Re: [Sks-devel] SKS apocalypse mitigation

[Kristian Fiskerstrand]

[I previously responded to a specific message not related to this thread
but none the less... ]

On 03/23/2018 03:02 PM, Daniel Kahn Gillmor wrote:
> On Fri 2018-03-23 11:10:49 +0000, Andrew Gallagher wrote:
>> Updating the sets on each side is outside the scope of the recon
>> algorithm, and in SKS it proceeds by a sequence of client pull requests
>> to the remote server. This is important, because it opens a way to
>> implement object blacklists in a minimally-disruptive manner.
> 
> as both an sks server operator, and as a user of the pool, i do not want
> sks server operators to be in the position of managing a blacklist of
> specific data.

I would definitely agree with this

> 
>> The trick is to ensure that all the servers in the pool agree (to a
>> reasonable level) on the blacklist. This could be as simple as a file
>> hosted at a well known URL that each pool server downloads on a
>> schedule. The problem then becomes a procedural one - who hosts this,
>> who decides what goes in it, and what are the criteria?
> 
> This is a really sticky question, and i don't believe we have a global
> consensus on how this should be done.  I don't think this approach is
> feasible.
> 
>> Another effective method that does not require an ongoing management
>> process would be to blacklist all image IDs - this would also have many
>> other benefits (I say this as someone who once foolishly added an
>> enormous image to his key). This would cause a cliff edge in the number
>> of objects and, unless carefully choreographed, could result in a mass
>> failure of recon.
>>
>> One way to prevent this would be to add the blacklist of images in the
>> code itself during a version bump, but only enable the filter at some
>> timestamp well in the future - then a few days before the deadline,
>> increase the version criterion for the pool. That way, all pool members
>> will move in lockstep and recon interruptions should be temporary and
>> limited to clock skew.
> 
> I have no problems with blacklisting User Attribute packets from sks,
> and i like Andrew's suggestion of an implementation roll-out, followed
> by a "switch on" date for the filter.  I support this proposal.
> 

I agree with this as well, UAT generally have very limited value, so if
we introduce a filter to skip all UATs I'm all fine with making that a
requirement across severs in sks-keyservers.net pools. That isn't
something that restricts servers overall, but anyhow...

> I've had no luck getting new filters added to sks in the past [0], so
> i'd appreciate if someone who *does* have the skills/time/commit access
> could propose a patch for this.  I'd be happy to test it.


and here comes at least one of the issues, we're talking about a filter
that responds to a specific alteration; mainly we need to specify a
specific filter for a specific version and move from there, which can be
relatively easy given sufficient time.

> 
>       --dkg
> 
> [0] see for example 
> https://bitbucket.org/skskeyserver/sks-keyserver/pull-request/20/trim-local-certifications-from-any-handled
> 
> 
> 
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Kristian Fiskerstrand
Blog: https://blog.sumptuouscapital.com
Twitter: @krifisk
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