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Ethics (was: Re: Directories traversal (was Re: the deadly hypercube of


From: Marcus Brinkmann
Subject: Ethics (was: Re: Directories traversal (was Re: the deadly hypercube of death, or: handling permissions)
Date: Fri, 28 Apr 2006 16:51:27 +0200
User-agent: Wanderlust/2.14.0 (Africa) SEMI/1.14.6 (Maruoka) FLIM/1.14.7 (Sanjō) APEL/10.6 Emacs/21.4 (i486-pc-linux-gnu) MULE/5.0 (SAKAKI)

At Fri, 28 Apr 2006 08:34:27 -0400,
"Jonathan S. Shapiro" <address@hidden> wrote:
> 
> On Fri, 2006-04-28 at 14:01 +0200, Bas Wijnen wrote:
> > I think it's a very bad idea to give the system administrator read access to
> > all your files, just because he wants to make backups.  There already is a
> > form which can be used for recovering, because we have a persistent system.
> > Making a backup should simply consist of copying the snapshot.
> 
> I agree that the administrator should not be able to read my files
> unless I give permission.
> 
> Allowing the system administrator to copy the snapshot is equivalent to
> allowing them to browse the raw disk.
> 
> If you need a personal backup, and you do not want the administrator to
> be able to read your files, then what you want is a way that (a) the
> administrator can make a copy, but (b) it will be encrypted using a
> private key known to you before the bits are disclosed to the
> administrator.
> 
> Unfortunately Marcus is terribly confused, and believes that the
> mechanisms needed to support this are intrinsically evil. Any system
> that can support this successfully can also support DRM.

(1) I am not confused, and that means I am not terribly confused either.

(2) I never said I believe that it is "intrinsically evil".  I think I
    never said this about anything in my whole life, so I am quite
    sure about that.  I do not even believe in the concept of
    something being "intrinsically evil".

(3) I will speak for myself, but not exhaustively at this time.  I
    will choose the time and conditions to defend my position.

(4) The system administrator (and the machine owner, who is more
    important in this regard) is a very special type of user.  In
    particular, he is a domain expert.  A domain expert can easily
    make a decision that reduces their own freedom without introducing
    a security risk.  As such, the evaluation _may_ be different for
    the system administrator than it is for a normal user.

(5) There is no legitimation to be derived from talking about these
    issues in the abstract.  If the administrator and/or the machine
    owner should have access to the user's files or not depends on who
    they are and what they do.  Privacy is neither an automatic nor an
    absolute right if people get together and do something
    collectively.

Thanks,
Marcus





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