Please, if you consider the canary...
Don't centralize it.
SKS is supposed to be decentralized.
If the power to ban someone from the public pool or from peers, or somewhere else, falls on a single person, then you are centralizing an important part of SKS.
SKS is already broken due to the attacks... If you centralize it, then it loses the only thing the other alternatives do not have.
Hendrik Visage wrote:
>
>
> > On 16 Aug 2019, at 18:01 , Andrew Gallagher <address@hidden> wrote:
> >
> > Signed PGP part
> > On 16/08/2019 16:13, Stefan Claas wrote:
> >> It should tell users that SKS operators share no dumps with 3rd
> >> parties for key analysis, i.e. social graph research etc. Those
> >> who publish a warrant canary can stay in the pool, while others
> >> who don't like to do so will be excluded from the pool.
> >
> > That's an utterly worthless exercise, considering that keyserver
> > operators can't vouch for any other keyserver operators, and any or all
> > of them could be three-letter agencies in disguise. You don't need a
> > warrant to scrape publicly-available data, and you don't need to be in
> > the pool to sync with pool keyservers.
>
> Not to mention that the latest dumps are publicly available for syncing
> purposes...
This is well known and Kristian could exclude this person from the pool.
Regards
Stefan
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