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Re: [Qemu-devel] [RFC PATCH v1 10/22] sev: add SEV debug decrypt command


From: Michael S. Tsirkin
Subject: Re: [Qemu-devel] [RFC PATCH v1 10/22] sev: add SEV debug decrypt command
Date: Wed, 14 Sep 2016 21:15:43 +0300

On Wed, Sep 14, 2016 at 06:53:22PM +0200, Paolo Bonzini wrote:
> 
> 
> On 14/09/2016 17:02, Michael S. Tsirkin wrote:
> > If you believe there are attackers that have access to the
> > monitor and nothing else, then a feature to disable debugging
> > is a generally useful one. But once we merge sev patchset then of course
> > sev people disappear and it will be up to others to make it
> > work on non-amd CPUs.
> > 
> > Another is to help merge other parts faster.  E.g.  looking at what
> > Daniel writes, the feature might have been over-sold so people will
> > disable debugging thinking this will prevent all active attacks. Thus we
> > now need to add good documentation so people know what they can actually
> > expect to get from QEMU in return for disabling debugging. Why not merge
> > the simple "encrypt memory part" while this documentation work is going
> > on?
> 
> Encrypting memory makes no sense if anyone can ask to decrypt it.

It's not useless since the attack model here is a passive adversary
that can not ask anything.

>  And
> I'm not even sure how force-enabling debug r/w, which is literally a
> single bit set in the feature register, would make the patchset simpler.

It will make the *interface* simpler.

> If anything, as I said already, it would make the patchset simpler to
> force-*disable* it, since you don't need to introduce debug hooks that
> go through the secure processor.
> 
> Paolo

My suggestion is to add a processor independent hook that disables
debugging.  Arguably this improves security in case attacker only has
access to the monitor.

-- 
MST



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