Re: [Qemu-devel] [PATCH] Improve documentation for TLS

[Alex Bligh]

Eric,

(this crossed with v2)

On 7 Apr 2016, at 16:35, Eric Blake <address@hidden> wrote:

> On 04/07/2016 06:36 AM, Alex Bligh wrote:
>> 
>> On 7 Apr 2016, at 13:13, Alex Bligh <address@hidden> wrote:
>> 
>>> I guess it's worth documenting
>>> this, though I thought it was obvious.
>> 
>> The next version will have this section:
>> 
>> ### Downgrade attacks
>> 
>> A danger inherent in any scheme      relying on the negotiation
> 
> too much space

Yeah the paste between emacs and OS-X Mail probably has
tabs in. I checked version 2 with hexdump -C and
that line is OK.

>> * The MitM hijacks a session and impersonates the client
>>  (possibly by proxying       it) claiming not to support TLS. In
>>  this manner the server is confused into oeprating in a plain-text
> 
> s/oeprating/operating/

thx

>>  manner with the MitM (with the session being possibly
>>  proxied to the server with the method above).
> 
> s/server/client/

thx

>> 
>> With regard to the first, any client that does not wish
>> to be subject to potential downgrade attack SHOULD ensure
>> that if      a TLS endpoint is specified by the client, it
>> ensures      that TLS is negotiated prior to sending or
>> requesting sensitive data. To recap, yhe client MAY send
> 
> s/yhe/the/

thx

>> `NBD_OPT_STARTTLS` at any point      during option haggling,
>> and MAY      disconnect the session if `NBD_REP_ACK` is not
>> provided.
> 
> Probably want to add: "but the client SHOULD strongly consider sending
> `NBD_OPT_STARTTLS` as its first option"

That's now elsewhere, but I've expanded that anyway in v2.

>> With regard to the second, any server that does      not wish
>> to be subject to a potential downgrade attack SHOULD either
>> used FORCEDTLS mode, or      should force TLS on those exports
>> it is concerned about using SELECTIVE mode and TLS-only
>> exports. It is not possible to avoid downgrade attacks
>> on exports which are may be served either via TLS or
>> in plain text.
> 
> Probably want to add: "OPTIONALTLS mode SHOULD NOT be used if there is a
> potential for man-in-the-middle attacks"

I've said "where man-in-the-middle attacks are a concern".

These will all be in v3.

--
Alex Bligh

signature.asc
Description: Message signed with OpenPGP using GPGMail