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Re: [gnutls-dev] bug in _gnutls_pkcs1_rsa_encrypt
From: |
Matthias Urlichs |
Subject: |
Re: [gnutls-dev] bug in _gnutls_pkcs1_rsa_encrypt |
Date: |
Wed, 18 Aug 2004 11:58:19 +0200 |
User-agent: |
Mutt/1.5.6+20040722i |
Hi,
Werner Koch:
> > This line doesn't make sense, IMHO.
>
> The idea is that when requesting K new random bytes to replace zero
> bytes of the initial random string, we request a few bytes more so
> that we have some spare random bytes in case the K new bytes contain
> zero bytes.
>
I thought so.
However, it would help a great deal if you'd actually skip zero bytes in
the new string when you replace the zeroes in the old string. ;-)
> Agreed, requesting just one extra byte for replacing 128 zero bytes is
> too less.
s/is too less/isn't enough/. (OK, OK, I'll shut up now.)
To be reasonably safe, add three more bytes.
--
Matthias Urlichs | {M:U} IT Design @ m-u-it.de | address@hidden
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- [gnutls-dev] bug in _gnutls_pkcs1_rsa_encrypt, Robey Pointer, 2004/08/16
- [gnutls-dev] Re: bug in _gnutls_pkcs1_rsa_encrypt, Simon Josefsson, 2004/08/17
- Re: [gnutls-dev] bug in _gnutls_pkcs1_rsa_encrypt, Werner Koch, 2004/08/17
- Re: [gnutls-dev] bug in _gnutls_pkcs1_rsa_encrypt, Matthias Urlichs, 2004/08/17
- Re: [gnutls-dev] bug in _gnutls_pkcs1_rsa_encrypt, Werner Koch, 2004/08/18
- Re: [gnutls-dev] bug in _gnutls_pkcs1_rsa_encrypt,
Matthias Urlichs <=
- Re: [gnutls-dev] bug in _gnutls_pkcs1_rsa_encrypt, Robey Pointer, 2004/08/18
- Re: [gnutls-dev] bug in _gnutls_pkcs1_rsa_encrypt, Werner Koch, 2004/08/19
- Re: [gnutls-dev] bug in _gnutls_pkcs1_rsa_encrypt, Matthias Urlichs, 2004/08/19
- Re: [gnutls-dev] bug in _gnutls_pkcs1_rsa_encrypt, Werner Koch, 2004/08/19