Re: [BUG] Org may fetch remote content without asking user consent

[Max Nikulin]

On 08/02/2024 22:07, Ihor Radchenko wrote:
> Max Nikulin writes:
> > > Max Nikulin writes:
> > >
> > > > Browsers
> > > > have concept of same origin for applying security and privacy measures.
> >
> > Consider a file opened as /ssh:host:org/test.org that has
> >
> > #+setupfile: /ssh:host:org/include.org
> >
> > Formally it is a remote file, actually it resides on the same host as
> > the current document. Perhaps user consent is redundant.
>
> `org--safe-remote-resource-p' checks the containing Org file as well, in
> addition to #+included URL.

If my reading of the code is correct then it considers 
/ssh:host:org/include.org as safe if file:///ssh:host:org/test.org is 
added to `org-safe-remote-resources'. I was considering a case when 
there is no matching entry in `org-safe-remote-resources'. The user 
opens (C-x C-f) /ssh:host:org/test.org and likely it is enough to 
consider /ssh:host:org/include.org safe as well due to the same origin 
"/ssh:host:".

> > I am not confident in proper policy though. When some URI matches a
> > pattern in the safe list, likely it is suitable for files created by the
> > user and it is not really safe to allow it for a mail message attachment.
>
> May you elaborate?

Consider a user that has "#+include:" loaded from their own public 
repository and used for some babel computations. It is safe when 
included into user's files. I am not sure that it is safe for an org 
file opened through a link in the browser. Perhaps it is better to avoid 
included files in `org-safe-remote-resources' and add local directories 
there.