Re: [Qemu-devel] [RFC PATCH v1 10/22] sev: add SEV debug decrypt command

[Michael S. Tsirkin]

On Wed, Sep 14, 2016 at 02:37:49PM +0100, Daniel P. Berrange wrote:
> On Wed, Sep 14, 2016 at 04:32:44PM +0300, Michael S. Tsirkin wrote:
> > On Wed, Sep 14, 2016 at 02:23:14PM +0100, Daniel P. Berrange wrote:
> > > On Wed, Sep 14, 2016 at 03:07:58PM +0200, Paolo Bonzini wrote:
> > > > 
> > > > 
> > > > On 14/09/2016 15:05, Michael S. Tsirkin wrote:
> > > > > I assumed that with debug on, memory is still encrypted but the
> > > > > hypervisor can break encryption, and as the cover letter states, the
> > > > > hypervisor is assumed benign. If true I don't see a need to
> > > > > give users more rope.
> > > > 
> > > > The hypervisor is assumed benign but vulnerable.
> > > > 
> > > > So, if somebody breaks the hypervisor, you would like to make it as hard
> > > > as possible for the attacker to do evil stuff to the guests.  If the
> > > > attacker can just ask the secure processor "decrypt some memory for me",
> > > > then the encryption is effectively broken.
> > > 
> > > So there's going to be a tradeoff here between use of SEV and use of
> > > certain other features. eg, it seems that if you're using SEV, then
> > > any concept of creating & analysing guest core dumps from the host
> > > is out.
> > 
> > I don't see why - as long as we don't trigger dumps, there's no leak :)
> 
> If the facility to trigger dumps is available, then the memory
> encryption feature of SEV is as useful as a chocolate teapot,
> as the would be attacker can simply trigger a dump

If attacker can trigger things, IOW execute code in hypervisor,
then encrypting memory is not useful anyway.

> bypassing
> any kind of SEV protection to get unencrypted memory. So if
> SEV is to provide any kind of useful security protection, there
> must be no way for a host admin to initiate core dumps of the
> guest, without first having some kind of explicit guest admin
> action to enable it.

As stated it protects against passive adversaries with read-only
access to hypervisor memory. I don't see how dump ability breaks that.


> > > It seems that SEV on its own is insufficient - there is at least some
> > > interaction with storage. eg merely running a guest with SEV is not
> > > going to guarantee security if the guest OS is able to swap out to a
> > > non-encrypted disk. You could run LUKS inside the guest but that has
> > > a number of downsides. How to provide the decryption key for LUKS
> > > at startup without guest admin interaction. Then there is the issue
> > > that if you take snapshots of the guest disk in the host, this is
> > > weakening the security of LUKS, since you're keeping around copies
> > > of the same logical guest sector with different contents which
> > > allows for improve crytoanalysis. These are reasons for using LUKS
> > > on the host instead of in the guest, but then the decryption kjeys
> > > for LUKS are in the QEMU process in memory which is (IIUC) not going
> > > to be protected by SEV ?  Unles there's a way for QEMU to do allocations
> > > which are SEV protected for its own purposes ?
> 
> Regards,
> Daniel
> -- 
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