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Re: [Qemu-devel] [RFC][BROKEN] rbd: Allow configuration of authenticatio


From: Markus Armbruster
Subject: Re: [Qemu-devel] [RFC][BROKEN] rbd: Allow configuration of authentication scheme
Date: Fri, 20 Apr 2018 16:50:38 +0200
User-agent: Gnus/5.13 (Gnus v5.13) Emacs/25.3 (gnu/linux)

Daniel P. Berrangé <address@hidden> writes:

> On Fri, Apr 20, 2018 at 03:34:26PM +0200, Markus Armbruster wrote:
>> Daniel P. Berrangé <address@hidden> writes:
>> 
>> > Yeah this is a mess - I wish we had never allowed users to pass a config
>> > file, and had used /dev/null all the time. Unfortunately changing either
>> > of these aspects would cause backcompat problems for existing deployments
>> > now :-( So we just have to accept that the global config file is always
>> > in present, but none the less libvirt should try to specify things as
>> > fully as possible.
>> 
>> I'm afraid you get backward compatibility problems no matter what.
>> Whenever you extend libvirt to pass configuration C "via normal per-disk
>> setup for blockdev", it breaks user config files containing C, doesn't
>> it?
>
> That's not actually a problem here. We are only passing things to QEMU
> that the user already provided us in the XML file. If we gain support
> for passing a new item via the blockdev schema, then we'd only be
> passing that to QEMU if the user actually provided that item in the
> XML too.  We're not likely to pass a new config field without the
> user having asked us to first.

What made me guess otherwise: "to properly protect against compromised
QEMU, ideally every QEMU would use a completely separate RBD
user+password, so that compromised QEMU can't then access RBD disks
belonging to a different user" led me to assume libvirt would do this
automatically.

[...]



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