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Re: [Qemu-devel] [RFC] [PATCHv2 2/2] Adding basic calls to libseccomp in


From: Daniel P. Berrange
Subject: Re: [Qemu-devel] [RFC] [PATCHv2 2/2] Adding basic calls to libseccomp in vl.c
Date: Tue, 19 Jun 2012 10:23:09 +0100
User-agent: Mutt/1.5.21 (2010-09-15)

On Mon, Jun 18, 2012 at 08:15:37PM +0000, Blue Swirl wrote:
> On Mon, Jun 18, 2012 at 8:31 AM, Daniel P. Berrange <address@hidden> wrote:
> > On Fri, Jun 15, 2012 at 05:02:19PM -0400, Paul Moore wrote:
> >> On Friday, June 15, 2012 07:06:10 PM Blue Swirl wrote:
> >> > I think allowing execve() would render seccomp pretty much useless.
> >>
> >> Not necessarily.
> >>
> >> I'll agree that it does seem a bit odd to allow execve(), but there is 
> >> still
> >> value in enabling seccomp to disable potentially buggy/exploitable 
> >> syscalls.
> >> Let's not forget that we have over 300 syscalls on x86_64, not including 
> >> the
> >> 32 bit versions, and even if we add all of the new syscalls suggested in 
> >> this
> >> thread we are still talking about a small subset of syscalls.  As far as
> >> security goes, the old adage of "less is more" applies.
> >
> > I can sort of see this argument, but *only* if the QEMU process is being
> > run under a dedicated, fully unprivileged (from a DAC pov) user, completely
> > separate from anything else on the system.
> >
> > If QEMU were being run as root, then even with seccomp, it could trivially
> > just overwrite some binary in /bin, update /proc/core-pattern to point to
> 
> Not wiithout 'open'. When run as root, it would be nice to chroot()
> also to some empty directory and then drop chroot() privileges.

That's just another example of my point, that adding seccomp alone
does nothing for QEMU security. It is only valuable when combined
with another security technique, be it per-user DAC separation,
SELinux MAC, or chroot, or splitting QEMU into multiple separate
processes, or using Linux containers to confine it, etc


Daniel
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