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Re: Applying the GPG web-of-trust to Guix (was Re: Signed archives)
From: |
Ludovic Courtès |
Subject: |
Re: Applying the GPG web-of-trust to Guix (was Re: Signed archives) |
Date: |
Sat, 22 Feb 2014 00:10:22 +0100 |
User-agent: |
Gnus/5.130007 (Ma Gnus v0.7) Emacs/24.3 (gnu/linux) |
Mark H Weaver <address@hidden> skribis:
> Nikita Karetnikov <address@hidden> writes:
>
>> 3. How does a user get Hydra’s public key?
>>
>> 4. Will the entire cache be signed with a single key? (Mark, would you
>> like to add something?)
>
> FWIW, I think it's a mistake to have Hydra sign all binaries. Doing
> this would make Hydra a single-point of failure, and therefore a very
> worthwhile machine for someone to hack into.
Ah, agreed. But I think here “Hydra” was understood as “the build
machine behind hydra.gnu.org”, not specifically the machine at
hydra.gnu.org.
I think the first milestone will be to have signatures at all, but I
agree that what you describe is the next one.
> Instead, the binaries should be signed by the build machine that
> produced them. Hydra's job should simply be to collect the set of
> signatures that have been made on a given binary. Initially, the build
> machine's signature would be the only one,
If there are several build slaves behind hydra.gnu.org, the offload hook
could also collect signatures from those machines.
> but then users should be able to upload their own signatures to Hydra,
> after they have independently verified that a given derivation
> produces a given binary.
Agreed. (That would mean either modifying Hydra, or coming up with an
alternative system, I think.)
[...]
> As far as I can tell, the trust metric algorithms are directly
> applicable to Guix. I think that we should simply copy all of the
> concepts and algorithms from GPG.
The analogies you make indeed show which concepts could be applicable.
Technically, I think SPKI is more appropriate than OpenPGP here, because
OpenPGP is really about certifying bindings between email addresses and
human beings. (And ‘guix authenticate’ & co. already is very SPKI-like.)
In particular, as Niels mentioned recently, delegation in SPKI may help
address some of these issues: users could publish delegation
certificates for the ‘guix-import’ tag, meaning that A trusts B for the
purposes of importing archives signed by B.
>From there, I think we should try to come up with a road map, because
it’ll be hard to address all of that at once.
Ludo’.