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Re: Can unprivileged users corrupt the store with bad tarballs?
From: |
Mark H Weaver |
Subject: |
Re: Can unprivileged users corrupt the store with bad tarballs? |
Date: |
Fri, 04 Apr 2014 08:21:12 -0400 |
User-agent: |
Gnus/5.13 (Gnus v5.13) Emacs/24.3 (gnu/linux) |
address@hidden (Ludovic Courtès) writes:
> Mark H Weaver <address@hidden> skribis:
>
>> I was thinking about the security implications of giving out shell
>> access to one of my systems running Guix.
>>
>> When I ask guix-daemon to build package 'foo', it will use as an input
>> the source for package 'foo', usually a tarball. If the tarball is
>> already in the store, it won't download it again, because it is
>> effectively cached in the store.
>>
>> It is possible for another user on the same system to corrupt the cache,
>> but manually adding a bad tarball for 'foo' to the store, in such a way
>> that it would be used to build 'foo' when I ask for it?
>
> No.
>
> Tarballs are fixed-output derivations, so the hash of the tarball is
> known in advance. Thus, when building a package, you’re sure to use the
> tarball whose hash is in the recipe.
What about things that aren't fixed-output derivations? Are the results
of 'origin' forms with included patches or snippets "fixed-output"?
Could an unprivileged user add one of these to the store that wasn't
authentic?
Mark