Re: [BUG] Org may fetch remote content without asking user consent

[Ihor Radchenko]

Max Nikulin <manikulin@gmail.com> writes:

> On 08/02/2024 22:07, Ihor Radchenko wrote:
>> 
>> `org--safe-remote-resource-p' checks the containing Org file as well, in
>> addition to #+included URL.
>
> If my reading of the code is correct then it considers 
> /ssh:host:org/include.org as safe if file:///ssh:host:org/test.org is 
> added to `org-safe-remote-resources'. I was considering a case when 
> there is no matching entry in `org-safe-remote-resources'. The user 
> opens (C-x C-f) /ssh:host:org/test.org and likely it is enough to 
> consider /ssh:host:org/include.org safe as well due to the same origin 
> "/ssh:host:".

I don't think so. And even if it is safe, I do not view it as a major
obstacle that will annoy users. There is an option to add the current
host to safe resources. No reason to layer complicated logic here -
simpler is more reliable.

>>> I am not confident in proper policy though. When some URI matches a
>>> pattern in the safe list, likely it is suitable for files created by the
>>> user and it is not really safe to allow it for a mail message attachment.
>> 
>> May you elaborate?
>
> Consider a user that has "#+include:" loaded from their own public 
> repository and used for some babel computations. It is safe when 
> included into user's files. I am not sure that it is safe for an org 
> file opened through a link in the browser. Perhaps it is better to avoid 
> included files in `org-safe-remote-resources' and add local directories 
> there.

What we may do is to add #+include + current file combination as safe
when user answers "!".

-- 
Ihor Radchenko // yantar92,
Org mode contributor,
Learn more about Org mode at <https://orgmode.org/>.
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