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Re: [PATCH v8 1/1] plainmount: Support plain encryption mode
From: |
Maxim Fomin |
Subject: |
Re: [PATCH v8 1/1] plainmount: Support plain encryption mode |
Date: |
Fri, 02 Dec 2022 17:11:23 +0000 |
------- Original Message -------
On Friday, December 2nd, 2022 at 0:00, Glenn Washburn
<development@efficientek.com> wrote:
>
>
> On Sat, 29 Oct 2022 17:40:42 +0000
> Maxim Fomin maxim@fomin.one wrote:
>
> > From 2b1d2deb3f2416cbc3e7d25cbc4141a3078eaf68 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
> > From: Maxim Fomin maxim@fomin.one
> > Date: Sat, 29 Oct 2022 18:18:58 +0100
> > Subject: [PATCH v8 1/1] plainmount: Support plain encryption mode
> >
> > This patch adds support for plain encryption mode (plain dm-crypt) via
> > new module/command named 'plainmount'.
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Maxim Fomin maxim@fomin.one
> >
> > Difference with v7:
>
>
> Daniel pointed this out, but this isn't a well formed patch. I do very
> much appreciate you adding the differences in as it made it easier to
> look at this. And my suggestion was to use --interdiff or --range-diff
> to the format-patch command, which would properly format things. It
> looks like you just copy pasted the output of "git diff v7 v8".
I will try to fix these issues in v9.
> I'm now compiling this patch and found a few compile issues below.
> You're compile testing this right?
First versions of the patch were tested in pure grub src directory.
Later I switched to directly making and installing GRUB package for
my distro using its source script syntax. It seems this process was
affected by environment options which hided these errors/warnings.
I test the patch on my two old laptops - one with UEFI BIOS (x86_64-efi)
and one is pre-UEFI (i386-pc). I was compiling i386-pc target too,
because otherwise the second laptop was unbootable. During i386-pc
compilation I noticed some warnings related to 'PRIuGRUB_XXX'
macros which were absent during efi target compilation. I noticed
that there are similar warnings in other modules and decided that
there are issues with 'PRIuGRUB_XXX' macros at i386-pc platform at
global level. In any case, these issues didn't cause compilation
fail in my working environment because I would not be able to compile
and boot pre-UEFI lap. Do you use -Werror?
P.S. Also thanks for suggested fixes.
Best regards,
Maxim Fomin
> > diff --git a/docs/grub.texi b/docs/grub.texi
> > index 377969984..34ca6b4f1 100644
> > --- a/docs/grub.texi
> > +++ b/docs/grub.texi
> > @@ -5138,13 +5138,13 @@ to generate password hashes. @xref{Security}.
> >
> > Setup access to the encrypted device in plain mode. Offset of the
> > encrypted -data at the device is specified in terms of 512 byte
> > sectors with the blocklist +data at the device is specified in terms
> > of 512 byte sectors using the blocklist syntax and loopback device.
> > The following example shows how to specify 1MiB offset:
> >
> > @example
> > loopback node (hd0,gpt1)2048+
> > -plainmount node
> > +plainmount node @var{...}
> > @end example
> >
> > The @command{plainmount} command can be used to open LUKS encrypted
> > volume @@ -5155,13 +5155,14 @@ The keyfile path parameter has higher
> > priority than the secret passphrase parameter and is specified with
> > the option @option{-d}. Password data obtained from keyfiles is not
> > hashed and is used directly as a cipher key. An optional offset of
> > password data in the keyfile can be specified with the option
> > -@option{-O} or directly with the option @option{-d} and GRUB
> > blocklist syntax. +@option{-O} or directly with the option
> > @option{-d} and GRUB blocklist syntax, +if the keyfile data can be
> > accessed from a device and is 512 byte aligned. The following example
> > shows both methods to specify password data in the keyfile at offset
> > 1MiB:
> >
> > @example
> > -plainmount -d (hd0,gpt1)2048+
> > -plainmount -d (hd0,gpt1)+ -O 1048576
> > +plainmount -d (hd0,gpt1)2048+ @var{...}
> > +plainmount -d (hd0,gpt1)+ -O 1048576 @var{...}
> > @end example
> >
> > If no keyfile is specified then the password is set to the string
> > specified diff --git a/grub-core/disk/plainmount.c
> > b/grub-core/disk/plainmount.c index 656c5d09f..85ada25bc 100644
> > --- a/grub-core/disk/plainmount.c
> > +++ b/grub-core/disk/plainmount.c
> > @@ -146,8 +146,12 @@ plainmount_configure_password (grub_cryptodisk_t
> > dev, const char *hash, dev->hash = grub_crypto_lookup_md_by_name
> > (hash); len = dev->hash->mdlen;
> >
> > - alloc_size = password_size >= key_size ? password_size : key_size;
> > - p = grub_zalloc (alloc_size + (alloc_size / len));
> > + alloc_size = grub_max (password_size, key_size);
> > + /*
> > + * Allocate buffer for the password and for an added prefix
> > character
> > + * for each hash round ('alloc_size' may not be a multiple of
> > 'len').
> > + */
> > + p = grub_zalloc (alloc_size + (alloc_size / len) + 1);
> > derived_hash = grub_zalloc (GRUB_CRYPTODISK_MAX_KEYLEN * 2);
> > if (p == NULL || derived_hash == NULL)
> > {
> > @@ -170,9 +174,10 @@ plainmount_configure_password (grub_cryptodisk_t
> > dev, const char *hash, if (len > size)
> > len = size;
> >
> > - grub_crypto_hash (dev->hash, dh, p, password_size);
> > + grub_crypto_hash (dev->hash, dh, p, password_size + round);
> > }
> > - grub_memcpy (key_data, derived_hash, GRUB_CRYPTODISK_MAX_KEYLEN *
> > 2);
> > + grub_memcpy (key_data, derived_hash, key_size);
> > +
> > exit:
> > grub_free (p);
> > grub_free (derived_hash);
> > ---
> > docs/grub.texi | 81 +++++++
> > grub-core/Makefile.core.def | 5 +
> > grub-core/disk/plainmount.c | 462
> > ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 3 files changed, 548
> > insertions(+) create mode 100644 grub-core/disk/plainmount.c
> >
> > diff --git a/docs/grub.texi b/docs/grub.texi
> > index 2d6cd8358..34ca6b4f1 100644
> > --- a/docs/grub.texi
> > +++ b/docs/grub.texi
> > @@ -4271,6 +4271,7 @@ you forget a command, you can run the command
> > @command{help}
> > * parttool:: Modify partition table entries
> > * password:: Set a clear-text password
> > * password_pbkdf2:: Set a hashed password
> > +* plainmount:: Open device encrypted in plain mode
> > * play:: Play a tune
> > * probe:: Retrieve device info
> > * rdmsr:: Read values from model-specific
> > registers @@ -4558,6 +4559,14 @@ function is supported, as Argon2 is
> > not yet supported.
> > Also, note that, unlike filesystem UUIDs, UUIDs for encrypted
> > devices must be specified without dash separators.
> > +
> > +Successfully decrypted disks are named as (cryptoX) and have
> > increasing numeration +suffix for each new decrypted disk. If the
> > encrypted disk hosts some higher level +of abstraction (like LVM2 or
> > MDRAID) it will be created under a separate device +namespace in
> > addition to the cryptodisk namespace. +
> > +Support for plain encryption mode (plain dm-crypt) is provided via
> > separate +@command{@pxref{plainmount}} command.
> > @end deffn
> >
> > @node cutmem
> > @@ -5120,6 +5129,78 @@ to generate password hashes. @xref{Security}.
> > @end deffn
> >
> > +@node plainmount
> > +@subsection plainmount
> > +
> > +@deffn Command plainmount device @option{-c} cipher @option{-s} key
> > size [@option{-h} hash] +[@option{-S} sector size] [@option{-p}
> > password] [@option{-u} uuid] +[[@option{-d} keyfile] [@option{-O}
> > keyfile offset]] +
> > +
> > +Setup access to the encrypted device in plain mode. Offset of the
> > encrypted +data at the device is specified in terms of 512 byte
> > sectors using the blocklist +syntax and loopback device. The
> > following example shows how to specify 1MiB +offset:
> > +
> > +@example
> > +loopback node (hd0,gpt1)2048+
> > +plainmount node @var{...}
> > +@end example
> > +
> > +The @command{plainmount} command can be used to open LUKS encrypted
> > volume +if its master key and parameters (key size, cipher, offset,
> > etc) are known. +
> > +There are two ways to specify a password: a keyfile and a secret
> > passphrase. +The keyfile path parameter has higher priority than the
> > secret passphrase +parameter and is specified with the option
> > @option{-d}. Password data obtained +from keyfiles is not hashed and
> > is used directly as a cipher key. An optional +offset of password
> > data in the keyfile can be specified with the option +@option{-O} or
> > directly with the option @option{-d} and GRUB blocklist syntax, +if
> > the keyfile data can be accessed from a device and is 512 byte
> > aligned. +The following example shows both methods to specify
> > password data in the +keyfile at offset 1MiB: +
> > +@example
> > +plainmount -d (hd0,gpt1)2048+ @var{...}
> > +plainmount -d (hd0,gpt1)+ -O 1048576 @var{...}
> > +@end example
> > +
> > +If no keyfile is specified then the password is set to the string
> > specified +by option @option{-p} or is requested interactively from
> > the console. In both +cases the provided password is hashed with the
> > algorithm specified by the +option @option{-h}. This option is
> > mandatory if no keyfile is specified, but +it can be set to
> > @samp{plain} which means that no hashing is done and such +password
> > is used directly as a key. +
> > +Cipher @option{-c} and keysize @option{-s} options specify the
> > cipher algorithm +and the key size respectively and are mandatory
> > options. Cipher must be specified +with the mode separated by a dash
> > (for example, @samp{aes-xts-plain64}). Key size +option @option{-s}
> > is the key size of the cipher in bits, not to be confused with +the
> > offset of the key data in a keyfile specified with the @option{-O}
> > option. It +must not exceed 1024 bits, so a 32 byte key would be
> > specified as 256 bits + +The optional parameter @option{-S} specifies
> > encrypted device sector size. It +must be at least 512 bytes long
> > (default value) and a power of 2. @footnote{Current +implementation
> > of cryptsetup supports only 512/1024/2048/4096 byte sectors}. +Disk
> > sector size is configured when creating the encrypted volume.
> > Attempting +to decrypt volumes with a different sector size than it
> > was created with will +not result in an error, but will decrypt to
> > random bytes and thus prevent +accessing the volume (in some cases
> > the filesystem driver can detect the presence +of a filesystem, but
> > nevertheless will refuse to mount it). + +By default new plainmount
> > devices will be given a UUID starting with
> > +'109fea84-a6b7-34a8-4bd1-1c506305a401' where the last digits are
> > incremented +by one for each plainmounted device beyond the first up
> > to 2^10 devices. + +All encryption arguments (cipher, hash, key size,
> > disk offset and disk sector +size) must match the parameters used to
> > create the volume. If any of them does +not match the actual
> > arguments used during the initial encryption, plainmount +will create
> > virtual device with the garbage data and GRUB will report unknown
> > +filesystem for such device. Writing data to such virtual device will
> > result in +the data loss if the underlying partition contained
> > desired data. +@end deffn +
> > +
> > @node play
> > @subsection play
> >
> > diff --git a/grub-core/Makefile.core.def b/grub-core/Makefile.core.def
> > index 98714c68d..f4153608c 100644
> > --- a/grub-core/Makefile.core.def
> > +++ b/grub-core/Makefile.core.def
> > @@ -1184,6 +1184,11 @@ module = {
> > common = disk/cryptodisk.c;
> > };
> >
> > +module = {
> > + name = plainmount;
> > + common = disk/plainmount.c;
> > +};
> > +
> > module = {
> > name = json;
> > common = lib/json/json.c;
> > diff --git a/grub-core/disk/plainmount.c b/grub-core/disk/plainmount.c
> > new file mode 100644
> > index 000000000..85ada25bc
> > --- /dev/null
> > +++ b/grub-core/disk/plainmount.c
> > @@ -0,0 +1,462 @@
> > +/*
> > + * GRUB -- GRand Unified Bootloader
> > + * Copyright (C) 2022 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
> > + *
> > + * GRUB is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
> > + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
> > published by
> > + * the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
> > + * (at your option) any later version.
> > + *
> > + * GRUB is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
> > + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
> > + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
> > + * GNU General Public License for more details.
> > + *
> > + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
> > + * along with GRUB. If not, see http://www.gnu.org/licenses/.
> > + /
> > +
> > +/ plaimount.c - Open device encrypted in plain mode. /
> > +
> > +#include <grub/cryptodisk.h>
> > +#include <grub/dl.h>
> > +#include <grub/err.h>
> > +#include <grub/extcmd.h>
> > +#include <grub/partition.h>
> > +#include <grub/file.h>
> > +
> > +
> > +GRUB_MOD_LICENSE ("GPLv3+");
> > +
> > +#define PLAINMOUNT_DEFAULT_SECTOR_SIZE 512
> > +#define PLAINMOUNT_DEFAULT_UUID
> > "109fea84-a6b7-34a8-4bd1-1c506305a400" +
> > +
> > +enum PLAINMOUNT_OPTION
> > + {
> > + OPTION_HASH,
> > + OPTION_CIPHER,
> > + OPTION_KEY_SIZE,
> > + OPTION_SECTOR_SIZE,
> > + OPTION_PASSWORD,
> > + OPTION_KEYFILE,
> > + OPTION_KEYFILE_OFFSET,
> > + OPTION_UUID
> > + };
> > +
> > +
> > +static const struct grub_arg_option options[] =
> > + {
> > + / TRANSLATORS: It's still restricted to this module only. /
> > + {"hash", 'h', 0, N_("Password hash"), 0, ARG_TYPE_STRING},
> > + {"cipher", 'c', 0, N_("Password cipher"), 0, ARG_TYPE_STRING},
> > + {"key-size", 's', 0, N_("Key size (in bits)"), 0, ARG_TYPE_INT},
> > + {"sector-size", 'S', 0, N_("Device sector size"), 0,
> > ARG_TYPE_INT},
> > + {"password", 'p', 0, N_("Password (key)"), 0, ARG_TYPE_STRING},
> > + {"keyfile", 'd', 0, N_("Keyfile path"), 0, ARG_TYPE_STRING},
> > + {"keyfile-offset", 'O', 0, N_("Keyfile offset"), 0,
> > ARG_TYPE_INT},
> > + {"uuid", 'u', 0, N_("Set device UUID"), 0, ARG_TYPE_STRING},
> > + {0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}
> > + };
> > +
> > +
> > +/ Cryptodisk setkey() function wrapper */
> > +static grub_err_t
> > +plainmount_setkey (grub_cryptodisk_t dev, grub_uint8_t key,
> > + grub_size_t size)
> > +{
> > + gcry_err_code_t code = grub_cryptodisk_setkey (dev, key, size);
> > + if (code != GPG_ERR_NO_ERROR)
> > + {
> > + grub_dprintf ("plainmount", "failed to set cipher key with
> > code: %d\n", code);
> > + return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT, N_("cannot set
> > specified key"));
> > + }
> > + return GRUB_ERR_NONE;
> > +}
> > +
> > +
> > +/ Configure cryptodisk uuid */
> > +static void plainmount_set_uuid (grub_cryptodisk_t dev, const char
> > user_uuid) +{
> > + grub_size_t pos = 0;
> > +
> > + / Size of user_uuid is checked in main func /
> > + if (user_uuid != NULL)
> > + grub_memcpy (dev->uuid, user_uuid, grub_strlen (user_uuid));
> > + else
> > + {
> > + /
> > + * Set default UUID. Last digits start from 1 and are
> > incremented for
> > + * each new plainmount device by snprintf().
> > + /
> > + grub_snprintf (dev->uuid, sizeof (dev->uuid)-1, "%36lx",
> > dev->id+1);
> > + while (dev->uuid[++pos] == ' ');
> > + grub_memcpy (dev->uuid, PLAINMOUNT_DEFAULT_UUID, pos);
> > + }
> > + COMPILE_TIME_ASSERT (sizeof (dev->uuid) >= sizeof
> > (PLAINMOUNT_DEFAULT_UUID)); +}
> > +
> > +
> > +/ Configure cryptodevice sector size (-S option) /
> > +static grub_err_t
> > +plainmount_configure_sectors (grub_cryptodisk_t dev, grub_disk_t
> > disk,
> > + grub_size_t sector_size)
> > +{
> > + dev->total_sectors = grub_disk_native_sectors (disk);
> > + if (dev->total_sectors == GRUB_DISK_SIZE_UNKNOWN)
> > + return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_DEVICE, N_("cannot determine
> > disk %s size"),
> > + disk->name);
> > +
> > + / Convert size to sectors */
> > + dev->log_sector_size = grub_log2ull (sector_size);
> > + dev->total_sectors = grub_convert_sector (dev->total_sectors,
> > + GRUB_DISK_SECTOR_BITS,
> > + dev->log_sector_size);
> > + if (dev->total_sectors == 0)
> > + return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_DEVICE,
> > + N_("cannot set specified sector size on disk
> > %s"),
> > + disk->name);
> > +
> > + grub_dprintf ("plainmount", "log_sector_size=%d, total_sectors=%"
> > + PRIuGRUB_SIZE"\n", dev->log_sector_size,
> > dev->total_sectors);
>
>
> s/PRIuGRUB_SIZE/PRIuGRUB_UINT64_T/
>
> This compiles fine on x86_64 as is, but fails to compile on i386.
>
> > + return GRUB_ERR_NONE;
> > +}
> > +
> > +
> > +/* Hashes a password into a key and stores it with the cipher. */
> > +static grub_err_t
> > +plainmount_configure_password (grub_cryptodisk_t dev, const char
> > *hash,
> > + grub_uint8_t *key_data, grub_size_t
> > key_size,
> > + grub_size_t password_size)
> > +{
> > + grub_uint8_t *derived_hash, dh;
> > + char p;
> > + unsigned int round, i, len, size;
> > + grub_size_t alloc_size;
> > + grub_err_t err = GRUB_ERR_NONE;
> > +
> > + / Support none (plain) hash /
> > + if (grub_strcmp (hash, "plain") == 0)
> > + {
> > + dev->hash = NULL;
> > + return err;
> > + }
> > +
> > + / Hash argument was checked at main func /
> > + dev->hash = grub_crypto_lookup_md_by_name (hash);
> > + len = dev->hash->mdlen;
> > +
> > + alloc_size = grub_max (password_size, key_size);
> > + /
> > + * Allocate buffer for the password and for an added prefix
> > character
> > + * for each hash round ('alloc_size' may not be a multiple of
> > 'len').
> > + /
> > + p = grub_zalloc (alloc_size + (alloc_size / len) + 1);
> > + derived_hash = grub_zalloc (GRUB_CRYPTODISK_MAX_KEYLEN * 2);
> > + if (p == NULL || derived_hash == NULL)
> > + {
> > + err = grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_MEMORY, "out of memory");
> > + goto exit;
> > + }
> > + dh = derived_hash;
> > +
> > + /
> > + * Hash password. Adapted from cryptsetup.
> > + *
> > https://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/cryptsetup/-/blob/main/lib/crypt_plain.c
> > + /
> > + for (round = 0, size = alloc_size; size; round++, dh += len, size
> > -= len)
> > + {
> > + for (i = 0; i < round; i++)
> > + p[i] = 'A';
> > +
> > + grub_memcpy (p + i, (char) key_data, password_size);
> > +
> > + if (len > size)
> > + len = size;
> > +
> > + grub_crypto_hash (dev->hash, dh, p, password_size + round);
> > + }
> > + grub_memcpy (key_data, derived_hash, key_size);
> > +
> > +exit:
> > + grub_free (p);
> > + grub_free (derived_hash);
> > + return err;
> > +}
> > +
> > +
> > +/ Read key material from keyfile */
> > +static grub_err_t
> > +plainmount_configure_keyfile (char *keyfile, grub_uint8_t *key_data,
> > + grub_size_t key_size, grub_size_t
> > keyfile_offset) +{
> > + grub_file_t g_keyfile = grub_file_open (keyfile,
> > GRUB_FILE_TYPE_NONE);
> > + if (g_keyfile == NULL)
> > + return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_FILE_NOT_FOUND, N_("cannot open
> > keyfile %s"),
> > + keyfile);
> > +
> > + if (grub_file_seek (g_keyfile, keyfile_offset) == (grub_off_t)-1)
> > + return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_FILE_READ_ERROR,
> > + N_("cannot seek keyfile at offset
> > %"PRIuGRUB_SIZE),
> > + keyfile_offset);
> > +
> > + if (key_size > (g_keyfile->size - keyfile_offset))
> > + return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT, N_("Specified key size
> > (%"
> > + PRIuGRUB_SIZE") is too small for keyfile size
> > (%"
> > + PRIuGRUB_SIZE") and offset
> > (%"PRIuGRUB_SIZE")"),
>
>
> Also, this compiles fine on x86_64 as is, but fails to compile on i386.
>
> The format code for g_keyfile->size should be PRIuGRUB_UINT64_T.
>
> > + key_size, g_keyfile->size, keyfile_offset);
> > +
> > + if (grub_file_read (g_keyfile, key_data, key_size) !=
> > (grub_ssize_t) key_size)
> > + return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_FILE_READ_ERROR, N_("error reading
> > key file"));
> > + return GRUB_ERR_NONE;
> > +}
> > +
> > +
> > +/* Plainmount command entry point */
> > +static grub_err_t
> > +grub_cmd_plainmount (grub_extcmd_context_t ctxt, int argc, char
> > **args) +{
> > + struct grub_arg_list *state = ctxt->state;
> > + grub_cryptodisk_t dev = NULL;
> > + grub_disk_t disk = NULL;
> > + const gcry_md_spec_t *gcry_hash;
> > + char *diskname, *disklast = NULL, *cipher, *mode, *hash, *keyfile,
> > *uuid;
> > + grub_size_t len, key_size, sector_size, keyfile_offset = 0,
> > password_size = 0;
> > + grub_err_t err;
> > + const char *p;
> > + grub_uint8_t key_data;
> > +
> > + if (argc < 1)
> > + return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT, N_("device name
> > required")); +
> > + / Check whether required arguments are specified /
> > + if (!state[OPTION_CIPHER].set || !state[OPTION_KEY_SIZE].set)
> > + return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT, "cipher and key size
> > must be set");
> > + if (!state[OPTION_HASH].set && !state[OPTION_KEYFILE].set)
> > + return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT, "hash algorithm must
> > be set"); +
> > + / Check hash /
> > + if (!state[OPTION_KEYFILE].set)
> > + {
> > + gcry_hash = grub_crypto_lookup_md_by_name
> > (state[OPTION_HASH].arg);
> > + if (!gcry_hash)
> > + return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_FILE_NOT_FOUND, N_("couldn't load
> > hash %s"),
> > + state[OPTION_HASH].arg);
> > +
> > + if (gcry_hash->mdlen > GRUB_CRYPTODISK_MAX_KEYLEN)
> > + return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT,
> > + N_("hash length %"PRIuGRUB_SIZE" exceeds
> > maximum %d bits"),
> > + gcry_hash->mdlen * GRUB_CHAR_BIT,
> > + GRUB_CRYPTODISK_MAX_KEYLEN * GRUB_CHAR_BIT);
> > + }
> > +
> > + / Check cipher mode /
> > + if (!grub_strchr (state[OPTION_CIPHER].arg,'-'))
> > + return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT,
> > + N_("invalid cipher mode, must be of format
> > cipher-mode")); +
> > + / Check password size /
> > + if (state[OPTION_PASSWORD].set && grub_strlen
> > (state[OPTION_PASSWORD].arg) >
> > +
> > GRUB_CRYPTODISK_MAX_PASSPHRASE)
> > + return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT,
> > + N_("password exceeds maximium size"));
> > +
> > + / Check uuid length */
> > + if (state[OPTION_UUID].set && grub_strlen (state[OPTION_UUID].arg)
> >
> > + sizeof (PLAINMOUNT_DEFAULT_UUID))
> > + return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT,
> > + N_("specified UUID exceeds maximum size"));
> > +
> > + /* Parse plainmount arguments */
> > + grub_errno = GRUB_ERR_NONE;
> > + keyfile_offset = state[OPTION_KEYFILE_OFFSET].set ?
> > + grub_strtoull (state[OPTION_KEYFILE_OFFSET].arg,
> > &p, 0) : 0;
> > + if (state[OPTION_KEYFILE_OFFSET].set &&
> > + (state[OPTION_KEYFILE_OFFSET].arg[0] == '\0' || *p != '\0' ||
> > + grub_errno != GRUB_ERR_NONE))
> > + return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT, N_("unrecognized
> > keyfile offset")); +
> > + sector_size = state[OPTION_SECTOR_SIZE].set ?
> > + grub_strtoull (state[OPTION_SECTOR_SIZE].arg, &p, 0)
> > :
> > + PLAINMOUNT_DEFAULT_SECTOR_SIZE;
> > + if (state[OPTION_SECTOR_SIZE].set &&
> > (state[OPTION_SECTOR_SIZE].arg[0] == '\0' ||
> > + p != '\0' || grub_errno !=
> > GRUB_ERR_NONE))
> > + return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT, N_("unrecognized
> > sector size")); +
> > + / Check key size */
> > + key_size = grub_strtoull (state[OPTION_KEY_SIZE].arg, &p, 0);
> > + if (state[OPTION_KEY_SIZE].arg[0] == '\0' || p != '\0' ||
> > + grub_errno != GRUB_ERR_NONE)
> > + return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT, N_("unrecognized key
> > size"));
> > + if ((key_size % GRUB_CHAR_BIT) != 0)
> > + return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT,
> > + N_("key size is not multiple of %d bits"),
> > GRUB_CHAR_BIT);
> > + key_size = key_size / GRUB_CHAR_BIT;
> > + if (key_size > GRUB_CRYPTODISK_MAX_KEYLEN)
> > + return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT,
> > + N_("key size %"PRIuGRUB_SIZE" exceeds maximum
> > %d bits"),
> > + key_size * GRUB_CHAR_BIT,
> > + GRUB_CRYPTODISK_MAX_KEYLEN * GRUB_CHAR_BIT);
> > +
> > + / Check disk sector size /
> > + if (sector_size < GRUB_DISK_SECTOR_SIZE)
> > + return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT,
> > + N_("sector size -S must be at least %d"),
> > + GRUB_DISK_SECTOR_SIZE);
> > + if ((sector_size & (sector_size - 1)) != 0)
> > + return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT,
> > + N_("sector size -S %"PRIuGRUB_SIZE" is not
> > power of 2"),
> > + sector_size);
> > +
> > + / Allocate all stuff here */
> > + hash = state[OPTION_HASH].set ? grub_strdup
> > (state[OPTION_HASH].arg) : NULL;
> > + cipher = grub_strdup (state[OPTION_CIPHER].arg);
> > + keyfile = state[OPTION_KEYFILE].set ?
> > + grub_strdup (state[OPTION_KEYFILE].arg) : NULL;
> > + dev = grub_zalloc (sizeof dev);
> > + key_data = grub_zalloc (GRUB_CRYPTODISK_MAX_PASSPHRASE);
> > + uuid = state[OPTION_UUID].set ? grub_strdup
> > (state[OPTION_UUID].arg) : NULL;
> > + if ((hash == NULL && state[OPTION_HASH].set) || cipher == NULL ||
> > dev == NULL ||
> > + (keyfile == NULL && state[OPTION_KEYFILE].set) || key_data ==
> > NULL ||
> > + (uuid == NULL && state[OPTION_UUID].set))
> > + {
> > + err = grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_MEMORY, "out of memory");
> > + goto exit;
> > + }
> > +
> > + / Copy user password from -p option /
> > + if (state[OPTION_PASSWORD].set)
> > + {
> > + /
> > + * Password from the '-p' option is limited to C-string.
> > + * Arbitrary data keys are supported via keyfiles.
> > + /
> > + password_size = grub_strlen (state[OPTION_PASSWORD].arg);
> > + grub_memcpy (key_data, state[OPTION_PASSWORD].arg,
> > password_size);
> > + }
> > +
> > + / Copy user UUID from -u option /
> > + if (state[OPTION_UUID].set)
> > + grub_memcpy (uuid, state[OPTION_UUID].arg,
> > + grub_strlen (state[OPTION_UUID].arg));
> > +
> > + / Set cipher mode (tested above) */
> > + mode = grub_strchr (cipher,'-');
> > + mode++ = '\0';
> > +
> > + / Check cipher /
> > + if (grub_cryptodisk_setcipher (dev, cipher, mode) != GRUB_ERR_NONE)
> > + {
> > + err = grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT, N_("invalid cipher
> > %s"), cipher);
> > + goto exit;
> > + }
> > +
> > + / Open SOURCE disk */
> > + diskname = args[0];
> > + len = grub_strlen (diskname);
> > + if (len && diskname[0] == '(' && diskname[len - 1] == ')')
> > + {
> > + disklast = &diskname[len - 1];
> > + *disklast = '\0';
> > + diskname++;
> > + }
> > + disk = grub_disk_open (diskname);
> > + if (disk == NULL)
> > + {
> > + if (disklast)
> > + disklast = ')';
> > + err = grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT, N_("cannot open disk
> > %s"), diskname);
> > + goto exit;
> > + }
> > +
> > + / Get password from console */
> > + if (!state[OPTION_KEYFILE].set && key_data[0] == '\0')
> > + {
> > + char part = grub_partition_get_name (disk->partition);
> > + grub_printf_ (N_("Enter passphrase for %s%s%s: "), disk->name,
> > + disk->partition != NULL ? "," : "",
> > + part != NULL ? part : N_("UNKNOWN"));
> > + grub_free (part);
> > +
> > + if (!grub_password_get ((char)key_data,
> > GRUB_CRYPTODISK_MAX_PASSPHRASE-1))
>
>
> Space between cast and key_data.
>
> > + {
> > + err = grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT, N_("error reading
> > password"));
> > + goto exit;
> > + }
> > + /*
> > + * Password from interactive console is limited to C-string.
> > + * Arbitrary data keys are supported via keyfiles.
> > + */
> > + password_size = grub_strlen (key_data);
>
>
> This caused x86_64 to fail to compile with sign mismatch. Should
> probably cast to char * as above.
>
> Glenn
>
> > + }
> > +
> > + /* Warn if hash and keyfile are both provided /
> > + if (state[OPTION_KEYFILE].set && state[OPTION_HASH].arg)
> > + grub_printf_ (N_("warning: hash is ignored if keyfile is
> > specified\n")); +
> > + / Warn if -p option is specified with keyfile /
> > + if (state[OPTION_PASSWORD].set && state[OPTION_KEYFILE].set)
> > + grub_printf_ (N_("warning: password specified with -p option "
> > + "is ignored if keyfile is provided\n"));
> > +
> > + / Warn of -O is provided without keyfile /
> > + if (state[OPTION_KEYFILE_OFFSET].set && !state[OPTION_KEYFILE].set)
> > + grub_printf_ (N_("warning: keyfile offset option -O "
> > + "specified without keyfile option -d\n"));
> > +
> > + grub_dprintf ("plainmount", "parameters: cipher=%s, hash=%s,
> > key_size=%"
> > + PRIuGRUB_SIZE", keyfile=%s, keyfile
> > offset=%"PRIuGRUB_SIZE"\n",
> > + cipher, hash, key_size, keyfile, keyfile_offset);
> > +
> > + err = plainmount_configure_sectors (dev, disk, sector_size);
> > + if (err != GRUB_ERR_NONE)
> > + goto exit;
> > +
> > + / Configure keyfile or password */
> > + if (state[OPTION_KEYFILE].set)
> > + err = plainmount_configure_keyfile (keyfile, key_data, key_size,
> > keyfile_offset);
> > + else
> > + err = plainmount_configure_password (dev, hash, key_data,
> > key_size, password_size);
> > + if (err != GRUB_ERR_NONE)
> > + goto exit;
> > +
> > + err = plainmount_setkey (dev, key_data, key_size);
> > + if (err != GRUB_ERR_NONE)
> > + goto exit;
> > +
> > + err = grub_cryptodisk_insert (dev, diskname, disk);
> > + if (err != GRUB_ERR_NONE)
> > + goto exit;
> > +
> > + dev->modname = "plainmount";
> > + dev->source_disk = disk;
> > + plainmount_set_uuid (dev, uuid);
> > +
> > +exit:
> > + grub_free (hash);
> > + grub_free (cipher);
> > + grub_free (keyfile);
> > + grub_free (key_data);
> > + grub_free (uuid);
> > + if (err != GRUB_ERR_NONE && disk)
> > + grub_disk_close (disk);
> > + if (err != GRUB_ERR_NONE && dev)
> > + grub_free (dev);
> > + return err;
> > +}
> > +
> > +static grub_extcmd_t cmd;
> > +GRUB_MOD_INIT (plainmount)
> > +{
> > + cmd = grub_register_extcmd ("plainmount", grub_cmd_plainmount, 0,
> > + N_("-c cipher -s key-size [-h hash]
> > [-S sector-size]"
> > + " [-o offset] [-p password] [-u uuid] "
> > + " [[-d keyfile] [-O keyfile offset]]
> > <SOURCE>"),
> > + N_("Open partition encrypted in plain
> > mode."),
> > + options);
> > +}
> > +
> > +GRUB_MOD_FINI (plainmount)
> > +{
> > + grub_unregister_extcmd (cmd);
> > +}
Re: [PATCH v8 1/1] plainmount: Support plain encryption mode, Maxim Fomin, 2022/12/02