x163)
+#define CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE (0x164)
+#define CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE (0x165)
+#define CKA_KEY_GEN_MECHANISM (0x166)
+#define CKA_MODIFIABLE (0x170)
+#define CKA_ECDSA_PARAMS (0x180)
+#define CKA_EC_PARAMS (0x180)
+#define CKA_EC_POINT (0x181)
+#define CKA_SECONDARY_AUTH (0x200)
+#define CKA_AUTH_PIN_FLAGS (0x201)
+#define CKA_ALWAYS_AUTHENTICATE (0x202)
+#define CKA_WRAP_WITH_TRUSTED (0x210)
+#define CKA_HW_FEATURE_TYPE (0x300)
+#define CKA_RESET_ON_INIT (0x301)
+#define CKA_HAS_RESET (0x302)
+#define CKA_PIXEL_X (0x400)
+#define CKA_PIXEL_Y (0x401)
+#define CKA_RESOLUTION (0x402)
+#define CKA_CHAR_ROWS (0x403)
+#define CKA_CHAR_COLUMNS (0x404)
+#define CKA_COLOR (0x405)
+#define CKA_BITS_PER_PIXEL (0x406)
+#define CKA_CHAR_SETS (0x480)
+#define CKA_ENCODING_METHODS (0x481)
+#define CKA_MIME_TYPES (0x482)
+#define CKA_MECHANISM_TYPE (0x500)
+#define CKA_REQUIRED_CMS_ATTRIBUTES (0x501)
+#define CKA_DEFAULT_CMS_ATTRIBUTES (0x502)
+#define CKA_SUPPORTED_CMS_ATTRIBUTES (0x503)
+#define CKA_WRAP_TEMPLATE (CKF_ARRAY_ATTRIBUTE | 0x211)
+#define CKA_UNWRAP_TEMPLATE (CKF_ARRAY_ATTRIBUTE | 0x212)
+#define CKA_ALLOWED_MECHANISMS (CKF_ARRAY_ATTRIBUTE | 0x600)
+#define CKA_VENDOR_DEFINED ((unsigned long) (1 << 31))
+
+
+struct ck_attribute
+{
+ ck_attribute_type_t type;
+ void *value;
+ unsigned long value_len;
+};
+
+
+struct ck_date
+{
+ unsigned char year[4];
+ unsigned char month[2];
+ unsigned char day[2];
+};
+
+
+typedef unsigned long ck_mechanism_type_t;
+
+#define CKM_RSA_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN (0)
+#define CKM_RSA_PKCS (1)
+#define CKM_RSA_9796 (2)
+#define CKM_RSA_X_509 (3)
+#define CKM_MD2_RSA_PKCS (4)
+#define CKM_MD5_RSA_PKCS (5)
+#define CKM_SHA1_RSA_PKCS (6)
+#define CKM_RIPEMD128_RSA_PKCS (7)
+#define CKM_RIPEMD160_RSA_PKCS (8)
+#define CKM_RSA_PKCS_OAEP (9)
+#define CKM_RSA_X9_31_KEY_PAIR_GEN (0xa)
+#define CKM_RSA_X9_31 (0xb)
+#define CKM_SHA1_RSA_X9_31 (0xc)
+#define CKM_RSA_PKCS_PSS (0xd)
+#define CKM_SHA1_RSA_PKCS_PSS (0xe)
+#define CKM_DSA_KEY_PAIR_GEN (0x10)
+#define CKM_DSA (0x11)
+#define CKM_DSA_SHA1 (0x12)
+#define CKM_DH_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN (0x20)
+#define CKM_DH_PKCS_DERIVE (0x21)
+#define CKM_X9_42_DH_KEY_PAIR_GEN (0x30)
+#define CKM_X9_42_DH_DERIVE (0x31)
+#define CKM_X9_42_DH_HYBRID_DERIVE (0x32)
+#define CKM_X9_42_MQV_DERIVE (0x33)
+#define CKM_SHA256_RSA_PKCS (0x40)
+#define CKM_SHA384_RSA_PKCS (0x41)
+#define CKM_SHA512_RSA_PKCS (0x42)
+#define CKM_SHA256_RSA_PKCS_PSS (0x43)
+#define CKM_SHA384_RSA_PKCS_PSS (0x44)
+#define CKM_SHA512_RSA_PKCS_PSS (0x45)
+#define CKM_RC2_KEY_GEN (0x100)
+#define CKM_RC2_ECB (0x101)
+#define CKM_RC2_CBC (0x102)
+#define CKM_RC2_MAC (0x103)
+#define CKM_RC2_MAC_GENERAL (0x104)
+#define CKM_RC2_CBC_PAD (0x105)
+#define CKM_RC4_KEY_GEN (0x110)
+#define CKM_RC4 (0x111)
+#define CKM_DES_KEY_GEN (0x120)
+#define CKM_DES_ECB (0x121)
+#define CKM_DES_CBC (0x122)
+#define CKM_DES_MAC (0x123)
+#define CKM_DES_MAC_GENERAL (0x124)
+#define CKM_DES_CBC_PAD (0x125)
+#define CKM_DES2_KEY_GEN (0x130)
+#define CKM_DES3_KEY_GEN (0x131)
+#define CKM_DES3_ECB (0x132)
+#define CKM_DES3_CBC (0x133)
+#define CKM_DES3_MAC (0x134)
+#define CKM_DES3_MAC_GENERAL (0x135)
+#define CKM_DES3_CBC_PAD (0x136)
+#define CKM_CDMF_KEY_GEN (0x140)
+#define CKM_CDMF_ECB (0x141)
+#define CKM_CDMF_CBC (0x142)
+#define CKM_CDMF_MAC (0x143)
+#define CKM_CDMF_MAC_GENERAL (0x144)
+#define CKM_CDMF_CBC_PAD (0x145)
+#define CKM_MD2 (0x200)
+#define CKM_MD2_HMAC (0x201)
+#define CKM_MD2_HMAC_GENERAL (0x202)
+#define CKM_MD5 (0x210)
+#define CKM_MD5_HMAC (0x211)
+#define CKM_MD5_HMAC_GENERAL (0x212)
+#define CKM_SHA_1 (0x220)
+#define CKM_SHA_1_HMAC (0x221)
+#define CKM_SHA_1_HMAC_GENERAL (0x222)
+#define CKM_RIPEMD128 (0x230)
+#define CKM_RIPEMD128_HMAC (0x231)
+#define CKM_RIPEMD128_HMAC_GENERAL (0x232)
+#define CKM_RIPEMD160 (0x240)
+#define CKM_RIPEMD160_HMAC (0x241)
+#define CKM_RIPEMD160_HMAC_GENERAL (0x242)
+#define CKM_SHA256 (0x250)
+#define CKM_SHA256_HMAC (0x251)
+#define CKM_SHA256_HMAC_GENERAL (0x252)
+#define CKM_SHA384 (0x260)
+#define CKM_SHA384_HMAC (0x261)
+#define CKM_SHA384_HMAC_GENERAL (0x262)
+#define CKM_SHA512 (0x270)
+#define CKM_SHA512_HMAC (0x271)
+#define CKM_SHA512_HMAC_GENERAL (0x272)
+#define CKM_CAST_KEY_GEN (0x300)
+#define CKM_CAST_ECB (0x301)
+#define CKM_CAST_CBC (0x302)
+#define CKM_CAST_MAC (0x303)
+#define CKM_CAST_MAC_GENERAL (0x304)
+#define CKM_CAST_CBC_PAD (0x305)
+#define CKM_CAST3_KEY_GEN (0x310)
+#define CKM_CAST3_ECB (0x311)
+#define CKM_CAST3_CBC (0x312)
+#define CKM_CAST3_MAC (0x313)
+#define CKM_CAST3_MAC_GENERAL (0x314)
+#define CKM_CAST3_CBC_PAD (0x315)
+#define CKM_CAST5_KEY_GEN (0x320)
+#define CKM_CAST128_KEY_GEN (0x320)
+#define CKM_CAST5_ECB (0x321)
+#define CKM_CAST128_ECB (0x321)
+#define CKM_CAST5_CBC (0x322)
+#define CKM_CAST128_CBC (0x322)
+#define CKM_CAST5_MAC (0x323)
+#define CKM_CAST128_MAC (0x323)
+#define CKM_CAST5_MAC_GENERAL (0x324)
+#define CKM_CAST128_MAC_GENERAL (0x324)
+#define CKM_CAST5_CBC_PAD (0x325)
+#define CKM_CAST128_CBC_PAD (0x325)
+#define CKM_RC5_KEY_GEN (0x330)
+#define CKM_RC5_ECB (0x331)
+#define CKM_RC5_CBC (0x332)
+#define CKM_RC5_MAC (0x333)
+#define CKM_RC5_MAC_GENERAL (0x334)
+#define CKM_RC5_CBC_PAD (0x335)
+#define CKM_IDEA_KEY_GEN (0x340)
+#define CKM_IDEA_ECB (0x341)
+#define CKM_IDEA_CBC (0x342)
+#define CKM_IDEA_MAC (0x343)
+#define CKM_IDEA_MAC_GENERAL (0x344)
+#define CKM_IDEA_CBC_PAD (0x345)
+#define CKM_GENERIC_SECRET_KEY_GEN (0x350)
+#define CKM_CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_KEY (0x360)
+#define CKM_CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA (0x362)
+#define CKM_CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE (0x363)
+#define CKM_XOR_BASE_AND_DATA (0x364)
+#define CKM_EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY (0x365)
+#define CKM_SSL3_PRE_MASTER_KEY_GEN (0x370)
+#define CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE (0x371)
+#define CKM_SSL3_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE (0x372)
+#define CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH (0x373)
+#define CKM_TLS_PRE_MASTER_KEY_GEN (0x374)
+#define CKM_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE (0x375)
+#define CKM_TLS_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE (0x376)
+#define CKM_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH (0x377)
+#define CKM_SSL3_MD5_MAC (0x380)
+#define CKM_SSL3_SHA1_MAC (0x381)
+#define CKM_MD5_KEY_DERIVATION (0x390)
+#define CKM_MD2_KEY_DERIVATION (0x391)
+#define CKM_SHA1_KEY_DERIVATION (0x392)
+#define CKM_PBE_MD2_DES_CBC (0x3a0)
+#define CKM_PBE_MD5_DES_CBC (0x3a1)
+#define CKM_PBE_MD5_CAST_CBC (0x3a2)
+#define CKM_PBE_MD5_CAST3_CBC (0x3a3)
+#define CKM_PBE_MD5_CAST5_CBC (0x3a4)
+#define CKM_PBE_MD5_CAST128_CBC (0x3a4)
+#define CKM_PBE_SHA1_CAST5_CBC (0x3a5)
+#define CKM_PBE_SHA1_CAST128_CBC (0x3a5)
+#define CKM_PBE_SHA1_RC4_128 (0x3a6)
+#define CKM_PBE_SHA1_RC4_40 (0x3a7)
+#define CKM_PBE_SHA1_DES3_EDE_CBC (0x3a8)
+#define CKM_PBE_SHA1_DES2_EDE_CBC (0x3a9)
+#define CKM_PBE_SHA1_RC2_128_CBC (0x3aa)
+#define CKM_PBE_SHA1_RC2_40_CBC (0x3ab)
+#define CKM_PKCS5_PBKD2 (0x3b0)
+#define CKM_PBA_SHA1_WITH_SHA1_HMAC (0x3c0)
+#define CKM_KEY_WRAP_LYNKS (0x400)
+#define CKM_KEY_WRAP_SET_OAEP (0x401)
+#define CKM_SKIPJACK_KEY_GEN (0x1000)
+#define CKM_SKIPJACK_ECB64 (0x1001)
+#define CKM_SKIPJACK_CBC64 (0x1002)
+#define CKM_SKIPJACK_OFB64 (0x1003)
+#define CKM_SKIPJACK_CFB64 (0x1004)
+#define CKM_SKIPJACK_CFB32 (0x1005)
+#define CKM_SKIPJACK_CFB16 (0x1006)
+#define CKM_SKIPJACK_CFB8 (0x1007)
+#define CKM_SKIPJACK_WRAP (0x1008)
+#define CKM_SKIPJACK_PRIVATE_WRAP (0x1009)
+#define CKM_SKIPJACK_RELAYX (0x100a)
+#define CKM_KEA_KEY_PAIR_GEN (0x1010)
+#define CKM_KEA_KEY_DERIVE (0x1011)
+#define CKM_FORTEZZA_TIMESTAMP (0x1020)
+#define CKM_BATON_KEY_GEN (0x1030)
+#define CKM_BATON_ECB128 (0x1031)
+#define CKM_BATON_ECB96 (0x1032)
+#define CKM_BATON_CBC128 (0x1033)
+#define CKM_BATON_COUNTER (0x1034)
+#define CKM_BATON_SHUFFLE (0x1035)
+#define CKM_BATON_WRAP (0x1036)
+#define CKM_ECDSA_KEY_PAIR_GEN (0x1040)
+#define CKM_EC_KEY_PAIR_GEN (0x1040)
+#define CKM_ECDSA (0x1041)
+#define CKM_ECDSA_SHA1 (0x1042)
+#define CKM_ECDH1_DERIVE (0x1050)
+#define CKM_ECDH1_COFACTOR_DERIVE (0x1051)
+#define CKM_ECMQV_DERIVE (0x1052)
+#define CKM_JUNIPER_KEY_GEN (0x1060)
+#define CKM_JUNIPER_ECB128 (0x1061)
+#define CKM_JUNIPER_CBC128 (0x1062)
+#define CKM_JUNIPER_COUNTER (0x1063)
+#define CKM_JUNIPER_SHUFFLE (0x1064)
+#define CKM_JUNIPER_WRAP (0x1065)
+#define CKM_FASTHASH (0x1070)
+#define CKM_AES_KEY_GEN (0x1080)
+#define CKM_AES_ECB (0x1081)
+#define CKM_AES_CBC (0x1082)
+#define CKM_AES_MAC (0x1083)
+#define CKM_AES_MAC_GENERAL (0x1084)
+#define CKM_AES_CBC_PAD (0x1085)
+#define CKM_DSA_PARAMETER_GEN (0x2000)
+#define CKM_DH_PKCS_PARAMETER_GEN (0x2001)
+#define CKM_X9_42_DH_PARAMETER_GEN (0x2002)
+#define CKM_VENDOR_DEFINED ((unsigned long) (1 << 31))
+
+
+struct ck_mechanism
+{
+ ck_mechanism_type_t mechanism;
+ void *parameter;
+ unsigned long parameter_len;
+};
+
+
+struct ck_mechanism_info
+{
+ unsigned long min_key_size;
+ unsigned long max_key_size;
+ ck_flags_t flags;
+};
+
+#define CKF_HW (1 << 0)
+#define CKF_ENCRYPT (1 << 8)
+#define CKF_DECRYPT (1 << 9)
+#define CKF_DIGEST (1 << 10)
+#define CKF_SIGN (1 << 11)
+#define CKF_SIGN_RECOVER (1 << 12)
+#define CKF_VERIFY (1 << 13)
+#define CKF_VERIFY_RECOVER (1 << 14)
+#define CKF_GENERATE (1 << 15)
+#define CKF_GENERATE_KEY_PAIR (1 << 16)
+#define CKF_WRAP (1 << 17)
+#define CKF_UNWRAP (1 << 18)
+#define CKF_DERIVE (1 << 19)
+#define CKF_EXTENSION ((unsigned long) (1 << 31))
+
+
+/* Flags for C_WaitForSlotEvent. */
+#define CKF_DONT_BLOCK (1)
+
+
+typedef unsigned long ck_rv_t;
+
+
+typedef ck_rv_t (*ck_notify_t) (ck_session_handle_t session,
+ ck_notification_t event, void *application);
+
+/* Forward reference. */
+struct ck_function_list;
+
+#define _CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(name, args) \
+typedef ck_rv_t (*CK_ ## name) args; \
+ck_rv_t CK_SPEC name args
+
+_CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_Initialize, (void *init_args));
+_CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_Finalize, (void *reserved));
+_CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_GetInfo, (struct ck_info *info));
+_CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_GetFunctionList,
+ (struct ck_function_list **function_list));
+
+_CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_GetSlotList,
+ (unsigned char token_present, ck_slot_id_t *slot_list,
+ unsigned long *count));
+_CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_GetSlotInfo,
+ (ck_slot_id_t slot_id, struct ck_slot_info *info));
+_CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_GetTokenInfo,
+ (ck_slot_id_t slot_id, struct ck_token_info *info));
+_CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_WaitForSlotEvent,
+ (ck_flags_t flags, ck_slot_id_t *slot, void *reserved));
+_CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_GetMechanismList,
+ (ck_slot_id_t slot_id,
+ ck_mechanism_type_t *mechanism_list,
+ unsigned long *count));
+_CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_GetMechanismInfo,
+ (ck_slot_id_t slot_id, ck_mechanism_type_t type,
+ struct ck_mechanism_info *info));
+_CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_InitToken,
+ (ck_slot_id_t slot_id, unsigned char *pin,
+ unsigned long pin_len, unsigned char *label));
+_CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_InitPIN,
+ (ck_session_handle_t session, unsigned char *pin,
+ unsigned long pin_len));
+_CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_SetPIN,
+ (ck_session_handle_t session, unsigned char *old_pin,
+ unsigned long old_len, unsigned char *new_pin,
+ unsigned long new_len));
+
+_CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_OpenSession,
+ (ck_slot_id_t slot_id, ck_flags_t flags,
+ void *application, ck_notify_t notify,
+ ck_session_handle_t *session));
+_CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_CloseSession, (ck_session_handle_t session));
+_CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_CloseAllSessions, (ck_slot_id_t slot_id));
+_CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_GetSessionInfo,
+ (ck_session_handle_t session,
+ struct ck_session_info *info));
+_CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_GetOperationState,
+ (ck_session_handle_t session,
+ unsigned char *operation_state,
+ unsigned long *operation_state_len));
+_CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_SetOperationState,
+ (ck_session_handle_t session,
+ unsigned char *operation_state,
+ unsigned long operation_state_len,
+ ck_object_handle_t encryption_key,
+ ck_object_handle_t authentiation_key));
+_CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_Login,
+ (ck_session_handle_t session, ck_user_type_t user_type,
+ unsigned char *pin, unsigned long pin_len));
+_CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_Logout, (ck_session_handle_t session));
+
+_CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_CreateObject,
+ (ck_session_handle_t session,
+ struct ck_attribute *templ,
+ unsigned long count, ck_object_handle_t *object));
+_CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_CopyObject,
+ (ck_session_handle_t session, ck_object_handle_t object,
+ struct ck_attribute *templ, unsigned long count,
+ ck_object_handle_t *new_object));
+_CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_DestroyObject,
+ (ck_session_handle_t session,
+ ck_object_handle_t object));
+_CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_GetObjectSize,
+ (ck_session_handle_t session,
+ ck_object_handle_t object,
+ unsigned long *size));
+_CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_GetAttributeValue,
+ (ck_session_handle_t session,
+ ck_object_handle_t object,
+ struct ck_attribute *templ,
+ unsigned long count));
+_CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_SetAttributeValue,
+ (ck_session_handle_t session,
+ ck_object_handle_t object,
+ struct ck_attribute *templ,
+ unsigned long count));
+_CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_FindObjectsInit,
+ (ck_session_handle_t session,
+ struct ck_attribute *templ,
+ unsigned long count));
+_CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_FindObjects,
+ (ck_session_handle_t session,
+ ck_object_handle_t *object,
+ unsigned long max_object_count,
+ unsigned long *object_count));
+_CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_FindObjectsFinal,
+ (ck_session_handle_t session));
+
+_CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_EncryptInit,
+ (ck_session_handle_t session,
+ struct ck_mechanism *mechanism,
+ ck_object_handle_t key));
+_CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_Encrypt,
+ (ck_session_handle_t session,
+ unsigned char *data, unsigned long data_len,
+ unsigned char *encrypted_data,
+ unsigned long *encrypted_data_len));
+_CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_EncryptUpdate,
+ (ck_session_handle_t session,
+ unsigned char *part, unsigned long part_len,
+ unsigned char *encrypted_part,
+ unsigned long *encrypted_part_len));
+_CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_EncryptFinal,
+ (ck_session_handle_t session,
+ unsigned char *last_encrypted_part,
+ unsigned long *last_encrypted_part_len));
+
+_CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_DecryptInit,
+ (ck_session_handle_t session,
+ struct ck_mechanism *mechanism,
+ ck_object_handle_t key));
+_CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_Decrypt,
+ (ck_session_handle_t session,
+ unsigned char *encrypted_data,
+ unsigned long encrypted_data_len,
+ unsigned char *data, unsigned long *data_len));
+_CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_DecryptUpdate,
+ (ck_session_handle_t session,
+ unsigned char *encrypted_part,
+ unsigned long encrypted_part_len,
+ unsigned char *part, unsigned long *part_len));
+_CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_DecryptFinal,
+ (ck_session_handle_t session,
+ unsigned char *last_part,
+ unsigned long *last_part_len));
+
+_CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_DigestInit,
+ (ck_session_handle_t session,
+ struct ck_mechanism *mechanism));
+_CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_Digest,
+ (ck_session_handle_t session,
+ unsigned char *data, unsigned long data_len,
+ unsigned char *digest,
+ unsigned long *digest_len));
+_CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_DigestUpdate,
+ (ck_session_handle_t session,
+ unsigned char *part, unsigned long part_len));
+_CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_DigestKey,
+ (ck_session_handle_t session, ck_object_handle_t key));
+_CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_DigestFinal,
+ (ck_session_handle_t session,
+ unsigned char *digest,
+ unsigned long *digest_len));
+
+_CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_SignInit,
+ (ck_session_handle_t session,
+ struct ck_mechanism *mechanism,
+ ck_object_handle_t key));
+_CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_Sign,
+ (ck_session_handle_t session,
+ unsigned char *data, unsigned long data_len,
+ unsigned char *signature,
+ unsigned long *signature_len));
+_CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_SignUpdate,
+ (ck_session_handle_t session,
+ unsigned char *part, unsigned long part_len));
+_CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_SignFinal,
+ (ck_session_handle_t session,
+ unsigned char *signature,
+ unsigned long *signature_len));
+_CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_SignRecoverInit,
+ (ck_session_handle_t session,
+ struct ck_mechanism *mechanism,
+ ck_object_handle_t key));
+_CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_SignRecover,
+ (ck_session_handle_t session,
+ unsigned char *data, unsigned long data_len,
+ unsigned char *signature,
+ unsigned long *signature_len));
+
+_CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_VerifyInit,
+ (ck_session_handle_t session,
+ struct ck_mechanism *mechanism,
+ ck_object_handle_t key));
+_CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_Verify,
+ (ck_session_handle_t session,
+ unsigned char *data, unsigned long data_len,
+ unsigned char *signature,
+ unsigned long signature_len));
+_CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_VerifyUpdate,
+ (ck_session_handle_t session,
+ unsigned char *part, unsigned long part_len));
+_CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_VerifyFinal,
+ (ck_session_handle_t session,
+ unsigned char *signature,
+ unsigned long signature_len));
+_CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_VerifyRecoverInit,
+ (ck_session_handle_t session,
+ struct ck_mechanism *mechanism,
+ ck_object_handle_t key));
+_CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_VerifyRecover,
+ (ck_session_handle_t session,
+ unsigned char *signature,
+ unsigned long signature_len,
+ unsigned char *data,
+ unsigned long *data_len));
+
+_CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_DigestEncryptUpdate,
+ (ck_session_handle_t session,
+ unsigned char *part, unsigned long part_len,
+ unsigned char *encrypted_part,
+ unsigned long *encrypted_part_len));
+_CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_DecryptDigestUpdate,
+ (ck_session_handle_t session,
+ unsigned char *encrypted_part,
+ unsigned long encrypted_part_len,
+ unsigned char *part,
+ unsigned long *part_len));
+_CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_SignEncryptUpdate,
+ (ck_session_handle_t session,
+ unsigned char *part, unsigned long part_len,
+ unsigned char *encrypted_part,
+ unsigned long *encrypted_part_len));
+_CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_DecryptVerifyUpdate,
+ (ck_session_handle_t session,
+ unsigned char *encrypted_part,
+ unsigned long encrypted_part_len,
+ unsigned char *part,
+ unsigned long *part_len));
+
+_CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_GenerateKey,
+ (ck_session_handle_t session,
+ struct ck_mechanism *mechanism,
+ struct ck_attribute *templ,
+ unsigned long count,
+ ck_object_handle_t *key));
+_CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_GenerateKeyPair,
+ (ck_session_handle_t session,
+ struct ck_mechanism *mechanism,
+ struct ck_attribute *public_key_template,
+ unsigned long public_key_attribute_count,
+ struct ck_attribute *private_key_template,
+ unsigned long private_key_attribute_count,
+ ck_object_handle_t *public_key,
+ ck_object_handle_t *private_key));
+_CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_WrapKey,
+ (ck_session_handle_t session,
+ struct ck_mechanism *mechanism,
+ ck_object_handle_t wrapping_key,
+ ck_object_handle_t key,
+ unsigned char *wrapped_key,
+ unsigned long *wrapped_key_len));
+_CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_UnwrapKey,
+ (ck_session_handle_t session,
+ struct ck_mechanism *mechanism,
+ ck_object_handle_t unwrapping_key,
+ unsigned char *wrapped_key,
+ unsigned long wrapped_key_len,
+ struct ck_attribute *templ,
+ unsigned long attribute_count,
+ ck_object_handle_t *key));
+_CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_DeriveKey,
+ (ck_session_handle_t session,
+ struct ck_mechanism *mechanism,
+ ck_object_handle_t base_key,
+ struct ck_attribute *templ,
+ unsigned long attribute_count,
+ ck_object_handle_t *key));
+
+_CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_SeedRandom,
+ (ck_session_handle_t session, unsigned char *seed,
+ unsigned long seed_len));
+_CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_GenerateRandom,
+ (ck_session_handle_t session,
+ unsigned char *random_data,
+ unsigned long random_len));
+
+_CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_GetFunctionStatus, (ck_session_handle_t session));
+_CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_CancelFunction, (ck_session_handle_t session));
+
+
+struct ck_function_list
+{
+ struct ck_version version;
+ CK_C_Initialize C_Initialize;
+ CK_C_Finalize C_Finalize;
+ CK_C_GetInfo C_GetInfo;
+ CK_C_GetFunctionList C_GetFunctionList;
+ CK_C_GetSlotList C_GetSlotList;
+ CK_C_GetSlotInfo C_GetSlotInfo;
+ CK_C_GetTokenInfo C_GetTokenInfo;
+ CK_C_GetMechanismList C_GetMechanismList;
+ CK_C_GetMechanismInfo C_GetMechanismInfo;
+ CK_C_InitToken C_InitToken;
+ CK_C_InitPIN C_InitPIN;
+ CK_C_SetPIN C_SetPIN;
+ CK_C_OpenSession C_OpenSession;
+ CK_C_CloseSession C_CloseSession;
+ CK_C_CloseAllSessions C_CloseAllSessions;
+ CK_C_GetSessionInfo C_GetSessionInfo;
+ CK_C_GetOperationState C_GetOperationState;
+ CK_C_SetOperationState C_SetOperationState;
+ CK_C_Login C_Login;
+ CK_C_Logout C_Logout;
+ CK_C_CreateObject C_CreateObject;
+ CK_C_CopyObject C_CopyObject;
+ CK_C_DestroyObject C_DestroyObject;
+ CK_C_GetObjectSize C_GetObjectSize;
+ CK_C_GetAttributeValue C_GetAttributeValue;
+ CK_C_SetAttributeValue C_SetAttributeValue;
+ CK_C_FindObjectsInit C_FindObjectsInit;
+ CK_C_FindObjects C_FindObjects;
+ CK_C_FindObjectsFinal C_FindObjectsFinal;
+ CK_C_EncryptInit C_EncryptInit;
+ CK_C_Encrypt C_Encrypt;
+ CK_C_EncryptUpdate C_EncryptUpdate;
+ CK_C_EncryptFinal C_EncryptFinal;
+ CK_C_DecryptInit C_DecryptInit;
+ CK_C_Decrypt C_Decrypt;
+ CK_C_DecryptUpdate C_DecryptUpdate;
+ CK_C_DecryptFinal C_DecryptFinal;
+ CK_C_DigestInit C_DigestInit;
+ CK_C_Digest C_Digest;
+ CK_C_DigestUpdate C_DigestUpdate;
+ CK_C_DigestKey C_DigestKey;
+ CK_C_DigestFinal C_DigestFinal;
+ CK_C_SignInit C_SignInit;
+ CK_C_Sign C_Sign;
+ CK_C_SignUpdate C_SignUpdate;
+ CK_C_SignFinal C_SignFinal;
+ CK_C_SignRecoverInit C_SignRecoverInit;
+ CK_C_SignRecover C_SignRecover;
+ CK_C_VerifyInit C_VerifyInit;
+ CK_C_Verify C_Verify;
+ CK_C_VerifyUpdate C_VerifyUpdate;
+ CK_C_VerifyFinal C_VerifyFinal;
+ CK_C_VerifyRecoverInit C_VerifyRecoverInit;
+ CK_C_VerifyRecover C_VerifyRecover;
+ CK_C_DigestEncryptUpdate C_DigestEncryptUpdate;
+ CK_C_DecryptDigestUpdate C_DecryptDigestUpdate;
+ CK_C_SignEncryptUpdate C_SignEncryptUpdate;
+ CK_C_DecryptVerifyUpdate C_DecryptVerifyUpdate;
+ CK_C_GenerateKey C_GenerateKey;
+ CK_C_GenerateKeyPair C_GenerateKeyPair;
+ CK_C_WrapKey C_WrapKey;
+ CK_C_UnwrapKey C_UnwrapKey;
+ CK_C_DeriveKey C_DeriveKey;
+ CK_C_SeedRandom C_SeedRandom;
+ CK_C_GenerateRandom C_GenerateRandom;
+ CK_C_GetFunctionStatus C_GetFunctionStatus;
+ CK_C_CancelFunction C_CancelFunction;
+ CK_C_WaitForSlotEvent C_WaitForSlotEvent;
+};
+
+
+typedef ck_rv_t (*ck_createmutex_t) (void **mutex);
+typedef ck_rv_t (*ck_destroymutex_t) (void *mutex);
+typedef ck_rv_t (*ck_lockmutex_t) (void *mutex);
+typedef ck_rv_t (*ck_unlockmutex_t) (void *mutex);
+
+
+struct ck_c_initialize_args
+{
+ ck_createmutex_t create_mutex;
+ ck_destroymutex_t destroy_mutex;
+ ck_lockmutex_t lock_mutex;
+ ck_unlockmutex_t unlock_mutex;
+ ck_flags_t flags;
+ void *reserved;
+};
+
+
+#define CKF_LIBRARY_CANT_CREATE_OS_THREADS (1 << 0)
+#define CKF_OS_LOCKING_OK (1 << 1)
+
+#define CKR_OK (0)
+#define CKR_CANCEL (1)
+#define CKR_HOST_MEMORY (2)
+#define CKR_SLOT_ID_INVALID (3)
+#define CKR_GENERAL_ERROR (5)
+#define CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED (6)
+#define CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD (7)
+#define CKR_NO_EVENT (8)
+#define CKR_NEED_TO_CREATE_THREADS (9)
+#define CKR_CANT_LOCK (0xa)
+#define CKR_ATTRIBUTE_READ_ONLY (0x10)
+#define CKR_ATTRIBUTE_SENSITIVE (0x11)
+#define CKR_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE_INVALID (0x12)
+#define CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID (0x13)
+#define CKR_DATA_INVALID (0x20)
+#define CKR_DATA_LEN_RANGE (0x21)
+#define CKR_DEVICE_ERROR (0x30)
+#define CKR_DEVICE_MEMORY (0x31)
+#define CKR_DEVICE_REMOVED (0x32)
+#define CKR_ENCRYPTED_DATA_INVALID (0x40)
+#define CKR_ENCRYPTED_DATA_LEN_RANGE (0x41)
+#define CKR_FUNCTION_CANCELED (0x50)
+#define CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_PARALLEL (0x51)
+#define CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_SUPPORTED (0x54)
+#define CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID (0x60)
+#define CKR_KEY_SIZE_RANGE (0x62)
+#define CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT (0x63)
+#define CKR_KEY_NOT_NEEDED (0x64)
+#define CKR_KEY_CHANGED (0x65)
+#define CKR_KEY_NEEDED (0x66)
+#define CKR_KEY_INDIGESTIBLE (0x67)
+#define CKR_KEY_FUNCTION_NOT_PERMITTED (0x68)
+#define CKR_KEY_NOT_WRAPPABLE (0x69)
+#define CKR_KEY_UNEXTRACTABLE (0x6a)
+#define CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID (0x70)
+#define CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID (0x71)
+#define CKR_OBJECT_HANDLE_INVALID (0x82)
+#define CKR_OPERATION_ACTIVE (0x90)
+#define CKR_OPERATION_NOT_INITIALIZED (0x91)
+#define CKR_PIN_INCORRECT (0xa0)
+#define CKR_PIN_INVALID (0xa1)
+#define CKR_PIN_LEN_RANGE (0xa2)
+#define CKR_PIN_EXPIRED (0xa3)
+#define CKR_PIN_LOCKED (0xa4)
+#define CKR_SESSION_CLOSED (0xb0)
+#define CKR_SESSION_COUNT (0xb1)
+#define CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID (0xb3)
+#define CKR_SESSION_PARALLEL_NOT_SUPPORTED (0xb4)
+#define CKR_SESSION_READ_ONLY (0xb5)
+#define CKR_SESSION_EXISTS (0xb6)
+#define CKR_SESSION_READ_ONLY_EXISTS (0xb7)
+#define CKR_SESSION_READ_WRITE_SO_EXISTS (0xb8)
+#define CKR_SIGNATURE_INVALID (0xc0)
+#define CKR_SIGNATURE_LEN_RANGE (0xc1)
+#define CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE (0xd0)
+#define CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT (0xd1)
+#define CKR_TOKEN_NOT_PRESENT (0xe0)
+#define CKR_TOKEN_NOT_RECOGNIZED (0xe1)
+#define CKR_TOKEN_WRITE_PROTECTED (0xe2)
+#define CKR_UNWRAPPING_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID (0xf0)
+#define CKR_UNWRAPPING_KEY_SIZE_RANGE (0xf1)
+#define CKR_UNWRAPPING_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT (0xf2)
+#define CKR_USER_ALREADY_LOGGED_IN (0x100)
+#define CKR_USER_NOT_LOGGED_IN (0x101)
+#define CKR_USER_PIN_NOT_INITIALIZED (0x102)
+#define CKR_USER_TYPE_INVALID (0x103)
+#define CKR_USER_ANOTHER_ALREADY_LOGGED_IN (0x104)
+#define CKR_USER_TOO_MANY_TYPES (0x105)
+#define CKR_WRAPPED_KEY_INVALID (0x110)
+#define CKR_WRAPPED_KEY_LEN_RANGE (0x112)
+#define CKR_WRAPPING_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID (0x113)
+#define CKR_WRAPPING_KEY_SIZE_RANGE (0x114)
+#define CKR_WRAPPING_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT (0x115)
+#define CKR_RANDOM_SEED_NOT_SUPPORTED (0x120)
+#define CKR_RANDOM_NO_RNG (0x121)
+#define CKR_DOMAIN_PARAMS_INVALID (0x130)
+#define CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL (0x150)
+#define CKR_SAVED_STATE_INVALID (0x160)
+#define CKR_INFORMATION_SENSITIVE (0x170)
+#define CKR_STATE_UNSAVEABLE (0x180)
+#define CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED (0x190)
+#define CKR_CRYPTOKI_ALREADY_INITIALIZED (0x191)
+#define CKR_MUTEX_BAD (0x1a0)
+#define CKR_MUTEX_NOT_LOCKED (0x1a1)
+#define CKR_FUNCTION_REJECTED (0x200)
+#define CKR_VENDOR_DEFINED ((unsigned long) (1 << 31))
+
+
+
+/* Compatibility layer. */
+
+#ifdef CRYPTOKI_COMPAT
+
+#undef CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION
+#define CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(retval, name) retval CK_SPEC name
+
+/* For NULL. */
+#include <stddef.h>
+
+typedef unsigned char CK_BYTE;
+typedef unsigned char CK_CHAR;
+typedef unsigned char CK_UTF8CHAR;
+typedef unsigned char CK_BBOOL;
+typedef unsigned long int CK_ULONG;
+typedef long int CK_LONG;
+typedef CK_BYTE *CK_BYTE_PTR;
+typedef CK_CHAR *CK_CHAR_PTR;
+typedef CK_UTF8CHAR *CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR;
+typedef CK_ULONG *CK_ULONG_PTR;
+typedef void *CK_VOID_PTR;
+typedef void **CK_VOID_PTR_PTR;
+#define CK_FALSE 0
+#define CK_TRUE 1
+#ifndef CK_DISABLE_TRUE_FALSE
+#ifndef FALSE
+#define FALSE 0
+#endif
+#ifndef TRUE
+#define TRUE 1
+#endif
+#endif
+
+typedef struct ck_version CK_VERSION;
+typedef struct ck_version *CK_VERSION_PTR;
+
+typedef struct ck_info CK_INFO;
+typedef struct ck_info *CK_INFO_PTR;
+
+typedef ck_slot_id_t *CK_SLOT_ID_PTR;
+
+typedef struct ck_slot_info CK_SLOT_INFO;
+typedef struct ck_slot_info *CK_SLOT_INFO_PTR;
+
+typedef struct ck_token_info CK_TOKEN_INFO;
+typedef struct ck_token_info *CK_TOKEN_INFO_PTR;
+
+typedef ck_session_handle_t *CK_SESSION_HANDLE_PTR;
+
+typedef struct ck_session_info CK_SESSION_INFO;
+typedef struct ck_session_info *CK_SESSION_INFO_PTR;
+
+typedef ck_object_handle_t *CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR;
+
+typedef ck_object_class_t *CK_OBJECT_CLASS_PTR;
+
+typedef struct ck_attribute CK_ATTRIBUTE;
+typedef struct ck_attribute *CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR;
+
+typedef struct ck_date CK_DATE;
+typedef struct ck_date *CK_DATE_PTR;
+
+typedef ck_mechanism_type_t *CK_MECHANISM_TYPE_PTR;
+
+typedef struct ck_mechanism CK_MECHANISM;
+typedef struct ck_mechanism *CK_MECHANISM_PTR;
+
+typedef struct ck_mechanism_info CK_MECHANISM_INFO;
+typedef struct ck_mechanism_info *CK_MECHANISM_INFO_PTR;
+
+typedef struct ck_function_list CK_FUNCTION_LIST;
+typedef struct ck_function_list *CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR;
+typedef struct ck_function_list **CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR_PTR;
+
+typedef struct ck_c_initialize_args CK_C_INITIALIZE_ARGS;
+typedef struct ck_c_initialize_args *CK_C_INITIALIZE_ARGS_PTR;
+
+#define NULL_PTR NULL
+
+/* Delete the helper macros defined at the top of the file. */
+#undef ck_flags_t
+#undef ck_version
+
+#undef ck_info
+#undef cryptoki_version
+#undef manufacturer_id
+#undef library_description
+#undef library_version
+
+#undef ck_notification_t
+#undef ck_slot_id_t
+
+#undef ck_slot_info
+#undef slot_description
+#undef hardware_version
+#undef firmware_version
+
+#undef ck_token_info
+#undef serial_number
+#undef max_session_count
+#undef session_count
+#undef max_rw_session_count
+#undef rw_session_count
+#undef max_pin_len
+#undef min_pin_len
+#undef total_public_memory
+#undef free_public_memory
+#undef total_private_memory
+#undef free_private_memory
+#undef utc_time
+
+#undef ck_session_handle_t
+#undef ck_user_type_t
+#undef ck_state_t
+
+#undef ck_session_info
+#undef slot_id
+#undef device_error
+
+#undef ck_object_handle_t
+#undef ck_object_class_t
+#undef ck_hw_feature_type_t
+#undef ck_key_type_t
+#undef ck_certificate_type_t
+#undef ck_attribute_type_t
+
+#undef ck_attribute
+#undef value
+#undef value_len
+
+#undef ck_date
+
+#undef ck_mechanism_type_t
+
+#undef ck_mechanism
+#undef parameter
+#undef parameter_len
+
+#undef ck_mechanism_info
+#undef min_key_size
+#undef max_key_size
+
+#undef ck_rv_t
+#undef ck_notify_t
+
+#undef ck_function_list
+
+#undef ck_createmutex_t
+#undef ck_destroymutex_t
+#undef ck_lockmutex_t
+#undef ck_unlockmutex_t
+
+#undef ck_c_initialize_args
+#undef create_mutex
+#undef destroy_mutex
+#undef lock_mutex
+#undef unlock_mutex
+#undef reserved
+
+#endif /* CRYPTOKI_COMPAT */
+
+
+/* System dependencies. */
+#if defined(_WIN32) || defined(CRYPTOKI_FORCE_WIN32)
+#pragma pack(pop, cryptoki)
+#endif
+
+#if defined(__cplusplus)
+}
+#endif
+
+#endif /* PKCS11_H */
diff --git a/lib/pkcs11_write.c b/lib/pkcs11_write.c
index a8ed760..d7a8958 100644
--- a/lib/pkcs11_write.c
+++ b/lib/pkcs11_write.c
@@ -100,8 +100,9 @@ int gnutls_pkcs11_copy_x509_crt(const char* token_url,
gnutls_x509_crt_t crt,
goto cleanup;
}
-
- a[0].type = CKA_CLASS;
+ /* FIXME: copy key usage flags */
+
+ a[0].type = CKA_CLASS;
a[0].value = &class;
a[0].value_len = sizeof(class);
a[1].type = CKA_ID;
@@ -206,18 +207,20 @@ int gnutls_pkcs11_copy_x509_privkey(const char* token_url,
return ret;
}
+ /* FIXME: copy key usage flags */
+
a[0].type = CKA_CLASS;
a[0].value = &class;
a[0].value_len = sizeof(class);
a[1].type = CKA_ID;
a[1].value = id;
a[1].value_len = id_size;
- a[2].type = CKA_KEY_TYPE;
- a[2].value = &type;
- a[2].value_len = sizeof(type);
- a[3].type = CKA_SENSITIVE;
- a[3].value = &tval;
- a[3].value_len = sizeof(tval);
+ a[2].type = CKA_KEY_TYPE;
+ a[2].value = &type;
+ a[2].value_len = sizeof(type);
+ a[3].type = CKA_SENSITIVE;
+ a[3].value = &tval;
+ a[3].value_len = sizeof(tval);
a_val = 4;
hooks/post-receive
--
GNU gnutls
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- [SCM] GNU gnutls branch, new, updated. gnutls_2_9_10-124-g0f65714,
Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos <=