Re: [Sks-devel] SKS apocalypse mitigation

[brent s.]

On 03/25/2018 07:39 AM, Andrew Gallagher wrote:
> 
>> On 25 Mar 2018, at 03:37, Phil Pennock <address@hidden> wrote:
>>
>> Disappearance of
>> public keyservers would be a major inconvenience, but not a disaster.
> 
> Considering that keyservers are currently the only resilient way to 
> distribute key revocations, I’m not sure I would be so sanguine. If I’m 
> hosting my key exclusively on WKD or some other web based service, it would 
> be easy to prevent key revocations from being distributed. Granted, 
> revocation is imperfect at the best of times. But SKS is the best tool we 
> have at the moment, and the ecosystem would be severely damaged without it.
> 
> A
> 


I strongly and vehemently agree with both sides.


On a more serious note (albeit somewhat off-topic), and admittedly much
less deplorable a consideration - has the topic of copyrighted material
being distributed in keys (notably in the image data) come up at any point?

I suggest the same mechanism used in this approach should also be
applicable to those instances as well. Under DMCA in the US, keyserver
operators would be liable for this data (as we would be "distributing"
it) and responsible for its removal for compliance. I presume many other
countries have similar copyright laws/stipulations as well.




(Ironically, many if not all of agents for intellectual property
reclamation have PGP keys themselves on our servers, as one of the
stipulations for a DMCA's validity per § 512(c)(3)(A) (found here[0]) is
"A[n] ... electronic signature of a person authorized to act on behalf
of the owner of an exclusive right that is allegedly infringed.")


[0] https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/17/512

-- 
brent saner
https://square-r00t.net/
GPG info: https://square-r00t.net/gpg-info

signature.asc
Description: OpenPGP digital signature