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Re: PAM authentication patch - v2
From: |
Brian Murphy |
Subject: |
Re: PAM authentication patch - v2 |
Date: |
Wed, 16 Apr 2003 18:27:17 +0200 |
User-agent: |
Mozilla/5.0 (X11; U; Linux i686; en-US; rv:1.0.0) Gecko/20020623 Debian/1.0.0-0.woody.1 |
Derek Robert Price wrote:
Brian, your patch looked good, though I haven't attempted to install
it yet, but it will still need manual (doc/cvs.texinfo) additions
before it can be committed.
How is this?
/Brian
Index: config.h.in
===================================================================
RCS file: /cvs/cvs/config.h.in,v
retrieving revision 1.1.1.2
retrieving revision 1.6
diff -u -r1.1.1.2 -r1.6
--- config.h.in 13 Apr 2003 20:34:13 -0000 1.1.1.2
+++ config.h.in 15 Apr 2003 12:49:15 -0000 1.6
@@ -206,6 +206,9 @@
/* Define to 1 if you have the <ndir.h> header file, and it defines `DIR'. */
#undef HAVE_NDIR_H
+/* Defined to 1 if you use PAM system authentication instead of getpwnam */
+#undef HAVE_PAM
+
/* Define to 1 if you have the `putenv' function. */
#undef HAVE_PUTENV
Index: configure.in
===================================================================
RCS file: /cvs/cvs/configure.in,v
retrieving revision 1.1.1.2
retrieving revision 1.9
diff -u -r1.1.1.2 -r1.9
--- configure.in 13 Apr 2003 20:34:14 -0000 1.1.1.2
+++ configure.in 15 Apr 2003 16:06:30 -0000 1.9
@@ -741,6 +741,37 @@
fi
+
+dnl
+dnl Check if PAM authentication is enabled
+dnl
+AC_ARG_ENABLE(
+ [pam],
+ AC_HELP_STRING(
+ [--enable-pam],
+ [Use to enable system authentication with PAM instead of using the
+ simple getpwnam interface. This allows authentication (in theory)
+ with any PAM module, e.g. on systems with shadow passwords or via LDAP]), ,
+ [enable_pam=yes]
+ )
+
+if test yes = $enable_pam; then
+ AC_CHECK_HEADER(security/pam_appl.h,
+ AC_DEFINE(HAVE_PAM, 1,
+ [Define to enable system authentication with PAM instead of using the
+ simple getpwnam interface. This allows authentication (in theory)
+ with any PAM module, e.g. on systems with shadow passwords or via LDAP])
+ AC_CHECK_LIB(pam, pam_start, [LIBS="${LIBS} -lpam"],
+ AC_MSG_ERROR([Could not find PAM libraries but the headers exist.
+ Give the --disable-pam option to compile without PAM support (or fix
+ your broken configuration)])
+ ),
+ AC_MSG_WARN([PAM authentication disabled - could not find PAM headers])
+ )
+fi
+
+
+
dnl
dnl Give the confiscator control over whether the server code is compiled
dnl
Index: doc/cvs.texinfo
===================================================================
RCS file: /cvs/cvs/doc/cvs.texinfo,v
retrieving revision 1.1.1.2
retrieving revision 1.3
diff -u -r1.1.1.2 -r1.3
--- doc/cvs.texinfo 13 Apr 2003 20:34:16 -0000 1.1.1.2
+++ doc/cvs.texinfo 16 Apr 2003 16:25:45 -0000 1.3
@@ -2489,13 +2489,41 @@
the username and password using the operating system's
user-lookup routines (this "fallback" behavior can be
disabled by setting @code{SystemAuth=no} in the
-@sc{cvs} @file{config} file, @pxref{config}). Be
-aware, however, that falling back to system
+@sc{cvs} @file{config} file, @pxref{config}).
+
+The default fallback behaviour is to look in
+@file{/etc/passwd} for this system password but if your
+system has PAM - Pluggable Authentication Modules - then
+cvs will use that instead. This means that with a
+global configuration file usually @file{/etc/pam.conf}
+or possibly @file{/etc/pam.d/cvs}
+you can tell cvs to use LDAP or normal UNIX passwd
+authentication or many other possibilities - see your
+PAM documentation for details. CVS needs an "auth"
+and "account" module in the PAM configuration file.
+Using PAM gives the system administrator much more
+flexibility in how cvs users are authenticated but
+no more security than other methods, see below.
+
+Be aware, however, that falling back to system
authentication might be a security risk: @sc{cvs}
operations would then be authenticated with that user's
regular login password, and the password flies across
the network in plaintext. See @ref{Password
authentication security} for more on this.
+This may be more of a problem with PAM authentication
+because it is likely that the source of the system
+password is some central authentication service like
+LDAP which is also used to authenticate other services.
+On the other hand PAM makes it very easy to change
+your password regularly - this is impossible to do
+for a user authenticated via cvs' private password file
+without total access to the @file{CVSROOT/passwd} file
+, i.e. the user needs all rights to the repository to
+allow password change which in my experience means
+the password never gets changed, see below. Users are
+much more willing to change their password regularly
+if they only have to remember one.
Right now, the only way to put a password in the
@sc{cvs} @file{passwd} file is to paste it there from
Index: src/server.c
===================================================================
RCS file: /cvs/cvs/src/server.c,v
retrieving revision 1.1.1.2
retrieving revision 1.15
diff -u -r1.1.1.2 -r1.15
--- src/server.c 13 Apr 2003 20:34:20 -0000 1.1.1.2
+++ src/server.c 15 Apr 2003 18:46:08 -0000 1.15
@@ -5548,71 +5548,119 @@
return retval;
}
+#ifdef HAVE_PAM
-/* Return a hosting username if password matches, else NULL. */
-static char *
-check_password (username, password, repository)
- char *username, *password, *repository;
-{
- int rc;
- char *host_user = NULL;
- char *found_passwd = NULL;
- struct passwd *pw;
+#include <security/pam_appl.h>
- /* First we see if this user has a password in the CVS-specific
- password file. If so, that's enough to authenticate with. If
- not, we'll check /etc/passwd. */
+struct cvs_pam_userinfo {
+ char *username;
+ char *password;
+};
+
+static int
+cvs_pam_conv(num_msg, msg, resp, appdata_ptr)
+ int num_msg;
+ const struct pam_message **msg;
+ struct pam_response **resp;
+ void *appdata_ptr;
+{
+ int i;
+ struct pam_response *response;
+ struct cvs_pam_userinfo *ui = (struct cvs_pam_userinfo *)appdata_ptr;
- rc = check_repository_password (username, password, repository,
- &host_user);
+ assert (ui && ui->username && ui->password && msg && resp);
- if (rc == 2)
- return NULL;
+ response = xmalloc(num_msg * sizeof(struct pam_response));
+ memset(response, 0, num_msg * sizeof(struct pam_response));
- if (rc == 1)
+ for (i = 0; i < num_msg; i++)
{
- /* host_user already set by reference, so just return. */
- goto handle_return;
+ switch(msg[i]->msg_style)
+ {
+ /* PAM wants a username */
+ case PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_ON:
+ response[i].resp = xstrdup(ui->username);
+ break;
+ /* PAM wants a password */
+ case PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_OFF:
+ response[i].resp = xstrdup(ui->password);
+ break;
+ case PAM_ERROR_MSG:
+ case PAM_TEXT_INFO:
+ printf("E %s\n",msg[i]->msg);
+ break;
+ /* PAM wants something we don't understand - bail out */
+ default:
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
}
- assert (rc == 0);
+ *resp = response;
+ return PAM_SUCCESS;
- if (!system_auth)
+cleanup:
+ for (i = 0; i < num_msg; i++)
{
- /* Note that the message _does_ distinguish between the case in
- which we check for a system password and the case in which
- we do not. It is a real pain to track down why it isn't
- letting you in if it won't say why, and I am not convinced
- that the potential information disclosure to an attacker
- outweighs this. */
- printf ("error 0 no such user %s in CVSROOT/passwd\n", username);
+ if (response[i].resp)
+ {
+ free(response[i].resp);
+ response[i].resp = 0;
+ }
+ }
+ free(response);
+ return PAM_CONV_ERR;
+}
+
+static int
+check_system_password (username, password)
+ char *username, *password;
+{
+ pam_handle_t *pamh = NULL;
+ int retval;
+ struct cvs_pam_userinfo ui = { username, password };
+ struct pam_conv conv = { cvs_pam_conv, (void *)&ui };
+
+ retval = pam_start(program_name, username, &conv, &pamh);
+ if (retval == PAM_SUCCESS)
+ retval = pam_authenticate(pamh, 0);
+
+ if (retval == PAM_SUCCESS)
+ retval = pam_acct_mgmt(pamh, 0);
+
+ if (pam_end(pamh,retval) != PAM_SUCCESS)
+ {
+ printf("E Fatal error, aborting.\n
+ pam failed to release authenticator\n");
error_exit ();
}
- /* No cvs password found, so try /etc/passwd. */
-
+ return (retval == PAM_SUCCESS); /* indicate success */
+}
+#else
+static int
+check_system_password (username, password)
+ char *username, *password;
+{
+ char *found_passwd = NULL;
+ struct passwd *pw;
#ifdef HAVE_GETSPNAM
{
struct spwd *spw;
spw = getspnam (username);
if (spw != NULL)
- {
found_passwd = spw->sp_pwdp;
- }
}
#endif
if (found_passwd == NULL && (pw = getpwnam (username)) != NULL)
- {
found_passwd = pw->pw_passwd;
- }
if (found_passwd == NULL)
{
printf ("E Fatal error, aborting.\n\
-error 0 %s: no such user\n", username);
+ error 0 %s: no such user\n", username);
error_exit ();
}
@@ -5636,34 +5684,74 @@
{
/* user exists and has a password */
if (strcmp (found_passwd, crypt (password, found_passwd)) == 0)
- {
- host_user = xstrdup (username);
- }
+ return 1;
else
{
- host_user = NULL;
#ifdef LOG_AUTHPRIV
syslog (LOG_AUTHPRIV | LOG_NOTICE,
"password mismatch for %s: %s vs. %s", username,
crypt(password, found_passwd), found_passwd);
#endif
+ return 0;
}
- goto handle_return;
}
- if (password && *password)
- {
- /* user exists and has no system password, but we got
- one as parameter */
- host_user = xstrdup (username);
+#ifdef LOG_AUTHPRIV
+ syslog (LOG_AUTHPRIV | LOG_NOTICE,
+ "user %s authenticated because of blank system password",
+ username);
+#endif
+ return 1;
+}
+#endif
+
+/* Return a hosting username if password matches, else NULL. */
+static char *
+check_password (username, password, repository)
+ char *username, *password, *repository;
+{
+ int rc;
+ char *host_user = NULL;
+
+ /* First we see if this user has a password in the CVS-specific
+ password file. If so, that's enough to authenticate with. If
+ not, we'll check /etc/passwd. */
+
+ rc = check_repository_password (username, password, repository,
+ &host_user);
+
+ if (rc == 2)
+ return NULL;
+
+ if (rc == 1)
+ /* host_user already set by reference, so just return. */
goto handle_return;
+
+ assert (rc == 0);
+
+ if (!system_auth)
+ {
+ /* Note that the message _does_ distinguish between the case in
+ which we check for a system password and the case in which
+ we do not. It is a real pain to track down why it isn't
+ letting you in if it won't say why, and I am not convinced
+ that the potential information disclosure to an attacker
+ outweighs this. */
+ printf ("error 0 no such user %s in CVSROOT/passwd\n", username);
+
+ error_exit ();
}
- /* user exists but has no password at all */
- host_user = NULL;
+ /* No cvs password found, so try /etc/passwd. */
+ if ( check_system_password(username, password) )
+ host_user = xstrdup (username);
+ else
+ host_user = NULL;
+
#ifdef LOG_AUTHPRIV
- syslog (LOG_AUTHPRIV | LOG_NOTICE,
- "login refused for %s: user has no password", username);
+ if (!host_user)
+ syslog (LOG_AUTHPRIV | LOG_NOTICE,
+ "login refused for %s: user has no password", username);
#endif
handle_return:
- Re: PAM authentication patch - v2, (continued)
- Re: PAM authentication patch - v2, Larry Jones, 2003/04/16
- Re: PAM authentication patch - v2, Brian Murphy, 2003/04/16
- Re: PAM authentication patch - v2, Mark D. Baushke, 2003/04/16
- Re: PAM authentication patch - v2, Larry Jones, 2003/04/16
- Re: PAM authentication patch - v2, Derek Robert Price, 2003/04/16
- Re: PAM authentication patch - v2, Brian Murphy, 2003/04/16
- Re: PAM authentication patch - v2,
Brian Murphy <=
- Re: PAM authentication patch - v2, Derek Robert Price, 2003/04/16
- Re: PAM authentication patch - v2, Brian Murphy, 2003/04/16
- Re: PAM authentication patch - v2, Brian Murphy, 2003/04/17
- Re: PAM authentication patch - v2, Mark D. Baushke, 2003/04/17
- Re: PAM authentication patch - v2, Derek Robert Price, 2003/04/17
- Re: PAM authentication patch - v2, Larry Jones, 2003/04/17
- Re: PAM authentication patch - v2, Derek Robert Price, 2003/04/17
- Re: PAM authentication patch - v2, Mark D. Baushke, 2003/04/17
- Re: PAM authentication patch - v2, Derek Robert Price, 2003/04/18
- Re: PAM authentication patch - v2, Brian Murphy, 2003/04/20