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Re: NPM and trusted binaries
From: |
Mike Gerwitz |
Subject: |
Re: NPM and trusted binaries |
Date: |
Thu, 08 Sep 2016 13:31:24 -0400 |
User-agent: |
Gnus/5.13 (Gnus v5.13) Emacs/25.0.92 (gnu/linux) |
On Thu, Sep 08, 2016 at 10:45:57 +0200, Jan Nieuwenhuizen wrote:
> If a user builds an npm package from its source repository, I assume
> that they install the devDependencies needed for that using npm?
Unfortunately that depends on the project. Some projects use
devDependencies only for things like linters, test runners, assertion
systems, etc; others might need them for building.
> The transitive closure of installing all devDependencies for the `q'
> package by building them all from their source repositories, means
> building > 6000 packages.
Many of those packages are shared between others. Given a sufficiently
large pool of npm packages, there'll be a great deal of intersections in
the graph.
I haven't been following this closely enough to speak intelligently
about the conversion, though.
> I would also like to explore if the source/binary package metaphor is
> a valid one for npm.
Sure it is.
> For the packages that I considered, I used the `diff' command to assert
> that the installable npm package includes javascript and C files and are
> identical to the ones in the repository.
In some cases, this will be true. Possibly in a majority. Think of npm
as publishing the results of `make dist` (literally, that's what I
do). That could do anything, it could do pretty much nothing. If a
Perl/Python/PHP/Ruby/Scheme/<insert interpreted language here> script is
in the distribution tarball unmodified from the source, what
considerations do we give it when packaging for, say, Debian?
But we'd have to know that on a case-by-case basis. If we want a
general solution to this problem, we wouldn't want to add a bunch of
exceptions.
If it's literally publishing the source code repository (which many
are), then there is no distinction. But we'd have to know that to be
true.
--
Mike Gerwitz
Free Software Hacker+Activist | GNU Maintainer & Volunteer
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- Re: GSoC NPM, (continued)
- Re: GSoC NPM, Jelle Licht, 2016/09/02
- Re: GSoC NPM, Jan Nieuwenhuizen, 2016/09/04
- Re: GSoC NPM, Thompson, David, 2016/09/06
- NPM and trusted binaries, Pjotr Prins, 2016/09/06
- Re: NPM and trusted binaries, Ludovic Courtès, 2016/09/07
- Re: NPM and trusted binaries, Jan Nieuwenhuizen, 2016/09/07
- Re: NPM and trusted binaries, Pjotr Prins, 2016/09/08
- Re: NPM and trusted binaries, Jelle Licht, 2016/09/08
- Re: NPM and trusted binaries, Mike Gerwitz, 2016/09/07
- Re: NPM and trusted binaries, Jan Nieuwenhuizen, 2016/09/08
- Re: NPM and trusted binaries,
Mike Gerwitz <=
- Re: NPM and trusted binaries, Jan Nieuwenhuizen, 2016/09/08
- Re: NPM and trusted binaries, Mike Gerwitz, 2016/09/08
- Re: NPM and trusted binaries, Ludovic Courtès, 2016/09/09
- Re: NPM and trusted binaries, Pjotr Prins, 2016/09/09
Re: GSoC NPM, Christopher Allan Webber, 2016/09/06
Re: GSoC NPM, Catonano, 2016/09/06