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Re: [Qemu-devel] [for-2.10 PATCH] 9pfs: local: fix fchmodat_nofollow() l


From: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé
Subject: Re: [Qemu-devel] [for-2.10 PATCH] 9pfs: local: fix fchmodat_nofollow() limitations
Date: Tue, 8 Aug 2017 15:48:20 -0300
User-agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:52.0) Gecko/20100101 Thunderbird/52.2.1

Hi Greg,

is this also related to CVE-2016-9602?

On 08/08/2017 02:28 PM, Greg Kurz wrote:
This function has to ensure it doesn't follow a symlink that could be used
to escape the virtfs directory. This could be easily achieved if fchmodat()
on linux honored the AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW flag as described in POSIX, but
it doesn't.

The current implementation covers most use-cases, but it notably fails if:
- the target path has access rights equal to 0000 (openat() returns EPERM),
   => once you've done chmod(0000) on a file, you can never chmod() again
- the target path is UNIX domain socket (openat() returns ENXIO)
   => bind() of UNIX domain sockets fails if the file is on 9pfs

The solution is to use O_PATH: openat() now succeeds in both cases, and we
can ensure the path isn't a symlink with fstat(). The associated entry in
"/proc/self/fd" can hence be safely passed to the regular chmod() syscall.

Signed-off-by: Greg Kurz <address@hidden>
---
  hw/9pfs/9p-local.c |   44 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------------
  hw/9pfs/9p-util.h  |   10 +++++++---
  2 files changed, 35 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)

diff --git a/hw/9pfs/9p-local.c b/hw/9pfs/9p-local.c
index 6e478f4765ef..b178d627c764 100644
--- a/hw/9pfs/9p-local.c
+++ b/hw/9pfs/9p-local.c
@@ -333,30 +333,42 @@ update_map_file:
static int fchmodat_nofollow(int dirfd, const char *name, mode_t mode)
  {
+    struct stat stbuf;
      int fd, ret;
+    char *proc_path;
/* FIXME: this should be handled with fchmodat(AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW).
-     * Unfortunately, the linux kernel doesn't implement it yet. As an
-     * alternative, let's open the file and use fchmod() instead. This
-     * may fail depending on the permissions of the file, but it is the
-     * best we can do to avoid TOCTTOU. We first try to open read-only
-     * in case name points to a directory. If that fails, we try write-only
-     * in case name doesn't point to a directory.
+     * Unfortunately, the linux kernel doesn't implement it yet.
       */
-    fd = openat_file(dirfd, name, O_RDONLY, 0);
-    if (fd == -1) {
-        /* In case the file is writable-only and isn't a directory. */
-        if (errno == EACCES) {
-            fd = openat_file(dirfd, name, O_WRONLY, 0);
-        }
-        if (fd == -1 && errno == EISDIR) {
-            errno = EACCES;
-        }
+    if (fstatat(dirfd, name, &stbuf, AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW)) {
+        return -1;
      }
+
+    if (S_ISLNK(stbuf.st_mode)) {
+        errno = ELOOP;
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    fd = openat_file(dirfd, name, O_RDONLY | O_PATH, 0);

since you use O_PATH, you can drop O_RDONLY.

      if (fd == -1) { >           return -1;
      }
-    ret = fchmod(fd, mode);
+
+    ret = fstat(fd, &stbuf);
+    if (ret) {
+        goto out;
+    }
+
+    if (S_ISLNK(stbuf.st_mode)) {
+        errno = ELOOP;
+        ret = -1;
+        goto out;
+    }
+
+    proc_path = g_strdup_printf("/proc/self/fd/%d", fd);
+    ret = chmod(proc_path, mode);
+    g_free(proc_path);
+out:
      close_preserve_errno(fd);
      return ret;
  }
diff --git a/hw/9pfs/9p-util.h b/hw/9pfs/9p-util.h
index 91299a24b8af..7c1c8fb1e35c 100644
--- a/hw/9pfs/9p-util.h
+++ b/hw/9pfs/9p-util.h
@@ -43,9 +43,13 @@ static inline int openat_file(int dirfd, const char *name, 
int flags,
      }
serrno = errno;
-    /* O_NONBLOCK was only needed to open the file. Let's drop it. */
-    ret = fcntl(fd, F_SETFL, flags);
-    assert(!ret);
+    /* O_NONBLOCK was only needed to open the file. Let's drop it. We don't
+     * do that with O_PATH since it ignores O_NONBLOCK.
+     */

thinking about if someone uses openat_file(d, O_PATH|O_CLOEXEC, ...), why not set the fd flags always? like:

       ret = fcntl(fd, F_SETFL, flags);
       assert((flags & O_PATH) || !ret);

      errno = serrno;
      return fd;
  }





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