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01/01: gnu: openssl: Fix CVE-2016-2177 and CVE-2016-2178.
|
From: |
Leo Famulari |
|
Subject: |
01/01: gnu: openssl: Fix CVE-2016-2177 and CVE-2016-2178. |
|
Date: |
Wed, 15 Jun 2016 14:59:11 +0000 (UTC) |
lfam pushed a commit to branch master
in repository guix.
commit 9c4a8514d621b6e2a19f56fa9b3396c940b968c5
Author: Leo Famulari <address@hidden>
Date: Mon Jun 13 16:15:34 2016 -0400
gnu: openssl: Fix CVE-2016-2177 and CVE-2016-2178.
* gnu/packages/patches/openssl-CVE-2016-2177.patch,
gnu/packages/patches/openssl-CVE-2016-2178.patch: New files.
* gnu/local.mk (dist_patch_DATA): Add them.
* gnu/packages/tls.scm (openssl/fixed): Use them.
---
gnu/local.mk | 2 +
gnu/packages/patches/openssl-CVE-2016-2177.patch | 286 ++++++++++++++++++++++
gnu/packages/patches/openssl-CVE-2016-2178.patch | 112 +++++++++
gnu/packages/tls.scm | 4 +-
4 files changed, 403 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/gnu/local.mk b/gnu/local.mk
index 8036c0e..83f4218 100644
--- a/gnu/local.mk
+++ b/gnu/local.mk
@@ -686,6 +686,8 @@ dist_patch_DATA =
\
%D%/packages/patches/openssh-CVE-2015-8325.patch \
%D%/packages/patches/openssl-runpath.patch \
%D%/packages/patches/openssl-c-rehash-in.patch \
+ %D%/packages/patches/openssl-CVE-2016-2177.patch \
+ %D%/packages/patches/openssl-CVE-2016-2178.patch \
%D%/packages/patches/orpheus-cast-errors-and-includes.patch \
%D%/packages/patches/ots-no-include-missing-file.patch \
%D%/packages/patches/patchelf-page-size.patch \
diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/openssl-CVE-2016-2177.patch
b/gnu/packages/patches/openssl-CVE-2016-2177.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f6465ae
--- /dev/null
+++ b/gnu/packages/patches/openssl-CVE-2016-2177.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,286 @@
+Fix CVE-2016-2177.
+
+<https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2016-2177>
+
+Source:
+<https://git.openssl.org/?p=openssl.git;a=commit;h=a004e72b95835136d3f1ea90517f706c24c03da7>
+
+From a004e72b95835136d3f1ea90517f706c24c03da7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Matt Caswell <address@hidden>
+Date: Thu, 5 May 2016 11:10:26 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] Avoid some undefined pointer arithmetic
+
+A common idiom in the codebase is:
+
+if (p + len > limit)
+{
+ return; /* Too long */
+}
+
+Where "p" points to some malloc'd data of SIZE bytes and
+limit == p + SIZE
+
+"len" here could be from some externally supplied data (e.g. from a TLS
+message).
+
+The rules of C pointer arithmetic are such that "p + len" is only well
+defined where len <= SIZE. Therefore the above idiom is actually
+undefined behaviour.
+
+For example this could cause problems if some malloc implementation
+provides an address for "p" such that "p + len" actually overflows for
+values of len that are too big and therefore p + len < limit!
+
+Issue reported by Guido Vranken.
+
+CVE-2016-2177
+
+Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <address@hidden>
+---
+ ssl/s3_srvr.c | 14 +++++++-------
+ ssl/ssl_sess.c | 2 +-
+ ssl/t1_lib.c | 56 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------------------
+ 3 files changed, 38 insertions(+), 34 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/ssl/s3_srvr.c b/ssl/s3_srvr.c
+index ab28702..ab7f690 100644
+--- a/ssl/s3_srvr.c
++++ b/ssl/s3_srvr.c
+@@ -980,7 +980,7 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
+
+ session_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+
+- if (p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1 >= d + n) {
++ if (SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1 >= (d + n) - p) {
+ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
+ goto f_err;
+@@ -998,7 +998,7 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
+ /* get the session-id */
+ j = *(p++);
+
+- if (p + j > d + n) {
++ if ((d + n) - p < j) {
+ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
+ goto f_err;
+@@ -1054,14 +1054,14 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
+
+ if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
+ /* cookie stuff */
+- if (p + 1 > d + n) {
++ if ((d + n) - p < 1) {
+ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ cookie_len = *(p++);
+
+- if (p + cookie_len > d + n) {
++ if ((d + n ) - p < cookie_len) {
+ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
+ goto f_err;
+@@ -1131,7 +1131,7 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
+ }
+ }
+
+- if (p + 2 > d + n) {
++ if ((d + n ) - p < 2) {
+ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
+ goto f_err;
+@@ -1145,7 +1145,7 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
+ }
+
+ /* i bytes of cipher data + 1 byte for compression length later */
+- if ((p + i + 1) > (d + n)) {
++ if ((d + n) - p < i + 1) {
+ /* not enough data */
+ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+@@ -1211,7 +1211,7 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
+
+ /* compression */
+ i = *(p++);
+- if ((p + i) > (d + n)) {
++ if ((d + n) - p < i) {
+ /* not enough data */
+ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+diff --git a/ssl/ssl_sess.c b/ssl/ssl_sess.c
+index b182998..54ee783 100644
+--- a/ssl/ssl_sess.c
++++ b/ssl/ssl_sess.c
+@@ -573,7 +573,7 @@ int ssl_get_prev_session(SSL *s, unsigned char
*session_id, int len,
+ int r;
+ #endif
+
+- if (session_id + len > limit) {
++ if (limit - session_id < len) {
+ fatal = 1;
+ goto err;
+ }
+diff --git a/ssl/t1_lib.c b/ssl/t1_lib.c
+index fb64607..cdac011 100644
+--- a/ssl/t1_lib.c
++++ b/ssl/t1_lib.c
+@@ -1867,11 +1867,11 @@ static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const
unsigned char *data,
+ 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
+ };
+
+- if (data >= (limit - 2))
++ if (limit - data <= 2)
+ return;
+ data += 2;
+
+- if (data > (limit - 4))
++ if (limit - data < 4)
+ return;
+ n2s(data, type);
+ n2s(data, size);
+@@ -1879,7 +1879,7 @@ static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned
char *data,
+ if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
+ return;
+
+- if (data + size > limit)
++ if (limit - data < size)
+ return;
+ data += size;
+
+@@ -1887,7 +1887,7 @@ static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned
char *data,
+ const size_t len1 = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
+ const size_t len2 = sizeof(kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock);
+
+- if (data + len1 + len2 != limit)
++ if (limit - data != (int)(len1 + len2))
+ return;
+ if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len1) != 0)
+ return;
+@@ -1896,7 +1896,7 @@ static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned
char *data,
+ } else {
+ const size_t len = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
+
+- if (data + len != limit)
++ if (limit - data != (int)(len))
+ return;
+ if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len) != 0)
+ return;
+@@ -2053,19 +2053,19 @@ static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s,
unsigned char **p,
+ if (data == limit)
+ goto ri_check;
+
+- if (data > (limit - 2))
++ if (limit - data < 2)
+ goto err;
+
+ n2s(data, len);
+
+- if (data + len != limit)
++ if (limit - data != len)
+ goto err;
+
+- while (data <= (limit - 4)) {
++ while (limit - data >= 4) {
+ n2s(data, type);
+ n2s(data, size);
+
+- if (data + size > (limit))
++ if (limit - data < size)
+ goto err;
+ # if 0
+ fprintf(stderr, "Received extension type %d size %d\n", type, size);
+@@ -2472,18 +2472,18 @@ static int ssl_scan_clienthello_custom_tlsext(SSL *s,
+ if (s->hit || s->cert->srv_ext.meths_count == 0)
+ return 1;
+
+- if (data >= limit - 2)
++ if (limit - data <= 2)
+ return 1;
+ n2s(data, len);
+
+- if (data > limit - len)
++ if (limit - data < len)
+ return 1;
+
+- while (data <= limit - 4) {
++ while (limit - data >= 4) {
+ n2s(data, type);
+ n2s(data, size);
+
+- if (data + size > limit)
++ if (limit - data < size)
+ return 1;
+ if (custom_ext_parse(s, 1 /* server */ , type, data, size, al) <= 0)
+ return 0;
+@@ -2569,20 +2569,20 @@ static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s,
unsigned char **p,
+ SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
+ # endif
+
+- if (data >= (d + n - 2))
++ if ((d + n) - data <= 2)
+ goto ri_check;
+
+ n2s(data, length);
+- if (data + length != d + n) {
++ if ((d + n) - data != length) {
+ *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+- while (data <= (d + n - 4)) {
++ while ((d + n) - data >= 4) {
+ n2s(data, type);
+ n2s(data, size);
+
+- if (data + size > (d + n))
++ if ((d + n) - data < size)
+ goto ri_check;
+
+ if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
+@@ -3307,29 +3307,33 @@ int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char
*session_id, int len,
+ /* Skip past DTLS cookie */
+ if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
+ i = *(p++);
+- p += i;
+- if (p >= limit)
++
++ if (limit - p <= i)
+ return -1;
++
++ p += i;
+ }
+ /* Skip past cipher list */
+ n2s(p, i);
+- p += i;
+- if (p >= limit)
++ if (limit - p <= i)
+ return -1;
++ p += i;
++
+ /* Skip past compression algorithm list */
+ i = *(p++);
+- p += i;
+- if (p > limit)
++ if (limit - p < i)
+ return -1;
++ p += i;
++
+ /* Now at start of extensions */
+- if ((p + 2) >= limit)
++ if (limit - p <= 2)
+ return 0;
+ n2s(p, i);
+- while ((p + 4) <= limit) {
++ while (limit - p >= 4) {
+ unsigned short type, size;
+ n2s(p, type);
+ n2s(p, size);
+- if (p + size > limit)
++ if (limit - p < size)
+ return 0;
+ if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
+ int r;
+--
+2.8.4
+
diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/openssl-CVE-2016-2178.patch
b/gnu/packages/patches/openssl-CVE-2016-2178.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..37cf276
--- /dev/null
+++ b/gnu/packages/patches/openssl-CVE-2016-2178.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,112 @@
+Fix CVE-2016-2178.
+
+<https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2016-2178>
+
+Source:
+<https://git.openssl.org/?p=openssl.git;a=commit;h=621eaf49a289bfac26d4cbcdb7396e796784c534>
+<https://git.openssl.org/?p=openssl.git;a=commit;h=b7d0f2834e139a20560d64c73e2565e93715ce2b>
+
+From 621eaf49a289bfac26d4cbcdb7396e796784c534 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Cesar Pereida <address@hidden>
+Date: Mon, 23 May 2016 12:45:25 +0300
+Subject: [PATCH 1/2] Fix DSA, preserve BN_FLG_CONSTTIME
+
+Operations in the DSA signing algorithm should run in constant time in
+order to avoid side channel attacks. A flaw in the OpenSSL DSA
+implementation means that a non-constant time codepath is followed for
+certain operations. This has been demonstrated through a cache-timing
+attack to be sufficient for an attacker to recover the private DSA key.
+
+CVE-2016-2178
+
+Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <address@hidden>
+Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <address@hidden>
+---
+ crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c | 6 +++---
+ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c b/crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c
+index efc4f1b..b29eb4b 100644
+--- a/crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c
++++ b/crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c
+@@ -248,9 +248,6 @@ static int dsa_sign_setup(DSA *dsa, BN_CTX *ctx_in, BIGNUM
**kinvp,
+ if (!BN_rand_range(&k, dsa->q))
+ goto err;
+ while (BN_is_zero(&k)) ;
+- if ((dsa->flags & DSA_FLAG_NO_EXP_CONSTTIME) == 0) {
+- BN_set_flags(&k, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+- }
+
+ if (dsa->flags & DSA_FLAG_CACHE_MONT_P) {
+ if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&dsa->method_mont_p,
+@@ -279,9 +276,12 @@ static int dsa_sign_setup(DSA *dsa, BN_CTX *ctx_in,
BIGNUM **kinvp,
+ }
+
+ K = &kq;
++
++ BN_set_flags(K, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+ } else {
+ K = &k;
+ }
++
+ DSA_BN_MOD_EXP(goto err, dsa, r, dsa->g, K, dsa->p, ctx,
+ dsa->method_mont_p);
+ if (!BN_mod(r, r, dsa->q, ctx))
+--
+2.8.4
+
+From b7d0f2834e139a20560d64c73e2565e93715ce2b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Matt Caswell <address@hidden>
+Date: Tue, 7 Jun 2016 09:12:51 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH 2/2] More fix DSA, preserve BN_FLG_CONSTTIME
+
+The previous "fix" still left "k" exposed to constant time problems in
+the later BN_mod_inverse() call. Ensure both k and kq have the
+BN_FLG_CONSTTIME flag set at the earliest opportunity after creation.
+
+CVE-2016-2178
+
+Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <address@hidden>
+---
+ crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c | 11 ++++++++---
+ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c b/crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c
+index b29eb4b..58013a4 100644
+--- a/crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c
++++ b/crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c
+@@ -247,7 +247,12 @@ static int dsa_sign_setup(DSA *dsa, BN_CTX *ctx_in,
BIGNUM **kinvp,
+ do
+ if (!BN_rand_range(&k, dsa->q))
+ goto err;
+- while (BN_is_zero(&k)) ;
++ while (BN_is_zero(&k));
++
++ if ((dsa->flags & DSA_FLAG_NO_EXP_CONSTTIME) == 0) {
++ BN_set_flags(&k, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
++ }
++
+
+ if (dsa->flags & DSA_FLAG_CACHE_MONT_P) {
+ if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&dsa->method_mont_p,
+@@ -261,6 +266,8 @@ static int dsa_sign_setup(DSA *dsa, BN_CTX *ctx_in, BIGNUM
**kinvp,
+ if (!BN_copy(&kq, &k))
+ goto err;
+
++ BN_set_flags(&kq, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
++
+ /*
+ * We do not want timing information to leak the length of k, so we
+ * compute g^k using an equivalent exponent of fixed length. (This
+@@ -276,8 +283,6 @@ static int dsa_sign_setup(DSA *dsa, BN_CTX *ctx_in, BIGNUM
**kinvp,
+ }
+
+ K = &kq;
+-
+- BN_set_flags(K, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+ } else {
+ K = &k;
+ }
+--
+2.8.4
+
diff --git a/gnu/packages/tls.scm b/gnu/packages/tls.scm
index e543a7e..513edcc 100644
--- a/gnu/packages/tls.scm
+++ b/gnu/packages/tls.scm
@@ -316,7 +316,9 @@ required structures.")
(base32
"06996ds1rk8xhnyb5y273a7xkcxhggp4bq1g02rab55d7bjhfh0x"))
(patches (search-patches "openssl-runpath.patch"
- "openssl-c-rehash-in.patch")))))))
+ "openssl-c-rehash-in.patch"
+ "openssl-CVE-2016-2177.patch"
+ "openssl-CVE-2016-2178.patch")))))))
(define-public libressl
(package