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[SECURITY PATCH 01/28] yylex: Make lexer fatal errors actually be fatal
From: |
Daniel Kiper |
Subject: |
[SECURITY PATCH 01/28] yylex: Make lexer fatal errors actually be fatal |
Date: |
Wed, 29 Jul 2020 19:00:14 +0200 |
From: Peter Jones <pjones@redhat.com>
When presented with a command that can't be tokenized to anything
smaller than YYLMAX characters, the parser calls YY_FATAL_ERROR(errmsg),
expecting that will stop further processing, as such:
#define YY_DO_BEFORE_ACTION \
yyg->yytext_ptr = yy_bp; \
yyleng = (int) (yy_cp - yy_bp); \
yyg->yy_hold_char = *yy_cp; \
*yy_cp = '\0'; \
if ( yyleng >= YYLMAX ) \
YY_FATAL_ERROR( "token too large, exceeds YYLMAX" ); \
yy_flex_strncpy( yytext, yyg->yytext_ptr, yyleng + 1 , yyscanner); \
yyg->yy_c_buf_p = yy_cp;
The code flex generates expects that YY_FATAL_ERROR() will either return
for it or do some form of longjmp(), or handle the error in some way at
least, and so the strncpy() call isn't in an "else" clause, and thus if
YY_FATAL_ERROR() is *not* actually fatal, it does the call with the
questionable limit, and predictable results ensue.
Unfortunately, our implementation of YY_FATAL_ERROR() is:
#define YY_FATAL_ERROR(msg) \
do { \
grub_printf (_("fatal error: %s\n"), _(msg)); \
} while (0)
The same pattern exists in yyless(), and similar problems exist in users
of YY_INPUT(), several places in the main parsing loop,
yy_get_next_buffer(), yy_load_buffer_state(), yyensure_buffer_stack,
yy_scan_buffer(), etc.
All of these callers expect YY_FATAL_ERROR() to actually be fatal, and
the things they do if it returns after calling it are wildly unsafe.
Fixes: CVE-2020-10713
Signed-off-by: Peter Jones <pjones@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
---
grub-core/script/yylex.l | 4 ++--
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/grub-core/script/yylex.l b/grub-core/script/yylex.l
index 7b44c37b7..b7203c823 100644
--- a/grub-core/script/yylex.l
+++ b/grub-core/script/yylex.l
@@ -37,11 +37,11 @@
/*
* As we don't have access to yyscanner, we cannot do much except to
- * print the fatal error.
+ * print the fatal error and exit.
*/
#define YY_FATAL_ERROR(msg) \
do { \
- grub_printf (_("fatal error: %s\n"), _(msg)); \
+ grub_fatal (_("fatal error: %s\n"), _(msg));\
} while (0)
#define COPY(str, hint) \
--
2.11.0
- [SECURITY PATCH 00/28] Multiple GRUB2 vulnerabilities - BootHole, Daniel Kiper, 2020/07/29
- [SECURITY PATCH 02/28] safemath: Add some arithmetic primitives that check for overflow, Daniel Kiper, 2020/07/29
- [SECURITY PATCH 03/28] calloc: Make sure we always have an overflow-checking calloc() available, Daniel Kiper, 2020/07/29
- [SECURITY PATCH 04/28] calloc: Use calloc() at most places, Daniel Kiper, 2020/07/29
- [SECURITY PATCH 01/28] yylex: Make lexer fatal errors actually be fatal,
Daniel Kiper <=
- [SECURITY PATCH 05/28] malloc: Use overflow checking primitives where we do complex allocations, Daniel Kiper, 2020/07/29
- [SECURITY PATCH 06/28] iso9660: Don't leak memory on realloc() failures, Daniel Kiper, 2020/07/29
- [SECURITY PATCH 07/28] font: Do not load more than one NAME section, Daniel Kiper, 2020/07/29
- [SECURITY PATCH 08/28] gfxmenu: Fix double free in load_image(), Daniel Kiper, 2020/07/29
- [SECURITY PATCH 10/28] json: Avoid a double-free when parsing fails., Daniel Kiper, 2020/07/29
- [SECURITY PATCH 11/28] lzma: Make sure we don't dereference past array, Daniel Kiper, 2020/07/29
- [SECURITY PATCH 12/28] term: Fix overflow on user inputs, Daniel Kiper, 2020/07/29
- [SECURITY PATCH 13/28] udf: Fix memory leak, Daniel Kiper, 2020/07/29
- [SECURITY PATCH 14/28] multiboot2: Fix memory leak if grub_create_loader_cmdline() fails, Daniel Kiper, 2020/07/29
- [SECURITY PATCH 15/28] tftp: Do not use priority queue, Daniel Kiper, 2020/07/29