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Re: [cp-patches] GNU Crypto and Jessie merge


From: Anthony Green
Subject: Re: [cp-patches] GNU Crypto and Jessie merge
Date: Mon, 09 Jan 2006 12:57:21 -0800

On Fri, 2006-01-06 at 12:12 -0800, Casey Marshall wrote:
> I'd propose playing it safe, and defining weak/strong as:
> 
>    Weak: all hash functions (SHA, MD5, etc.) and digital signature  
> algorithms (RSA, DSA). PRNGs based on hash functions (e.g. SHA1PRNG).
>    Strong: all ciphers, symmetric (AES, DES, etc.) and asymmetric  
> (RSA). All MACs (HMACs, OMAC, etc.). Key exchange functions (DH,  
> SRP). Cipher-based PRNGs (Fortuna, CSPRNG).
> 
> The wrinkle may be SASL. That API deals with authentication, not  
> crypto, so I don't think it is subject to these restrictions. We can  
> include SASL in the `strong' side, since it uses SRP, a generic key  
> exchange, but that would unnecessarily limit the usefulness of a  
> crypto-disabled Classpath.
> 
> Thoughts?

IANAL, and please don't consider this legal advice, but I did check with
a lawyer, who checked with another lawyer.  But, again, please don't
consider this legal advice.  That being said...

It seems that the only way to avoid an export submission is to eliminate
all confidentiality algorithms from the exported libraries (even 
under-40-bit confidentiality requires a submission to BIS that is quite 
similar to a review request, although BIS does not issue a CCATS for 56 
bit and under products).  Algorithms/protocols that can be used only for
authentication, signature and integrity do not require such a 
submission.  Thus, hash algorithms and PRNGs are OK, and MACs should 
also be OK (since they are one-way functions that cannot easily be used 
for confidentiality).  Likewise, assuming that SASL cannot be diverted 
for confidentiality uses, it would be OK to include in the libraries.

(and assume that this does not apply to exports from the US to their
restricted countries, which I'm told today includes Cuba, Iran, Libya,
North Korea, Sudan and Syria)

(and THIS INFORMATION COULD BE WRONG!  Please don't count on it!  Check
for yourself!)

That being said, having the code divided along these lines would be
convenient to me.

AG






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