From 0799beece00361cbaa2e1d9796532de0f5f55ff9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Leo Famulari Date: Sun, 1 Jan 2017 15:12:48 -0500 Subject: [PATCH] gnu: unrtf: Fix CVE-2016-10091. * gnu/packages/patches/unrtf-CVE-2016-10091.patch: New file. * gnu/local.mk (dist_patch_DATA): Add it. * gnu/packages/unrtf.scm (unrtf)[source]: Use it. --- gnu/local.mk | 1 + gnu/packages/patches/unrtf-CVE-2016-10091.patch | 189 ++++++++++++++++++++++++ gnu/packages/unrtf.scm | 2 + 3 files changed, 192 insertions(+) create mode 100644 gnu/packages/patches/unrtf-CVE-2016-10091.patch diff --git a/gnu/local.mk b/gnu/local.mk index f45030f84..00edacad7 100644 --- a/gnu/local.mk +++ b/gnu/local.mk @@ -878,6 +878,7 @@ dist_patch_DATA = \ %D%/packages/patches/tophat-build-with-later-seqan.patch \ %D%/packages/patches/totem-debug-format-fix.patch \ %D%/packages/patches/tuxpaint-stamps-path.patch \ + %D%/packages/patches/unrtf-CVE-2016-10091.patch \ %D%/packages/patches/unzip-CVE-2014-8139.patch \ %D%/packages/patches/unzip-CVE-2014-8140.patch \ %D%/packages/patches/unzip-CVE-2014-8141.patch \ diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/unrtf-CVE-2016-10091.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/unrtf-CVE-2016-10091.patch new file mode 100644 index 000000000..badd1b8ed --- /dev/null +++ b/gnu/packages/patches/unrtf-CVE-2016-10091.patch @@ -0,0 +1,189 @@ +Fix CVE-2016-10091 (stack-based buffer overflows in cmd_* functions): + +https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2016-10091 +https://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=849705 +http://seclists.org/oss-sec/2016/q4/787 + +Patch adapted from Debian: + +https://anonscm.debian.org/cgit/collab-maint/unrtf.git/commit/?h=jessie&id=7500a48fb0fbad3ab963fb17560b2f90a8a485c8 + +The Debian patch adapts this upstream commit so that it can be applied +to the 0.21.9 release tarball: + +http://hg.savannah.gnu.org/hgweb/unrtf/rev/3b16893a6406 + +From 7dd568ed8a6a5acb6c04f2b40f457d63a00435f3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Willi Mann +Date: Sat, 31 Dec 2016 20:31:38 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH] Add patch from upstream to fix CVE-2016-10091 (buffer + overflow in various cmd_ functions) + +diff --git a/src/attr.c b/src/attr.c +index 02b5c81..e2951ea 100644 +--- a/src/attr.c ++++ b/src/attr.c +@@ -746,7 +746,7 @@ char * + assemble_string(char *string, int nr) + { + +- char *s, tmp[12];/* Number of characters that can be in int type (including '\0') - AF */ ++ char *s, tmp[20]; + int i = 0, j = 0; + + if (string == NULL) +@@ -762,7 +762,7 @@ assemble_string(char *string, int nr) + } + + if (string[i] != '\0') { +- sprintf(tmp, "%d", nr); ++ snprintf(tmp, 20, "%d", nr); + strcpy(&s[j], tmp); + j = j + strlen(tmp); + } +diff --git a/src/convert.c b/src/convert.c +index c76d7d6..8eacdcb 100644 +--- a/src/convert.c ++++ b/src/convert.c +@@ -472,7 +472,7 @@ static const int fcharsetparmtocp(int parm) + } + + // Translate code page to encoding name hopefully suitable as iconv input +-static char *cptoencoding(parm) ++static char *cptoencoding(int parm) + { + // Note that CP0 is supposed to mean current system default, which does + // not make any sense as a stored value, we don't handle it. +@@ -964,7 +964,7 @@ cmd_cf (Word *w, int align, char has_param, int num) + } + else + { +- sprintf(str,"#%02x%02x%02x", ++ snprintf(str, 40, "#%02x%02x%02x", + color_table[num].r, + color_table[num].g, + color_table[num].b); +@@ -993,7 +993,7 @@ cmd_cb (Word *w, int align, char has_param, int num) + } + else + { +- sprintf(str,"#%02x%02x%02x", ++ snprintf(str, 40, "#%02x%02x%02x", + color_table[num].r, + color_table[num].g, + color_table[num].b); +@@ -1018,7 +1018,7 @@ cmd_fs (Word *w, int align, char has_param, int points) { + /* Note, fs20 means 10pt */ + points /= 2; + +- sprintf(str,"%d",points); ++ snprintf(str, 20, "%d", points); + attr_push(ATTR_FONTSIZE,str); + + return FALSE; +@@ -1166,7 +1166,7 @@ cmd_f (Word *w, int align, char has_param, int num) + { + // TOBEDONE: WHAT'S THIS ??? + name = my_malloc(12); +- sprintf(name, "%d", num); ++ snprintf(name, 12, "%d", num); + } + + /* we are going to output entities, so should not output font */ +@@ -1218,7 +1218,7 @@ cmd_highlight (Word *w, int align, char has_param, int num) + } + else + { +- sprintf(str,"#%02x%02x%02x", ++ snprintf(str, 40, "#%02x%02x%02x", + color_table[num].r, + color_table[num].g, + color_table[num].b); +@@ -1373,9 +1373,9 @@ cmd_ftech (Word *w, int align, char has_param, int param) { + + static int + cmd_expand (Word *w, int align, char has_param, int param) { +- char str[10]; ++ char str[20]; + if (has_param) { +- sprintf(str, "%d", param/4); ++ snprintf(str, 20, "%d", param / 4); + if (!param) + attr_pop(ATTR_EXPAND); + else +@@ -1394,7 +1394,7 @@ cmd_expand (Word *w, int align, char has_param, int param) { + + static int + cmd_emboss (Word *w, int align, char has_param, int param) { +- char str[10]; ++ char str[20]; + if (has_param && !param) + #ifdef SUPPORT_UNNESTED + attr_find_pop(ATTR_EMBOSS); +@@ -1403,7 +1403,7 @@ cmd_emboss (Word *w, int align, char has_param, int param) { + #endif + else + { +- sprintf(str, "%d", param); ++ snprintf(str, 20, "%d", param); + attr_push(ATTR_EMBOSS, str); + } + return FALSE; +@@ -1419,12 +1419,12 @@ cmd_emboss (Word *w, int align, char has_param, int param) { + + static int + cmd_engrave (Word *w, int align, char has_param, int param) { +- char str[10]; ++ char str[20]; + if (has_param && !param) + attr_pop(ATTR_ENGRAVE); + else + { +- sprintf(str, "%d", param); ++ snprintf(str, 20, "%d", param); + attr_push(ATTR_ENGRAVE, str); + } + return FALSE; +@@ -1976,7 +1976,7 @@ static int cmd_u (Word *w, int align, char has_param, int param) { + + short done=0; + long unicode_number = (long) param; /* On 16bit architectures int is too small to store unicode characters. - AF */ +- char tmp[12]; /* Number of characters that can be in int type (including '\0'). If int size is greater than 4 bytes change this value. - AF */ ++ char tmp[20]; /* Number of characters that can be in int type (including '\0'). If int size is greater than 4 bytes change this value. - AF */ + const char *alias; + #define DEBUG 0 + #if DEBUG +@@ -2006,7 +2006,7 @@ static int cmd_u (Word *w, int align, char has_param, int param) { + /* RTF spec: Unicode values beyond 32767 are represented by negative numbers */ + unicode_number += 65536; + } +- sprintf(tmp, "%ld", unicode_number); ++ snprintf(tmp, 20, "%ld", unicode_number); + + if (safe_printf(1, op->unisymbol_print, tmp)) fprintf(stderr, TOO_MANY_ARGS, "unisymbol_print"); + done++; +diff --git a/src/output.c b/src/output.c +index 86d8b5c..4cdbfa6 100644 +--- a/src/output.c ++++ b/src/output.c +@@ -320,7 +320,7 @@ op_begin_std_fontsize (OutputPersonality *op, int size) + if (!found_std_expr) { + if (op->fontsize_begin) { + char expr[16]; +- sprintf (expr, "%d", size); ++ snprintf(expr, 16, "%d", size); + if (safe_printf (1, op->fontsize_begin, expr)) fprintf(stderr, TOO_MANY_ARGS, "fontsize_begin"); + } else { + /* If we cannot write out a change for the exact +@@ -440,7 +440,7 @@ op_end_std_fontsize (OutputPersonality *op, int size) + if (!found_std_expr) { + if (op->fontsize_end) { + char expr[16]; +- sprintf (expr, "%d", size); ++ snprintf(expr, 16, "%d", size); + if (safe_printf(1, op->fontsize_end, expr)) fprintf(stderr, TOO_MANY_ARGS, "fontsize_end"); + } else { + /* If we cannot write out a change for the exact +- +.11.0 + diff --git a/gnu/packages/unrtf.scm b/gnu/packages/unrtf.scm index 162dec752..e11c9445c 100644 --- a/gnu/packages/unrtf.scm +++ b/gnu/packages/unrtf.scm @@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ #:use-module (guix download) #:use-module (guix build-system gnu) #:use-module (guix gexp) + #:use-module (gnu packages) #:use-module (gnu packages autotools) #:use-module (gnu packages m4) #:use-module (gnu packages base)) @@ -35,6 +36,7 @@ (method url-fetch) (uri (string-append "mirror://gnu/unrtf/unrtf-" version ".tar.gz")) + (patches (search-patches "unrtf-CVE-2016-10091.patch")) (sha256 (base32 "1pcdzf2h1prn393dkvg93v80vh38q0v817xnbwrlwxbdz4k7i8r2")) -- 2.11.0